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ABSTRACT 
 The chronic underfunding of numerous public pensions, along with historic 
capital-market setbacks, has created a public pension debt crisis throughout much of the 
nation. The depth of this crisis makes pension reform inevitable, and that reform will 
transform the nature of public-servant compensation in the coming decades. This thesis 
explores the impact pension reform will have on the effectiveness of public-sector 
organizations with homeland security missions. To approach this issue, this thesis draws 
on existing academic literature from a wide range of disciplines, including economics, 
public administration, organizational behavior, sociology, and social psychology. 
Emerging from the research is a clear recognition that pension reform will change 
employee behavior, organizational culture, and the market for human capital through 
second- and third-order effects. Exactly how such change will play out is not so clear. 
The thesis turns to scenario-planning techniques to synthesize the diverse literature and 
provide plausible responses to the question of what pension reform’s impact will be 
within the homeland security domain. The thesis offers three different future outcomes 
and recommends more robust, collaborative scenario-planning initiatives for which the 
thesis itself provides a useful launching pad. 
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The public sector is in a financial bind. Aggregate pension liabilities exceed assets 
at all levels of government, and the magnitude of the disparity is staggering. Reforms from 
the early 1980s put the federal civil servant pension system on a path to financial 
sustainability, yet despite the early and proactive nature of those reforms, the federal 
system’s unfunded liabilities are not projected to improve significantly for another two 
decades.1 At the state and local level, the situation remains daunting. Even under the 
optimistic investment return assumptions used by pension fund managers, the disparity 
between liabilities and assets is over a trillion dollars for state and local pensions.2 Worse, 
despite strong investment performance this decade, aggregate state and local pension debt 
remains at historically high levels, according to Pew Charitable Trusts.3 With or without 
future shocks to the capital markets, a significant proportion of pension funds appear on a 
path to insolvency. One way or another—either through proactive pension reform or 
something more drastic—the pension promises being made to most public servants are 
going to change.  
For many, the story begins and ends there. That is, for many observers anxious 
about pension debt and reform, the concern lies solely with resolving the financial 
imbalances. The dilemma for the public sector, however, goes beyond fiscal issues because 
reform measures alter employee incentives embedded in traditional pension structures. 
Those incentives drive employee behavior and career choices as well as influence 
organizational culture. In turn, pension reform will impact organizational effectiveness 
through second- and third-order effects. If these effects are deleterious for organizations 
                                                 
1 Office of Personnel Management, Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund Annual Report: 
Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 2016 (Washington, DC: Office of Personnel Management, 2017), 32–33, 
https://www.opm.gov/about-us/budget-performance/other-reports/fy-2016-csrdf-annual-report.pdf. 
2 “U.S. Pension Tracker,” Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, accessed August 13, 2019, 
http://us.pensiontracker.org/. 
3 Pew Charitable Trusts, The State Pension Funding Gap: 2017 (Philadelphia: Pew, 2019), 6, 15, 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2019/06/statepensionfundinggap.pdf. 
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with homeland security missions, then pension reform and the implications thereof warrant 
the attention of homeland security leaders. Indeed, this dilemma warrants the attention of 
anyone who depends on public-sector organizations to succeed in critical missions related 
to public safety, disaster management, and public security.  
These concerns raise the question of what impact pension reform will have on the 
homeland security enterprise. To respond to such a complex question, this thesis employs 
scenario-planning techniques. Key steps in the development of scenarios involve the 
identification and categorization of factors that will drive future outcomes. The research 
effort behind this thesis revealed relevant factors from myriad academic disciplines, 
including economics, public administration, organizational behavior, sociology, and social 
psychology. Not surprisingly, robust literature from economics explores the influence of 
financial incentives on employee behavior. Applicable literature from the other disciplines 
exists but seems sparse by comparison. 
Pension-reform measures wean public servants and the jurisdictions that employ 
them off the traditional, defined-benefit pension structure. They do this by reducing the 
value of pension annuities or eliminating such annuities altogether. Viewing this move 
primarily through an economic prism, existing research suggests pension reform will 
impact the following:  
 Turnover and employee retention 
 Labor sorting patterns that drive the quality of workers in homeland security 
jobs 
 Incidence of corruption and on-the-job malfeasance  
 Increased wage-based competition among employers for human capital  
The implications in these areas represent the second-order effects of pension 
reform. Third-order effects result from the increased reliance on wage-based competition 
for human capital. Such competition stands to decompress the wage structure of reforming 
organizations, which in turn has implications for worker motivation and organizational 
culture. These second- and third-order effects introduce factors that should be incorporated 
xix 
into any scenario-planning exercise on the implications of pension reform. Other factors 
emanate from non-economic perspectives that could short-circuit these second- and third-
order effects. Existing academic literature suggests these pertain to the unique motivations 
of public servants and the work preferences or values of emerging generational cohorts. 
Such mitigating factors deserve attention, along with broader trends and uncertainties that 
may be exogenous to the dynamics surrounding employee financial incentives and pension 
reform.  
In line with common scenario-planning techniques, relevant factors can be 
categorized as predetermined elements—the second- and third-order effects of pension 
reform—or critical uncertainties. The following tables summarize the factors used in the 
scenario exercise of this thesis:  
 




Turnover Effects: The degree to which pension reform increases 
employee turnover.  
2nd order 
Human Capital Effects: The human capital–related implications from 
pension reform. These include the quality of entry-level workers, the 
effectiveness of line employees, and the capabilities of mid- and upper-
level management. 
2nd order 
Wage-Based Competition: The extent to which homeland security 
organizations need to enhance wages and disperse their pay structures to 
attract and retain human capital ex post to pension reform.  
2nd order 
Motivation Crowding: The sensitivity of workers to the crowding out of 
intrinsic and prosocial motivation in the face of enhanced wages. 
3rd order 
Intraorganizational Pay Structure Effects: Employee morale and 
collaboration-related maladies associated with dispersed pay structures and 
employee perceptions about the fairness underlying their compensation.  
3rd order 
Corruption Deterrence Effects: The degree to which the removal of 
pension-related deterrence diminishes the professionalism and ethical 




Table 2.   Critical Uncertainties 
 
Critical Uncertainties Influence on Future Outcomes 
Market Performance: Capital market 
investment performance and volatility over the 
next two to three decades.  
Will drive the type and degree of 
pension reform necessary to prevent 
pension fund insolvency.  
Pension Politics: Legislative and macro-level 
policy outcomes that dictate public pension 
structures.  
Will define the options available to 
jurisdictions seeking to reform their 
pension systems. 
Political Finance of Wage Rivalry: Micro-
level political vectors and fiscal limitations 
related to compensation for public employees.  
Will determine how individual 
jurisdictions engage in wage-based 
competition for human capital. 
Sociological Influences: Social trends 
influencing the choices, attitudes, and 
motivational composition of the workforce.  
May mitigate the effectiveness of 
enhanced wages or otherwise short-
circuit the predetermined elements.  
Technological Evolution: The potential for 
technological innovations to supplant human 
capital in the homeland security organizations.  
Could influence the degree to which 
human capital and organizational 
culture matter in determining 
organizational effectiveness.  
 
A scenario planner can develop different future outcomes by varying the salience 
of different factors and imagining how critical uncertainties may change baseline 
assumptions. For this exercise, the author envisioned three scenarios delineating how 
things could get better, worse, or weird in the future. The scenarios presented describe the 
status of the homeland security enterprise a quarter century from now, in 2045. The 
outcomes can be summarized as follows:  
Scenario 1: Centers of Excellence and Centers of Disarray. It depicts a plausible 
future where all the factors play out in a banal, almost expected manner. As a result, 
the homeland security enterprise trifurcates by 2045 into first-, second-, and third-
tier employers with a commensurate pecking order in terms of mission 
effectiveness. Things get worse under this scenario because a high proportion of 
homeland security organizations suffer a loss of effectiveness ex post to pension 
reform.  
Scenario 2: A Pension Revolution Unshackles the Labor Market. It depicts a 
plausible future where developments in the capital market initiate a wholesale 
abandonment of the public sector’s defined-benefit pension regime. Things get 
better under this scenario because the benefits of labor mobility throughout the 
homeland security enterprise are realized by 2045, and non-economic leveling 
effects prevent the kind of stark divisions found in the first scenario.  
  
xxi 
Scenario 3: When a Jurisdiction Has to Hire a Rock Star. It depicts a plausible 
future where technological developments create a new class of worker, and the 
persistence of traditional pensions in some quarters complicates the pursuit of 
human capital for employers. Things get weird in this scenario because traditional 
pensions introduce perverse incentives for this new class of employees, and factors 
related to organizational behavior provide a comparative advantage to employers 
with insolvent pension funds.  
A central message that emerges from the research and scenario analysis is that 
pension reform will change the homeland security enterprise, forcing organizations in the 
enterprise to adapt. Scenario planning can help by enabling leaders to plan for undesirable 
outcomes and empower them to leverage desired effects. That is not to suggest that the 
particulars of the scenarios presented here will do that. Rather, it is through a participative 
process of developing scenarios that leaders can gain foresight and engage in what Kees 
Van der Heijden calls “strategic conversations.”4 Accordingly, the main recommendation 
here is for further research into the problems presented by pension reform, and the thesis 
posits that such research will be most valuable for homeland security if it engages 
collaborative teams of practitioners and emerging leaders in organizations with homeland 
security missions. This thesis could facilitate such efforts through its exploration of existing 
academic research and its synthesis of factors that will drive future outcomes. 
                                                 
4 Kees Van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation (Chichester, England: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1996), viii–ix. 
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In April 2016, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform sent a 
letter to the Director of the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) offering “to assist USSS as it 
attempts to address the historic attrition problem.”1 This remarkable letter highlights the 
negative impact the Secret Service’s “staffing crisis” has had on morale, and it bemoans 
the idea that this “low morale manifests in further attrition.” The letter’s signatories—Chair 
Representative Jason Chaffetz (R, Utah) and Representative Elijah Cummings (D, 
Maryland)—claimed, “The ability of USSS to satisfy its zero-fail mission of protecting the 
President and other protectees depends on its staffing health.” A year and a half earlier, 
Pulitzer-winning coverage of the Secret Service by Carol Leonnig identified the abrupt 
switch in 1983 from a law-enforcement-type retirement plan to a “less generous federal 
retirement plan” as the seminal factor leading to the service’s current staffing problems and 
overall decline.2  
If Leonnig’s reporting is correct, then the predicament in which the Secret Service 
finds itself—or, more precisely, the predicament in which the nation finds itself regarding 
the Secret Service—should concern everyone given the perilous financial condition of 
many public-sector pension funds. After all, if retirement plan changes could lead to a crisis 
in a high-profile organization such as the Secret Service, then one must wonder whether 
similar crises lie in store for the nation elsewhere. Increasingly, jurisdictions at all levels 
of government are reforming employee pension systems in the interest of financial 
solvency, so the potential consequences go well beyond this one federal entity. Should 
pension reform set in motion a dynamic that leads to metastatic staffing problems 
throughout the public sector, then the effectiveness of entities on which the nation relies to 
                                                 
1 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, “Letter to the Director of the U.S. Secret 
Service,” April 19, 2016, https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/2016-04-19-JEC-EEC-
to-Clancy-USSS-Staffing.pdf.  
2 Carol Leonnig, “Critical Decisions after 9/11 Led to Slow, Steady Decline in Quality for Secret 




ensure its defense, safety, and resiliency will diminish. This, in turn, stands to diminish or 
compromise the state of homeland security itself.  
Herein lie the problem space and central hypothesis this research effort considers: 
whether public pension reform will ultimately lead to retention and related problems for 
the governmental organizations engaged in and critical to homeland security. Should this 
problem manifest, the resulting loss of critical human capital will negatively impact the 
continuity of operations in and the organizational effectiveness of those entities.3 In 
addition, pension reform will alter an organization’s compensation structure, and such 
change may also impact the norms, values, and behavior of the organization itself.4 The 
thrust of this thesis is to synthesize disparate areas of prior academic research to illuminate 
the implications of pension reform for homeland security. Such an exploration may enable 
the nation’s leaders to mitigate negative effects or leverage positive ones. In turn, this will 
serve to further the nation’s broad-based, post-9/11 priority on homeland security. 
As a starting point, consider the generally tenuous financial condition of public 
employee pension systems throughout the United States. The remarkable “pension debt” 
of these systems makes reform or overhaul seem prudent, necessary, and inevitable.5 At 
the federal level, fiscal realities led to fundamental changes in the civil servant retirement 
system four decades ago. Such change, however, has only just begun to take hold at the 
state and local government (SLG) level. Given that there are thousands of different SLG 
pension systems in the United States, the timing, severity, and specific measures taken in 
the name of pension reform will vary in uncertain ways. In aggregate, however, the type of 
pension system overhaul underway involves a shift away from defined-benefit plans to less 
                                                 
3 Llorens succinctly defines human capital as “the knowledge, skills or abilities possessed by an 
individual or workforce.” Jared J. Llorens, “Fiscally Driven Compensation Reform and Threats to Human 
Capital Capacity in the Public Sector,” International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior 18, no. 
1 (Spring 2015): 23. 
4 For a discussion on how employee compensation and rewards systems influence organizational 
norms and values, see Jeffrey Kerr and John W. Slocum Jr., “Managing Corporate Culture through Reward 
Systems,” Academy of Management Executive 1, no. 2 (May 1987): 99–108. 
5 “U.S. Pension Tracker,” Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, accessed August 13, 2019, 
http://us.pensiontracker.org/. This site contains the most current available data showing the debt of public 
employee pension systems.  
3 
lucrative annuities or defined-contribution retirement accounts. The effect will be to shift 
financial risk from the employer to the employee.6 More significantly, such reform 
involves a change from retirement instruments that incentivize employee retention to 
instruments that are “portable” in that they allow employees to move from one employer 
to the next without financial penalty.  
Applying the concepts of personnel economics pioneered by economist Edward 
Lazear, such a change in the incentive structure should drive employee turnover higher.7 
This inference from Lazear’s economic theories is supported by empirical evidence from 
civil service turnover rates following a fundamental change in the federal pension system.8 
This thesis, however, looks beyond turnover rates and predictions drawn from Lazear’s 
work. It considers whether the potential loss of human capital will be evenly distributed 
within public-sector entities or whether individuals with higher levels of education are 
more vulnerable. To be thorough, this thesis also examines the potential implications such 
turnover will have for the effectiveness of the organizations involved; it explores whether 
they stand to suffer a “brain drain” or other maladies beyond a mere increase in turnover.  
While economics offers compelling insights about the human capital implications 
of pension reform, other academic disciplines offer counterarguments and caveats vis-à-vis 
the application of economic theory to the behavior of public servants. Accordingly, this 
thesis looks to scholarly work from fields such as public administration, sociology, social 
psychology, and organizational behavior for additional insight into how pension reform 
may ultimately impact the effectiveness of organizations with homeland security 
                                                 
6 Keith Brainard and Alex Brown, Significant Reforms to State Retirement Systems, Spotlight On 
(Lexington, KY: National Association of State Retirement Administrators, 2016), 6, http://www.nasra. 
org/files/Spotlight/Significant%20Reforms.pdf.  
7 Edward Lazear, “Pensions and Deferred Benefits as Strategic Compensation,” Industrial Relations: A 
Journal of Economy and Society 29, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 263–264, 269–275; Edward P. Lazear and 
Kathryn L. Shaw, “Personnel Economics: The Economist’s View of Human Resources,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 21, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 91–93, 102–105, https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.21.4.91. 
8 Gregory B. Lewis and Rayna L. Stoycheva, “Does Pension Plan Structure Affect Turnover Patterns?” 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 26, no. 4 (October 2016): 787–799, https://doi.org/ 
10.1093/jopart/muw035.  
4 
missions.9 This research effort draws from an array of academic disciplines to highlight 
consequences of pension reform that may be underappreciated to date. Though tangible 
solutions are elusive, the research and synthesis presented here should at least guide current 
and future leaders to confront the pitfalls of pension reform that reportedly have afflicted 
the Secret Service.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What impact will pension reform have on public-sector organizations with 
homeland security missions? 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This is a complex question. It embodies what Rittel and Webber would call a 
“wicked problem” that defies a definitive or testable solution.10 Responding to it will 
necessarily involve some conjecture, so the tenor of this thesis is speculative in nature. 
Even the subject’s starting point—the commonly held predictions about the nature of 
public sector pension reform—involves some degree of speculation. Scenario planning, as 
pioneered by Herman Kahn for the U.S. Air Force after World War II and Pierre Wack at 
Royal Dutch/Shell starting in the mid-1960s, offers a disciplined way to work through 
wicked problems that involve such uncertainty.11 This thesis employs a scenario-planning 
approach to address the research question.  
                                                 
9 Organizational effectiveness in the context of this thesis refers to the ability of an organization to 
achieve outcomes. For an alternative definition and list of other references that provide a more complete 
discussion of organizational effectiveness in both for-profit and nonprofit settings, see David Jacobs, 
“Toward a Theory of Mobility and Behavior in Organizations: An Inquiry into the Consequences of Some 
Relationships between Individual Performance and Organizational Success,” American Journal of 
Sociology 87, no. 3 (November 1981): 686–687, https://doi.org/10.1086/227500. 
10 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy 
Sciences 4, no. 2 (June 1973): 160–161, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01405730; “What’s a Wicked 
Problem?” Stony Brook University, accessed July 31, 2019, https://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/ 
wicked-problem/about/What-is-a-wicked-problem. 
11 Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 4–9; Kees Van der 
Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation (Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), 
15–16.  
5 
Within the Department of Homeland Security, scenario planning has been used by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Through FEMA’s Strategic 
Foresight Initiative, scenario-based strategic planning has been used to conceive, develop, 
and delineate a “range of possible alternative futures, known as scenarios.”12 In the context 
of FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative, scenarios are “detailed, systematically developed 
descriptions of operating environments that an organization may face over the next 20 years 
or longer.”13 In the context of this thesis, the timeframe is the same, and the scenarios 
describe the environment as it pertains to human capital, employee behavior, and 
organizational culture for organizations with homeland security missions at all levels of 
government.  
It should be emphasized that the goal in using scenarios is not to quantitatively 
forecast outcomes or to stipulate “accurate pictures of tomorrow” in the words of Peter 
Schwartz; the intent is to provide policymakers with tools for improved decision making.14 
Kees Van der Heijden frames the intent of this approach as follows: “Scenario planning 
relies not on probability but on qualitative causal thinking. As such it appeals more to the 
intuitive needs of the typical decision-makers in their search for enhanced understanding 
of the changing structures in society.”15 Therefore, the value of answers provided through 
this thesis lies less in the predictive nature of the individual scenarios and more in the 
identification, exploration, and synthesis of potential second- and third-order effects 
stemming from pension reform.16  
                                                 
12 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Foresight Workshop How-to Guide (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015), 2, https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/ 
103643. 
13 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2. 
14 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 4–9. 
15 Van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, 15. 
16 Michael G. Miller, “Thinking about Second & Third Order Effects: A Sample (and Simple) 
Methodology,” IO Sphere, summer 2006, 36–39, http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_ 
summer06_miller.pdf.  
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The key to this kind of analysis lies in the identification of driving forces—
factors—that determine possible future outcomes. In Schwartz’s view, factors may emerge 
from a broad array of influences, which may be social, technological, economic, political, 
or environmental.17 Further, under traditional scenario analysis techniques, such factors, 
once identified, are categorized as either predetermined elements or critical uncertainties 
to facilitate in the construction of scenarios.18 Pierre Wack defines predetermined elements 
as “those events that have already occurred (or that almost certainly will occur) but whose 
consequences have not yet unfolded.”19 While the existence of so-called predetermined 
elements seems to suggest that a scenario-planning exercise could produce a predictive 
result, Van der Heijden cautions that “while the overall direction of movement may be 
predetermined the specific outcomes may be highly uncertain.”20 The bulk of the research 
and analysis in this thesis is concerned with the exploration of predetermined elements. 
The identification of critical uncertainties and the weighting of individual factors are 
reserved for the conclusive chapters.  
In common practice, scenario planning and analysis involve the collaborative effort 
of a team of people with subject-matter expertise from diverse disciplines.21 One reason 
for this is to incorporate informed intuition or “gut feel” into the development of 
scenarios.22 This exposes a potential shortcoming for the scenario analysis presented here 
because, by definition, a thesis is an individual effort. Mitigating this shortcoming, 
however, is the author’s commitment to draw from a diverse array of perspectives. 
                                                 
17 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 106–113. 
18 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 113–123; Van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic 
Conversation, 86–88; Pierre Wack, “Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead,” Harvard Business Review 63, 
no. 5 (October 1985): 76–77; Pierre Wack, “Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids,” Harvard Business Review 63, 
no. 6 (December 1985): 140. 
19 Wack, “Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead,” 77.  
20 Van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, 87. 
21 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 108, 234; Hannah Kosow and Robert Gaßner, Methods of 
Future and Scenario Analysis: Overview, Assessment, and Selection Criteria, Studies 39 (Bonn, Germany: 
German Development Institute, 2008), 1. 
22 Kosow and Gaßner, Methods of Future and Scenario Analysis, 63. 
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Furthermore, because the author of this thesis is not an expert in the fields of inquiry—not 
an actuary, financier, public administrator, or social scientist—the sources of research and 
data used in this thesis come predominantly from peer-reviewed academic literature.23 This 
seems the most effective way to develop credible scenarios.  
Kosow and Gaßner stipulate that identifying the target audience is an essential 
element for any scenario analysis.24 For this thesis, the primary target audience is current 
policymakers and practitioners (i.e., future leaders) in public-sector organizations with 
homeland security mission sets (hereinafter “the homeland security enterprise”). These 
career public servants will be positioned to adapt this enterprise as pension reform takes 
shape. In Schwartz’s words, “Scenarios can help people make better decisions—usually 
difficult decisions—that they would otherwise miss or deny.”25 Thus, to the extent that this 
thesis resonates with this target audience, the research and analysis presented here may 
ultimately have positive implications for the security of the homeland. For similar reasons, 
a second target audience is elected leaders and political appointees, particularly at the state 
and local levels of government. Not only do these officials hold the ultimate responsibility 
of overseeing the homeland security enterprise, but they also oversee the pension funds 
that compensate the enterprise’s workforce; this gives them the unique opportunity to guide 
the trajectory of pension reform in ways that may minimize its potential pitfalls. 
As mentioned, when contemplating scenarios, Schwartz suggests looking for 
factors with social, technological, economic, political, or environmental origins. For this 
subject, the most relevant sources seem to originate from (1) financial constraints, (2) labor 
market dynamics, and (3) organizational behavior. Accordingly, the thesis is organized 
along these lines with Chapter III exploring factors emanating from finance, accounting, 
                                                 
23 While the author is not a credentialed expert, his professional and academic background provides 
some perspective. That background includes masters-level academic work in business administration and 
professional experience in both the private sector (general management consulting and the airline industry) 
and the public sector. As an Air Force officer and dual-status military technician (per 10 U.S.C. § 10216), 
the author has direct personal experience with two federal-level retirement systems—civil service and 
military—and experience leading employees covered under each of these.  
24 Kosow and Gaßner, Methods of Future and Scenario Analysis, 2–3. 
25 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 4. 
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and actuarial science; Chapter IV exploring factors related to labor economics; and Chapter 
V exploring organizational behavior factors. These three chapters may hold unique value 
for the target audience because they delineate consequences of pension reform that people 
outside of academia might not consider. The thesis closes with a scenario exercise 
presented in its conclusive chapters.  
C. HOMELAND SECURITY FOCUS 
A profound concern over the future effectiveness of the homeland security 
enterprise underlies this research effort. Readers should keep the following points in mind 
in subsequent chapters:  
1. The nation relies predominantly on public-sector organizations to provide 
for the safety, security, and resiliency of its communities. In short, it is 
public employees who bear the primary responsibility for homeland 
security.  
2. The vast majority of public servants participate in defined-benefit (DB) 
pension plans, which promise a predefined income stream upon the 
completion of a career. As of March 2017, the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
reports that 74 percent of SLG public-sector workers participate in such 
plans versus just 15 percent in the private sector.26  
3. A significant portion of a career public employees’ post-retirement and 
overall lifetime compensation is tied up in such DB arrangements. For 
example, under typical police and firefighter pension plans, 30-year career 
employees expect to receive an income equivalent of 60–90 percent of 
their final salary, and employees at the upper end of this band do not have 
                                                 
26 Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in the United States, 
March 2017, Bulletin 2787 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017), Table 2, https://www.bls. 
gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2017/ebbl0061.pdf. Note that aggregate rates of employee access to defined-benefit 
pensions are slightly higher participation rates—86 percent for SLG and 18 percent for private industry. 
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access to Social Security benefits.27 Thus, it is reasonable to expect that 
employee decisions and behavior are heavily influenced by such DB 
pension compensation.  
4. As reported in the Wall Street Journal in 2017, at the state and local levels 
of government, “police pensions are among the worst funded in the 
nation.”28 Therefore, looking to the future, it seems inevitable that police 
pension arrangements, in particular, must change.  
Taken together, these four points expose the nexus between pension reform and homeland 
security. They also signal the need for all stakeholders to be wary as the public sector’s 
retirement system changes. Should reforms substantially and fundamentally shift in the 
way we attract, compensate, and incentivize the nation’s public safety, disaster 
management, and public security professionals, then there will be consequences for 
organizations in the homeland security enterprise. 
Notably, pension reform will not exclusively impact public-sector organizations 
with homeland security–related missions. Indeed, public pension reform will also impact 
teachers, building inspectors, urban planners, sanitation officials, and a host of other public 
servants along with the organizations in which they serve. This thesis makes no claim of 
exclusivity in this regard. Stakeholders interested in other functions of government may 
also find value in much of the research and analysis presented in these pages. Nevertheless, 
the focus of this thesis lies in the domain of homeland security, where the imperatives to 
prevail are especially urgent. These imperatives make viewing the impact of pension 
reform through a lens trained on the homeland security enterprise particularly compelling 
because such an endeavor could benefit the state of homeland security itself.  
  
                                                 
27 Olivia S. Mitchell et al., “Developments in State and Local Pension Plans,” in Pensions in the 
Public Sector, ed. Olivia S. Mitchell and Edwin C. Hustead (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2001), 15–16, 20.  
28 Heather Gillers and Zusha Elinson, “Ill-Funded Police Pensions Put Cities in a Bind,” Wall Street 
Journal, July 4, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ill-funded-police-pensions-put-cities-in-a-
bind1499180342. 
10 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
11 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This effort draws extensively from peer-reviewed academic literature from a 
multitude of academic disciplines. This literature review is intended to show the depth and 
limits of the sources currently available. It is organized along general lines of inquiry that, 
once explored through the thesis, provide a firm foundation from which to speculate about 
outcomes through scenarios. These general lines of inquiry include the following: 
A. Public pension benefit structure, finance, and reform 
B. Economic incentives and labor market dynamics 
C. Non-economic work motivation  
D. The influence of compensation structure on organizational behavior 
E. Futurology and scenario-planning techniques 
A. PENSION STRUCTURE, FINANCE, AND REFORM  
A number of well-founded articles and other publications explain the features of 
different retirement systems serving public-sector workers (hereinafter “public pensions”) 
and provide historical background on public pension reform to date. Among these 
publications are works by academics Mitchell and Hustead, Hyde and Naff, and sections of 
a remarkably broad and thorough study by Bailey and Kirkegaard.29 Publications from the 
National Association of State Retirement Administrators (NASRA) and a broad array of 
think tanks, including the Brookings Institution, Employee Benefit Research Institute, 
RAND Corporation, Urban Institute, and American Enterprise Institute, also provide 
                                                 
29 Mitchell et al., “Developments in State and Local Pension Plans,” 11–40; Albert C. Hyde and 
Katherine C. Naff, “Public Sector Pensions and Benefits: Challenges in a New Environment,” in Public 
Personnel Management: Current Concerns, Future Challenges, ed. Norma M. Riccucci, 5th ed. (Boston: 
Longman, 2012), 157–172; Martin Neil Baily and Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, U.S. Pension Reform: Lessons 
from Other Countries (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009), 175–204, 
212–218, 382–386. 
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perspectives on public pension features and history.30 Governmental sources provide more 
detailed information and excellent, authoritative analyses on the subject of public pensions; 
prominent among these are reports from the Congressional Research Service, 
Congressional Budget Office, Government Accountability Office, Office of Management 
and Budget, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the Office of Personnel Management.31  
Most of the sources cited in the previous paragraph include data and analysis on 
public pension funding and finances. For recurring assessments of the financial well-being 
of SLG-level pension funds across the nation, the NASRA publishes useful statistics in its 
annual Public Fund Survey, and Pew Charitable Trusts offers periodic assessments that 
                                                 
30 Examples include the following: Brainard and Brown, Significant Reforms to State Retirement 
Systems; William G. Gale, Sarah E. Holmes, and David C. John, Public Pensions in Flux: Can the Federal 
Government’s Experiences Inform State Responses? (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/galeholmesjohn_CSRSandFERS_03092016_DP 
_BK-1.pdf; Ruth Helman, Craig Copeland, and Jack VanDerhei, The 2016 Retirement Confidence Survey: 
Worker Confidence Stable, Retiree Confidence Continues to Increase, Issue Brief 422 (Washington, DC: 
Employee Benefit Research Institute, 2016), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ebri_ib_422.mar16.rcs.pdf; 
Beth J. Asch and John T. Warner, Separation and Retirement Incentives in the Federal Civil Service: A 
Comparison of the Federal Employees Retirement System and the Civil Service Retirement System (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR986.html; 
Richard W. Johnson et al., How Long Must State and Local Employees Work to Accumulate Pension 
Benefits?, Public Pension Project Brief 1 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2014), https://www.urban.org/ 
sites/default/files/publication/22571/413107-How-Long-Must-State-and-Local-Employees-Work-to-
Accumulate-Pension-Benefits-.PDF; Andrew G. Biggs, Not So Modest: Pension Benefits for Full-Career 
State Government Employees, AEI Economic Perspectives (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, 2014), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/-aei-economic-
perspective-march-2014_160053300510.pdf.  
31 Jennifer Staman, State and Local Pension Plans and Fiscal Distress: A Legal Overview, CRS 
Report R41736 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), https://fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/misc/R41773.pdf; Congressional Budget Office, Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-
Sector Employees, 2011 to 2015 (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2017), https://www.cbo. 
gov/publication/52637; Government Accountability Office, State and Local Government Pension Plans: 
Economic Downturn Spurs Efforts to Address Costs and Sustainability, GAO-12-322 (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589043.pdf; Office of 
Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2010 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-
2010-PER/pdf/BUDGET-2010-PER.pdf; Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey; 
Office of Personnel Management, Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund Annual Report: Fiscal 
Year Ended September 30, 2016 (Washington, DC: Office of Personnel Management, 2017), https://www. 
opm.gov/about-us/budget-performance/other-reports/fy-2016-csrdf-annual-report.pdf. 
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identify which state funds have the best and worst funding ratios.32 A particularly useful 
tool for analyzing current pension fund finances is an online pension tracker promulgated 
by the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR).33 Through this tracker, 
SIEPR digests BLS pension funding data for all 50 states, and for California, it drills down 
further, enabling a researcher to break out funding data at the city, county, and special 
district level. These tools and assessments focus on the current state of affairs in pension 
finances at the SLG level. For a forward-looking assessment of the public sector’s pension 
health, a remarkable article was published in 2013 by Alicia Munnell and her colleagues 
at the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (CRR).34 CRR’s work touches on 
a number of topics germane to this thesis. The primary channel for distribution of CRR 
research is working papers published through the center’s website.35 Furthermore, in 
collaboration with NASRA and the Center for State and Local Government Excellence, 
CRR maintains a database of public pension plan financial data. This database can be 
accessed online, similar to the one maintained by SIEPR, and it “includes financial data on 
126 large state and local defined-benefit plans covering more than 85 percent of total state 
and local government pension assets and members,” according to the Government 
Accountability Office.36  
                                                 
32 “Public Fund Survey: Summary of Findings for FY 2017,” National Association of State 
Retirement Administrators, November 2018, https://www.nasra.org/publicfundsurvey; Pew Charitable 
Trusts, The State Pension Funding Gap: 2017 (Philadelphia: Pew, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-
/media/assets/2019/06/statepensionfundinggap.pdf. 
33 Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, “U.S. Pension Tracker.” 
34 Alicia H. Munnell et al., State and Local Pension Costs: Pre-Crisis, Post-Crisis, and Post-Reform 
(Chestnut Hill, MA: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, 2013), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/slp_30.pdf.  
35 Gene Hayworth, “Center for Retirement Research,” Journal of Business & Finance Librarianship 
13, no. 4 (August 2008): 491, https://doi.org/10.1080/08963560802202342; “Working Papers,” Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College, accessed September 22, 2018, http://crr.bc.edu/category/working-
papers/. 
36 Government Accountability Office, State and Local Government Pension Plans, 2. 
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On the subject of public pension reform trends, the NASRA, again, provides an 
excellent synopsis.37 The most current aggregations of state-level pension reform 
legislation come from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL); through 
2012, Ron Snell from the NCSL published annual synopses of pension legislation, and 
since then, NCSL has provided legislative data via regularly updated online means.38 The 
NCSL synopses seem particularly well-regarded; multiple sources, including Pew 
Charitable Trusts, the Government Accountability Office, Bailey and Kirkegaard, and 
academics such as economist Thom Reilly and accounting scholar Adriana Cordis, look to 
the NCSL for data on SLG-level pension reform initiatives.39 
Overall, for the researcher interested in assessing the nation’s current pension 
predicament, there is a voluminous body of high-quality research and data from research 
institutes, professional associations, academic institutions, and government agencies. 
Perhaps because the conditions behind this predicament are fluid and fast-evolving, a 
number of credible institutions have made their data available to the public in a regularly 
updated, online format.  
B. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS 
The economic incentives embedded in the public sector’s compensation structure 
will change as a result of pension reform. How workers will make choices and behave in 
                                                 
37 Brainard and Brown, Significant Reforms to State Retirement Systems. 
38 Ron Snell, Pensions and Retirement Plan Enactments in 2012 State Legislatures (Denver: National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/2012_pension_summary. 
pdf; “Pension and Retirement Legislation Information by State,” National Conference of State Legislatures, 
last modified March 11, 2019, http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/pension-legislation-database. 
aspx. 
39 Government Accountability Office, State and Local Government Pension Plans, 2; Pew Center on 
the States, “The Widening Gap Update,” Issue Brief (Philadelphia: Pew Center on the States, June 2012), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pewpensionsupdatepdf.pdf; Baily 
and Kirkegaard, U.S. Pension Reform: Lessons from Other Countries; Thom Reilly, “Comparing Public-
versus-Private Sector Pay and Benefits: Examining Lifetime Compensation,” Public Personnel 
Management 42, no. 4 (December 2013): 521–544, https://doi.org/10.1177/0091026013505504; Adriana 
Cordis, “An Analysis of Public Pension Systems Reforms” (paper presented at the Ninth Annual SC 
Upstate Research Symposium, Spartanburg, SC, 2013), https://www.uscupstate.edu/globalassets/ 
academics/sponsored-awards-and-research-support/final-draft-2013.pdf. 
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the face of such change is central to the research question of this thesis. The academic field 
of personnel economics—a branch of labor economics—explores extensively how 
compensation affects workers’ behavior and decision making and how “employers find the 
right workers,” so it offers critical insights for this thesis.40 Personnel economics uses 
microeconomic methods, principal-agent theory, and human capital theory, among other 
concepts, to analyze human resources mostly from an employer’s perspective.41 Economist 
Edward Lazear founded this unique branch of economics, and his work is referenced 
widely in academic literature that explores labor supply and the influence of financial 
incentives. Seminal articles from Lazear are particularly useful in the context of this thesis 
as they offer multiple economic arguments that project the effects of diminished DB 
pensions.42  
The empirical side of Lazear’s writings focuses on the private sector, so the 
challenge for the researcher is to find empirical tests of personnel economic theory in 
public-sector contexts. For the public sector, analyses by economist Richard Ippolito and 
public policy scholars Lewis and Stoycheva prove particularly useful in considering worker 
attrition rates and tenure patterns; both examine changing federal employee turnover rates 
following a significant 1980s reform of the federal pension system.43 Lewis and Stoycheva 
contrast their findings with earlier works that were more limited in scope by Beth Asch and 
                                                 
40 Edward P. Lazear and Paul Oyer, “Personnel Economics,” Working Paper 13480 (Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007), 1–2, http://www.nber.org/papers/w13480. 
41 Alexander Dilger, “Personnel Economics: Strengths, Weaknesses and Its Place in Human Resource 
Management,” Management Revue 22, no. 4 (August 2011): 332, https://doi.org/10.1688/1861-9908_ 
mrev_2011_04_Dilger. 
42 Examples include Lazear, “Pensions and Deferred Benefits as Strategic Compensation”; Edward P. 
Lazear, “Pay Equality and Industrial Politics,” Journal of Political Economy 97, no. 3 (1989): 561–580; 
Edward P. Lazear, “Pensions and Turnover,” in Pensions in the U.S. Economy, ed. Zvi Bodie, John B. 
Shoven, and David A. Wise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 163–90.  
43 Richard A. Ippolito, “Stayers as ‘Workers’ and ‘Savers’: Toward Reconciling the Pension-Quit 
Literature,” Journal of Human Resources 37, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 275–308, https://doi.org/10.2307/ 
3069648; Lewis and Stoycheva, “Does Pension Plan Structure Affect Turnover Patterns?”  
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her colleagues.44 Asch is a frequent writer on the subject of how compensation affects the 
retention of public employees, but most of her work focuses exclusively on the Department 
of Defense’s workforce. The most recent contributions from Asch and her colleagues at 
RAND involve models predicting employee retention in the face of civil-service 
compensation changes and the military’s new “blended” retirement system.45 While a 
healthy body of analysis examines the retention effects of pensions within the federal 
workforce, research targeting the SLG level seems sparse in the literature. This likely has 
to do with data challenges and the fact that pension reform has been late in coming to the 
SLG level.  
The shifts in economic incentives brought about by pension reform will have 
myriad implications for the public-sector workforce. As discussed, Lewis and Stoycheva 
along with Ippolito concentrate on the implications related to turnover. Other effects 
involve (1) worker quality and (2) human capital. In these two areas, well-founded research 
in academic literature provides useful insight and analysis:  
1. Economists often assess worker quality as a function of “sorting” or 
“selection” effects.46 The role pensions play in sorting high-quality 
workers into the public sector is explored, separately, in articles by 
Ippolito, Borjas, and Munnell’s team at CRR. All three of these analyses 
                                                 
44 Lewis and Stoycheva, “Does Pension Plan Structure Affect Turnover Patterns?” 790; Asch and 
Warner, Separation and Retirement Incentives in the Federal Civil Service; Beth Asch, Steven J. Haider, 
and Julie M. Zissimopoulos, “The Retirement Behavior of Federal Civil Service Workers,” Working Paper, 
WP 2002-026 (Ann Arbor: Michigan Retirement Research Center, 2002), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1088771; Beth Asch, Steven J. Haider, and Julie Zissimopoulos, “Financial 
Incentives and Retirement: Evidence from Federal Civil Service Workers,” Journal of Public Economics 
89, no. 2–3 (February 2005): 427–40, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.12.006. 
45 David Knapp et al., An Enhanced Capability to Model How Compensation Policy Affects DoD Civil 
Service Retention and Cost (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), http://www.rand.org/content/ 
dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1503/RAND_RR1503.pdf; Beth J. Asch, Michael G. Mattock, 
and James Hosek, The Blended Retirement System: Retention Effects and Continuation Pay Cost Estimates 
for the Armed Services (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
research_reports/RR1887.html. 
46 Joanne Salop and Steven Salop, “Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 90, no. 4 (1976): 619–627, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885325; Lazear and Oyer, 
“Personnel Economics,” 18. 
17 
prove useful in addressing the research question posed in this thesis, and 
all three suggest that existing DB pension regimes help the public sector 
attract a high-quality workforce.47  
2. With respect to human capital, foundational work by Nobel Laureate Gary 
S. Becker provides a theoretical foundation, and abundant literature 
establishes the significance of human capital as a determiner of 
organizational effectiveness.48 Within this arena, a 2015 article published 
by public administration scholar Jared Llorens is instrumental to the 
problem space addressed in this thesis.49 Llorens posits that new pension 
reforms at the SLG level may substantially weaken public-sector human 
capital capacity. He explores the relative wage-competitiveness of the 
public sector vis-à-vis the private sector to explain how the former has 
relied on a DB pension regime to attract and retain human capital. Among 
Lloren’s conclusions is the suggestion that public entities will need to 
enhance salaries to compete effectively in the labor market.  
In addition to shifting incentives, pension reform will change the public sector’s 
compensation structure in ways that facilitate increased mobility in the public-sector labor 
                                                 
47 Ippolito, “Stayers as ‘Workers’ and ‘Savers’; George J. Borjas, “The Wage Structure and the 
Sorting of Workers into the Public Sector,” Working Paper 9313 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2002), https://doi.org/10.3386/w9313; Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry, and 
Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher, “Recruiting and Retaining High-Quality State and Local Workers: Do Pensions 
Matter?,” Working Paper CRR WP 2015-1 (Chestnut Hill, MA: Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College, 2015), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/wp_2015-1.pdf. 
48 Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to 
Education, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); T. Russell Crook et al., “Does Human 
Capital Matter? A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship between Human Capital and Firm Performance,” 
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market. Increased mobility raises issues pertaining to economic efficiency and the wage 
competitiveness of the public sector. In these realms, academic and other sources provide 
well-founded research germane to this thesis. Baily and Kirkegaard, for example, highlight 
the market-distorting effects of DB pensions, implying that economic efficiency will be 
enhanced through pension reform.50 Concepts surrounding economic efficiency appear 
pervasively in textbooks on labor economics, and in that vein, Borjas provides an excellent 
source.51 Regarding wage competitiveness, multiple government and academic sources 
analyze the wage competitiveness of the public versus the private sector.52 Relatedly, from 
reputable media sources, anecdotal but illuminating examples have shown what happens 
when an increasingly mobile public labor force faces pension reform.53  
C. NON-ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS FOR WORK 
A foundational concept in personnel economics and most economic thought 
involves how workers are motivated by economic self-interest and income (or utility) 
maximization.54 However, economists acknowledge and many non-economists emphasize 
that pecuniary, economic incentives are not the sole drivers of worker behavior or choices 
in the job market. It stands to reason that the effects of pension reform inferred from 
personnel economic theory may be altered or mitigated if seemingly non-economic motives 
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hold sway over the public-sector workforce. In this vein, scholars from a variety of 
academic fields—both within and without economics—explore aspects of motivation that 
are relevant to the task of projecting pension reform’s impact on the homeland security 
enterprise.  
Prominent in academic literature emanating from the field of public administration 
is the concept of public service motivation (PSM), which posits that public servants exhibit 
unique motives for work that sets them apart from the rest of the labor force.55 In a series 
of seminal articles in the early 1990s, Perry and Wise introduced the PSM construct to 
define, measure, and explain how unique and largely non-economic motives hold sway 
over public servants.56 Under this construct, PSM is “the primary steering mechanism for 
bureaucratic behavior”; workers possessing elevated PSM levels are drawn to serve in 
government institutions over a commitment “to values associated with government service, 
among them personal sacrifice and duty to the public interest.”57 The suggestion here is 
that PSM involves traits inherent in individuals, and Perry and Wise argue that these traits 
are essential to performance levels exhibited by individual workers or a given workforce.58  
Over the last two decades, a consequential body of public administration literature 
has grown from Perry and Wise’s work.59 This body of literature includes empirical studies 
by Crewson (1997), Naff and Crum (1999), Brewer and Selden (2000), Kim (2005), Steijn 
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(2008), Bright (2008), Vandenabeele (2008), and Ertas (2015).60 Collectively, these 
authors explore the relationships between PSM and issues germane to the thesis, including 
(1) individual career choice and organizational commitment, (2) public employee retention 
and turnover, (3) worker quality and performance, (4) organizational effectiveness, and (5) 
the incidence of PSM among different generational cohorts. While PSM features 
prominently in public administration literature, it has not received the same level of 
attention from other academic fields. Indeed, as Francois observes, economists have 
neglected to formally consider PSM despite its challenge to fundamental assumptions of 
many economic theories.61  
That is not to say that economists ignore seemingly non-economic motivation. 
Rather, economists—and others taking a business management perspective—focus on the 
role of intrinsic motivation when contemplating non-economic drivers of worker behavior. 
Romaniuc argues that the introduction of intrinsic motivation in economics began with 
Scitovsky’s The Joyless Economy in 1976, and it came into the fore with articles by Bruno 
Frey growing out of his 1992 work titled “Tertium Datur: Pricing, Regulating and Intrinsic 
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Motivation.”62 In much of the “psychologically inspired economic analysis” that followed 
Scitovsky and Frey’s work, economists attribute non-pecuniary rewards to intrinsic 
motivation and conceptualize such rewards as just another element determining an 
individual’s utility function.63 Economic thought in this arena, however, has gone well 
beyond conceptualizing intrinsic motivation as a source of utility for the individual. For 
example, seeking to explain altruistic behavior, Benabou and Tirole developed a model 
involving intrinsic, extrinsic, and reputational motives, and dealing specifically with the 
public sector, Prendergast has assessed the complexity of intrinsic motivation in sorting 
the types of people attracted to different public bureaucracies.64  
Overall, a notable body of work from economists accounts for seemingly non-
economic motivation. Within this literature, however, the definitions of different forms of 
motivation—intrinsic, extrinsic, or prosocial—are not always consistent, and with the 
exception of Prendergast, there seems little focus on the public sector. What is consistent 
in this literature is the application of crowding theory. Crowding involves the manner in 
which pecuniary or so-called extrinsic rewards can diminish the intrinsic motivation in 
individuals. It is relevant to the thesis because pension reform will change the extrinsic 
reward structure of public-sector compensation systems. In this arena, a number of 
contributions from Frey and his colleagues, as well as economist David Kreps and 
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sociologist James Baron, proves insightful.65 Additionally, Francois and Vlassopoulos 
apply crowding theory to prosocial behavior and, notably, PSM.66 These articles are 
predominantly economic in nature, but all point to research from psychology—
intriguingly, all cite the work of psychologist Edward L. Deci—which explains the 
cognitive mechanisms behind crowding theory and empirically proves its existence.67  
Little if any of the academic literature relating to non-economic motivations for 
work deals directly with pensions. Nevertheless, given that pension reform will alter the 
financial or extrinsic incentive structure for public servants, crowding theory and other 
determinants influencing the motivational composition of the labor force are pertinent. 
Along these lines, there is some conjecture in the literature and from media sources that 
the norms, values, and characteristic traits of emerging generational cohorts will affect the 
motivational composition of the future labor force.68 Salient in early descriptions of the 
millennial generation is the notion that it exhibits prosocial tendencies that are unique 
among cohorts.69 Another popular conception is that millennials prefer mobility in their 
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careers over steady, long-tenured jobs.70 Both of these generational traits may influence or 
overshadow the second-order effects of pension reform discussed in the economics-
oriented sections of the thesis, so the thesis gives some attention to the character-defining 
features of future workers. 
In the early 20th century, sociologist Karl Mannheim brought ideas about the 
distinctive traits of generational cohorts into widespread consideration through a seminal 
1928 essay titled “The Problem of Generations.”71 Today, authors who embrace the idea 
of generational personality seem keen on helping employers understand and predict the 
work values and career patterns of their newest and future employees.72 Prominent among 
these authors is psychologist Jean M. Twenge, who focuses on the youngest cohorts in the 
labor force and is frequently quoted in the media on the subject of generational 
personalities. Assessing the values and preferences of the millennial cohort, Twenge and 
her colleagues address this generation’s prosocial orientation, framing it, in part, across the 
dimensions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.73 Public policy scholar Nevbahar Ertas 
(mentioned earlier) also views the motivational composition of the workforce through the 
lens of generational traits; Ertas’s assessment addresses PSM as well as intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation, which seem customary for public administration scholars.74 
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The work by Twenge and others in this arena is interesting, but the evidence is 
emerging, and the conclusions emanating from the research is inconsistent. Indeed, 
organizational behavior scholars Lyons and Kuron are critical of much of this research; 
they see it as “descriptive” and out of line with “key tenets of generation theory that have 
potential to advance our understanding of generations as a workplace phenomenon.”75 
Despite these shortcomings, the research in this area highlights variables that may impact 
future scenarios.  
D. COMPENSATION’S INFLUENCE ON ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
In a recent article, Gupta and Shaw observe that from the perspective of 
organizational behavior and human resources management, “research on employee 
compensation is sporadic and sparse.”76 These management scholars point out that much 
literature in their field has been devoted to employee selection, performance, and turnover, 
but relatively little has addressed the influence of compensation. A decade earlier, 
Westerman and Sundali expressed similar sentiments about the dearth of organizational 
behavior research into retirement compensation.77 Westerman and Sundali posit that the 
transformation of pensions from DB to defined-contribution plans in the United States will 
influence attitudinal and behavioral outcomes, which deserve attention, and they make an 
appeal for additional research.78 From outside the United States, de Thierry et al. focus on 
DB “pension decline,” pointing to areas for additional research in the realms of employee 
behavior and human resources practices.79  
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Notwithstanding such sentiments about a thin state of research in this arena, the 
literature is not entirely non-existent—authors of business school textbooks on human 
resources and organizational behavior highlight areas of inquiry into how compensation 
structure influences outcomes in the organizational domain.80 Common topics highlighted 
in these texts are the influence of (1) employee perceptions of fairness with respect to pay 
and (2) pay distribution within an organization’s workforce. As explored in Chapter V of 
this thesis, public pension reform may change employee compensation in both of these 
areas, and reputable sources provide pertinent research that suggests fairness in 
compensation and pay distribution will affect employee attitudes, behavior, and, in turn, 
organizational culture. With regard to fairness in the workplace, a host of scholars offer 
evidence and concepts pertaining to the attitudinal and behavioral impact of the related 
concepts of distributive and procedural justice.81 On the topic of pay distribution, Lazear 
takes an economic approach in modeling how a compressed pay structure can lead to 
economically efficient outcomes in organizations where collaboration is important.82 
Other scholars, such as Baron, Bloom, and Pfeffer, focus on how pay distributions may 
drive organizational culture.83 All in all, while there may not be extensive or recent 
research regarding the relationship between compensation schemes and organizational 
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behavior, research from the 1980s and 1990s identifies and explores salient topics in this 
arena.  
An intriguing aspect of compensation’s influence on employee and organizational 
behavior relates to the anti-corruption incentives embedded in DB pension arrangements. 
The potential link between DB pension incentives and corruption in the provision of public 
services was most prominently suggested by economists Becker and Stigler in the 1970s.84 
While Becker and Stigler’s theory is often cited in the literature on corrupt behavior, any 
in-depth exploration of this linkage seems thin in the literature. Rose-Ackerman, for 
example, initiates her 1999 book on corruption in government as follows: “Economics is a 
powerful tool for the analysis of corruption. Cultural differences and morality provide 
nuance and subtlety, but an economic approach is fundamental to understanding where 
corrupt incentives are the greatest and have the biggest impact.”85 While Rose-Ackerman 
explores a host of issues surrounding the economics of corruption, her thoughts on the 
deterrent effect of DB pensions receive only brief mention in this otherwise thorough work 
on the causes of and remedies for malfeasance in the public sector.86  
Perhaps the reason this deterrent effect receives such scant attention is the difficulty 
scholars encounter when attempting to measure it empirically. In a study that confirms a 
relationship between compensation rates and corruption levels across different countries, 
Rijckeghem and Weder acknowledge the deterrent effect that DB pensions may have, but 
citing difficulties associated with valuing different pension arrangements, they specifically 
exclude pensions from their analysis.87 As explored in this thesis, however, recent 
fieldwork by political scientist Diego Esparza may provide the best evidence available 
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validating the theoretical linkage between the DB pension benefits and malfeasance in the 
provision of public services.88 Although pensions may not be a central point in Esparza’s 
dissertation, his work documents that the professionalism of law enforcement 
organizations goes hand-in-hand with the provision of DB pension compensation.  
E. FUTUROLOGY AND SCENARIO-PLANNING TECHNIQUES 
Cooke writes that “Herman Kahn is regarded as the father of scenario analysis.”89 
Aligica and Weinstein agree, saying that Kahn is “recognized as one of the intellectual 
leaders of the emerging field of ‘futures studies’ or ‘futurology.’”90 Prominent among 
Kahn’s work is The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty Years, 
which he co-authored with Anthony J. Weiner.91 In that work, Kahn and Weiner describe 
scenarios as follows: 
Scenarios are hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose 
of focusing attention on causal processes and decision-points. They answer 
two kinds of questions: (1) Precisely how might some hypothetical situation 
come about, step by step? and (2) What alternatives exist, for each actor, at 
each step, for preventing, diverting, or facilitating the process.92  
Kahn uses scenarios as a means to overcome the inadequacies of mathematical decision 
theories when facing subjective probabilities or inconsistent objectives.93 In effect, as 
Cooke posits, Kahn’s approach urges “the scientist doing systems analysis to think, not as 
a scientist traditionally thinks, but rather as a politician.”94  
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Aligica and Weinstein argue that despite the breadth of topics and prolific nature 
of Kahn’s writings, the coherence of his arguments is difficult to capture due to the 
“prolixity and complexity of some of his writings”; in response, they attempt to capture the 
essence of his work in their published anthology.95 The dense nature of Kahn’s techniques 
may explain why, as Slaughter observes, through the 1980s and 1990s, scenario analysis 
became increasingly simplified as it gained in use and popularity.96 This is not to suggest 
that a scenario-based construct cannot be rigorous. Indeed, Godet argues the opposite, 
offering “morphological analysis” as a means of achieving such rigor when conducting 
scenario planning.97  
Beyond the works covering the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of 
futurology, a variety of authors have published more practical explorations of scenario 
analysis. Prominent among these from the 1980s and 1990s are works by Wack (1985), 
Schwartz (1991), Ringland (1998), and Van der Heijden (1996).98 More recently, 
publications by Kosow and Gaßner (2008), Lindgren and Bandhold (2009), and a guide 
used in FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative could prove useful in the application of 
futures methods and scenario planning.99  
                                                 
95 Kahn, The Essential Herman Kahn: In Defense of Thinking, 1–2. 
96 Richard A. Slaughter, “From Forecasting and Scenarios to Social Construction: Changing 
Methodological Paradigms in Futures Studies,” Foresight 4, no. 3 (June 2002): 27–28, https://doi. 
org/10.1108/14636680210697731.  
97 Michel Godet, “Forefront: How to Be Rigorous with Scenario Planning,” Foresight 2, no. 1 
(February 2000), 5–9. 
98 Wack, “Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead,” 73–89; Wack, “Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids,” 
139–150; Schwartz, The Art of the Long View; Gill Ringland, Scenario Planning: Managing for the Future 
(New York: Wiley, 1998); Van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation. 
99 Kosow and Gaßner, Methods of Future and Scenario Analysis; Mats Lindgren and Hans Bandhold, 
Scenario Planning: The Link between Future and Strategy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230233584; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Crisis Response and 
Disaster Resilience 2030: Forging Strategic Action in an Age of Uncertainty (Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2012), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1816-25045-
5167/sfi_report_13.jan.2012_final.docx.pdf. 
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F. CONCLUSION  
The literature applicable to the research question posed in this thesis is remarkably 
broad in its scope. Given that the drivers of future outcomes in this problem space are 
unclear, the breadth of the literary foundation seems appropriate. As stated at the outset, 
much of the material explored comes from peer-reviewed academic research. Within this 
literature, material pertaining to the financial health of public-sector pension funds is the 
most current; some of it is regularly updated and promulgated through online means. The 
most thoroughly researched subjects relevant to this thesis seem to be on the role of 
financial incentives as determiners of market and human behavior. This thesis draws from 
other subject areas—non-economic motivation and organizational behavior—for which the 
available literature seems either inconsistent or less developed in terms of applicability to 
pensions and reform. Scholars from different disciplines discuss non-economic 
motivations for work using variable terminology, and it is difficult to reconcile their 
perspectives. Finally, regarding compensation’s impact on organizational behavior, there 
is simply less research available at the time of this writing. 
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III. PENSION PROVISIONS FINANCE AND REFORM 
This chapter has three goals. The first is to establish a baseline understanding of 
terms and concepts relevant to public pension systems and the financial incentives 
embedded in them. For some readers, this material may seem somewhat intricate while for 
others, it may seem remedial. Regardless of the reader’s level of knowledge, the discussion 
provides the vocabulary necessary to appreciate both the problem space and the analysis 
that follows in later chapters.  
The second goal is to assess the financial state of public pension plans. The 
discussion reveals where the greatest challenges lie and frames the urgency of the problem. 
The analysis explores both federal retirement systems and pension plans serving state and 
local government employees, and from the analysis, it becomes clear that the most 
significant financial challenges lie at the SLG level. Accordingly, the weight of this chapter 
focuses on SLG pensions, but federal pension financing and reform deserve attention 
insofar as there are valuable lessons to be gleaned from the federal experience. It will 
become clear that, when one looks at SLG pension plans in aggregate, substantial reforms 
are necessary. Without such reform, many plans throughout the nation risk insolvency that 
will leave them unable to honor the pension promises made to current employees and 
retirees.  
The third goal is to explore pension reform measures taken to date. This line of 
inquiry reveals that much of the reforms made thus far at the SLG level are incremental 
and may prove inadequate. The implication here is, despite notable and widespread 
initiatives to reform pension arrangements, the long-term financial health of the aggregate 
SLG pension system remains in doubt.  
A. PUBLIC PENSION PRIMER  
1. Defined-Benefit Pension Features 
The Congressional Research Service defines a defined-benefit plan as “a pension 
plan under which an employee is promised a specified future benefit, traditionally an 
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annuity beginning at retirement.”100 Annuity payouts of such plans are a function of 
employment longevity (years of service) and salary history, and retirees or annuitants 
receive these payments until death. According to the Farlex Financial Dictionary, under a 
defined-benefit plan,  
the benefits the retiree receives are not dependent on the performance of the 
portfolio in which the contributions are invested; the company [or 
government entity] sponsoring the plan assumes the entire liability. . . . The 
disadvantage to a defined-benefit plan, from the company’s perspective, is 
the possibility that the investment portfolio will not perform as expected, 
forcing the company to make payments from its earnings, or, worse, to 
borrow money.101 
It is worth emphasizing the words of the Congressional Research Service: “In a defined 
benefit plan, the employer bears the investment risk and is responsible for any 
shortfalls.”102 The formula used to determine the amount of the pension annuity one 
receives under a defined-benefit plan is a function of an employee’s preretirement pay, 
years of service, and a benefit multiplier, which varies from one plan to the next.103  
The following example illustrates the value such a plan will have for an employee 
and, in parallel, the cost such a plan will represent for an employer. Consider the 
hypothetical case of a career law enforcement officer from the California Highway Patrol 
covered under the provisions of the California Public Employee Retirement System 
(CalPERS). For this hypothetical case, assume this person retires at the end of 2019, at 55 
years of age after 27 years of service, having achieved a terminal salary rate of $130,000 
                                                 
100 Staman, State and Local Pension Plans and Fiscal Distress, 1. See also 29 U.S.C. §1002 (35). 
101 “Defined benefit pension plan,” Farlex Financial Dictionary, accessed October 27, 2017, 
https://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Defined+Benefit+Pension+Plan 
102 Staman, State and Local Pension Plans and Fiscal Distress, 1. 
103 Tyler Bond, “How are Pension Benefits Calculated?” National Public Pension Coalition, June 30, 
2016, https://protectpensions.org/2016/06/30/pension-benefits-calculated/. 
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per year.104 Among the wider populace, 55 may seem a young age to be retiring, but, as 
Mitchell stipulates, “because police work and firefighting are physically demanding 
occupations, retirement benefits for public safety workers typically allow retirement at 
earlier ages, in part to maintain a younger workforce.”105 Given this profile, the sergeant 
would qualify for a “2.5 @ 55” (police officer and firefighter) retirement under 
CalPERS.106 
$130,000 x 2.5% x 27 = $87,750/year 
That is, after retirement, this hypothetical employee qualifies to receive a pension income 
of $87,750 per year (67.5 percent of his end-of-career salary) paid by the employer until 
his death.  
This income, however, will not remain a fixed dollar amount because most DB 
plans for police and firefighters include a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) provision to 
correct for inflation.107 Some COLA provisions provide adjustments directly tied to the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI): the federal civil service pension’s COLA formula is each 
year’s CPI minus 1 percent, and in the case of the California Highway Patrol, employee 
pay adjusts upward by 2 percent per annum except in years of extremely low inflation when 
it is equal to the CPI. Applying this simple 2 percent COLA to the aforementioned example 
                                                 
104 $130,000 is representative of an end-of-career salary for a police sergeant from the California 
Highway Patrol and numerous other California jurisdictions. Coincidentally, due to recent reforms, 
$130,000 is the maximum rate used in CalPERS pension formulas. For details on California public servant 
compensation rates, see “Civil Service Pay Scale - Alpha by Class Title,” California Department of Human 
Resources, accessed August 17, 2019, https://www.calhr.ca.gov/Pay%20Scales%20Library/PS_Sec_15. 
pdf; “Salary and Benefits – Officer,” California Highway Patrol, accessed August 17, 2019, https://www. 
chp.ca.gov/chp-careers/officer/why-become-a-chp-officer/salary-and-benefits-officer. 
105 Mitchell et al., “Developments in State and Local Pension Plans,” 15. 
106 CalPERS, State Safety Benefits, PUB 7 (Sacramento, CA: CalPERS, 2019), 38, https://www. 
calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/state-safety-benefits.pdf. The provisions in this example represent 
rules in place for California public employees hired before January 1, 2013.  
107 Mitchell et al., “Developments in State and Local Pension Plans,” 20, 22. As of the early 2000s, 45 
percent of all public-sector pension plans had “automatic indexation” (COLA), and 80 percent of police 
and firefighter pensions had such COLA provisions.  
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and assuming the retired police sergeant has an average life expectancy yield the pay 
schedule provided in Table 1.108 
Table 1. Example Defined-Benefit Pension Payment Schedule 
Year Age COLA DB payment  Year Age COLA DB payment 
2020 55 N/A  $ 87,750   2033 68 2.0%  $ 113,514  
2021 56 2.0%  $ 89,505   2034 69 2.0%  $ 115,784  
2022 57 2.0%  $ 91,295   2035 70 2.0%  $ 118,100  
2023 58 2.0%  $ 93,121   2036 71 2.0%  $ 120,462  
2024 59 2.0%  $ 94,983   2037 72 2.0%  $ 122,871  
2025 60 2.0%  $ 96,883   2038 73 2.0%  $ 125,329  
2026 61 2.0%  $ 98,821   2039 74 2.0%  $ 127,835  
2027 62 2.0%  $ 100,797   2040 75 2.0%  $ 130,392  
2028 63 2.0%  $ 102,813   2041 76 2.0%  $ 133,000  
2029 64 2.0%  $ 104,869   2042 77 2.0%  $ 135,660  
2030 65 2.0%  $ 106,967   2043 78 2.0%  $ 138,373  
2031 66 2.0%  $ 109,106   2044 79 2.0%  $ 141,140  
2032 67 2.0%  $ 111,288   2045 80 2.0%  $ 143,963  
 
Although not particularly relevant from a financial perspective, the cumulative 
postretirement earnings in this hypothetical case reach nearly $3 million. A more 
meaningful figure would be the net present value (NPV) of this cash-flow stream, which 
assumes a rate of return or discount rate.109 The NPV in this example would be $1.97 
million, assuming a 3 percent discount rate, or $1.22 million, assuming a 7.25 percent 
                                                 
108 Regarding average life expectancy, white males who reach the age of 55 can expect to live another 
25.7 years. Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., “Deaths: Final Data for 2014,” National Vital Statistics Reports 65, 
no. 4 (2016): 33. 
109 CBO defines present value as follows: “A single number that of future obligations expresses a 
flow of current and future payments in terms of an equivalent lump sum paid today.” Congressional Budget 
Office, Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees, 4. 
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discount rate.110 Framed another way, this DB annuity would equip an employee for 
retirement as if he had a 401(k) account with a balance of $1.97 million—assuming he 
(wisely) invested it in low-risk instruments throughout his retired years.111 From the 
pension fund’s perspective, this retiree’s pension annuity would likely represent a $1.22 
million liability on the balance sheet in 2019, given average pension-plan investment return 
assumptions.112 In short, the NPV reveals the value a given pension represents for a retiree 
and the cost that pension annuity represents for the employer.  
Benefit valuations for individual workers in the seven-figure range, such as the one 
in this hypothetical case, lead to disapproving commentary in the press about public-service 
“pension millionaires.”113 However, there may be a critical fallacy in the aforementioned 
valuations. Because retirement annuities cease (or diminish significantly in the case of 
ongoing survivor benefits) upon the retiree’s death, life expectancy is a key element, and 
it may not be accurate to assume that police and firefighters who achieve retirement age 
will live as long as others. In a study that compared the life expectancy of male police 
officers from Buffalo, New York, between 1950 and 2005 to that of the general male 
population, Violanti et al. found that the police in their sample had remarkably lower life 
expectancies.114 Violanti and his team of biostatisticians, epidemiologists, and public 
                                                 
110 For simplicity, all NPV calculations are made in this thesis as if the cash flows were disbursed on 
an annual basis. Three percent was chosen because it approximates contemporary yields on U.S. 30-year 
treasury bonds. 7.25 percent represents the median investment return assumption—FY01 to FY19—for 129 
different pension plans tracked by the NASRA. For details on pension fund investment assumptions, see 
National Association of State Retirement Administrators, Public Pension Plan Investment Return 
Assumptions, Issue Brief (Lexington, KY: NASRA, 2019), https://www.nasra.org/files/Issue%20Briefs/ 
NASRAInvReturnAssumptBrief.pdf.  
111 This further assumes the retiree withdraws from this account steadily such that the account value 
becomes zero at the end of the hypothetical retiree’s 26-year life expectancy.  
112 NASRA, Public Pension Plan Investment Return Assumptions, 3. Again, 7.25 percent was the 
average investment return assumed by SLG-level pension plans from FY01 to FY19. 
113 Andrew G. Biggs, “How to Become a (Public Pension) Millionaire,” Wall Street Journal, March 
14, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/andrew-biggs-how-to-become-a-public-pension-millionaire-
1394834779?tesla=y. 
114 John M. Violanti et al., “Life Expectancy in Police Officers: A Comparison with the US General 
Population,” International Journal of Emergency Mental Health and Human Resilience 15, no. 4 (2013): 
217–28, https://doi.org/10.1037/e577572014-031.  
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health scholars pointed to psychosocial and physical exposures inherent in police work—
shift work, stress, higher rates of obesity, environmental exposures, and posttraumatic 
stress disorder—to explain these shorter life expectancies. In the case of police officers and 
retirees who had attained the age of 55 to 59 years, the average life expectancy was just 
6.24 years.115 Rounding up and applying a seven-year life expectancy to the hypothetical 
case in Table 1, the pension valuation declines 60–70 percent, effectively negating the 
55-year-old police sergeant’s status as a pension millionaire.116 This is not to suggest that 
the specific life expectancies found in this one study apply to all police cohorts, but this 
study does illustrate how, when assessing the value or cost of police DB pensions, applying 
average life expectancies can lead to inflated figures.  
The valuation of an individual DB pension or group of pension annuities is sensitive 
to incremental changes to pension plan rules, terms, or provisions. In the hypothetical case 
above, cutting the COLA to 1 percent per year yields NPV values that are 11 percent less 
(3 percent discount rate) and 9 percent less (7.25 percent discount rate). By eliminating the 
COLA, values diminish by 20 percent and 17 percent, respectively. Thus, small changes 
can make an impact when facing a quarter century (or less, apparently, for police) of 
postretirement deferred compensation. Moreover, small changes to multiple plan 
provisions have a cumulative financial effect, which can be significant for both the 
annuitant and the employer. Therefore, individual pension plan provisions can serve as 
levers that reformers may consider adjusting to achieve a desired financial impact.  
To be sure, a pension plan’s benefit multiplier could be a powerful lever in that it 
directly determines the level of pension benefit, and state pension plans apply benefit 
multipliers in the range of 1.6 percent to 3 percent.117 As is discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter, some public-sector DB pension plans preclude employees from 
participating in Social Security programs, and such plans tend to have higher benefit 
                                                 
115 Violanti et al., “Life Expectancy in Police Officers,” Table 1.  
116 NPV valuations decline to $580,000 (3 percent discount rate) and $500,000 (7.25 percent discount 
rate).  
117 Baily and Kirkegaard, U.S. Pension Reform: Lessons from Other Countries, 212–218.  
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multipliers to offset the lack of Social Security benefits.118 Additionally, and particularly 
relevant to this thesis, pension systems for police and firefighters traditionally have the 
highest benefit multipliers of all public-sector occupations at the SLG level.119  
The way in which an employee’s salary is factored into a DB benefit formula also 
has a material effect on pension payouts, and it provides another lever available to would-
be reformers looking to reduce pension costs. Pension plans average an employee’s 
earnings over a specified period to determine the salary basis used to calculate the pension 
amount; normally, this period is when earnings are highest—at the end of an employee’s 
career. The Bureau of Labor Statistics refers to this basis as terminal earnings, and the 
length of time used to calculate terminal earnings is either one, three, or five years for most 
pension plans.120 Of particular relevance to the subject of reform, the longer the span of 
time under consideration, the lower the pension payout. This is because using more years 
will draw years of lower salary levels into the equation. Thus, when Trump administration 
officials unveiled a number of measures aimed at reducing federal civil-service pensions 
in 2017, among the cost-cutting initiatives was a move to increase the salary basis from a 
“high-three” average—the highest three years of an employee’s earnings—to a “high-five” 
average.121  
The significant role terminal earnings play in determining the dollar amount an 
employee receives can make pension costs less predictable for the employer. Provisions 
pertaining to terminal earnings can also elicit some unusual employee behaviors. Whenever 
                                                 
118 Mitchell et al., “Developments in State and Local Pension Plans,” 15–16, 20. 
119 Mitchell et al., 20. 
120 At the SLG level, 5 percent of plans use a one-year period to calculate terminal earnings, 48 
percent use three years, and 30 percent use five years. Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation 
Survey: Glossary of Employee Benefit Terms (Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017), 2, 
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/glossary20162017.pdf; Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation 
Survey: Retirement Plan Provisions in State and Local Government in the United States, 2016, Bulletin 
2786 (Washington, DC: BLS, 2017), Table 13, https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/detailedprovisions/2016/ 
ownership/govt/ebbl0060.pdf. 
121 Joe Davidson, “Trump’s Budget Calls for Hits on Federal Employee Retirement Programs,” 
Washington Post, May 18, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/05/18/ 
trumps-budget-calls-for-hits-on-federal-employee-retirement-programs/?utm_term=.4beb8baf893f. 
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the terminal earnings calculation includes overtime, unused sick leave, or other awards, 
employees are incentivized to seek excessive overtime, work sick, or engage in other 
potentially dysfunctional behaviors in the last years of their career. When an employer 
considers just one year to calculate terminal earnings, the incentive to engage in such 
behaviors in the last year of a career becomes significant. Such provisions give rise to the 
practice of pension spiking, which is the “boosting [of] a worker’s pay for the final year on 
the job to fatten future pension checks.”122 The practice is a common but controversial 
practice at the SLG level, and it hinders a jurisdiction’s ability to assess its future pension 
liabilities accurately.  
Pension plan vesting provisions and related penalties for early retirement may be 
the most motivational provisions in public pensions insofar as they create a retention 
incentive for mid-career employees.123 Vesting requirements normally hinge on a 
minimum number of years of service with a given employer before the employee qualifies 
for pension benefits offered by that particular employer. The mean vesting period for SLG 
pensions is six years, and most plans stipulate minimum age thresholds in addition to 
minimum vesting periods.124 Although a period of six years does not seem too onerous a 
vesting requirement, it is important to highlight that the accrual of pension benefits is not 
linear; as a result, public pensions tend not to be worth much until an employee approaches 
the end of a full career. As Andrew Biggs from the American Enterprise Institute explains 
in reference to SLG-level pension plans,  
Simply vesting does not ensure a public employee a generous retirement 
benefit. Defined benefit (DB) pension benefit formulas are “backloaded,” 
meaning benefits are not earned proportionately to the employee’s years of 
service. Midtenure employees—those who work for a decade or so—
                                                 
122 Associated Press, “‘Legal Pension Spiking’ Will Cost California $800 Million, Audit Says,” 
Mercury News, September 10, 2014, http://www.mercurynews.com/2014/09/10/legal-pension-spiking-will-
cost-california-800-million-audit-says/. 
123 The retention incentives associated with DB pensions are addressed in some depth in Chapter IV. 
124 Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey: Retirement Plan Provisions in State 
and Local Government, Table 4. 
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receive disproportionately low benefits, while full-career employees receive 
disproportionately high benefits.125 
By way of illustration, consider the abrupt form of backloading used by the U.S. military 
such that members do not qualify for any DB retirement benefits until 20 years of military 
service. Under both the military’s legacy retirement system and new “blended retirement 
system,” if a member is discharged a single day shy of 20 years, she receives no DB 
retirement benefits whatsoever.126 Vesting of this sort is called cliff vesting, and few 
pension systems outside the military contain cliff vesting provisions this extreme.127  
Similar but less extreme penalties exist in the federal government’s system for civil 
servants, and such backloading provisions are common among SLG-administered 
retirement plans.128 As Johnson et al. from the Urban Institute have found,  
In half of the traditional plans administered by state governments, 
employees must work at least 20 years before accumulating any employer-
financed pension benefits. . . . Employees in those plans who separate with 
less than 20 service years are better off collecting a refund on their plan 
contributions than waiting to collect a pension at their plan’s retirement age, 
so they effectively gain nothing from their retirement plan. In half of plans 
covering public school teachers, it takes at least 24 years of service to earn 
any employer-financed pension benefits; in half of plans covering police 
officers and firefighters, it takes 18 or more service years.129 
The penalties for leaving before completion of a full career may involve deferral of the 
pension annuity, loss of COLA, or other reductions, and the cumulative result can be 
                                                 
125 Biggs, Not So Modest: Pension Benefits for Full-Career State Government Employees, 6. 
126 Asch, Mattock, and Hosek, The Blended Retirement System, 5–7.  
127 “Cliff Vesting,” Investopedia, accessed October 20, 2016, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
c/cliffvesting.asp?ad=dirN&qo=serpSearchTopBox&qsrc=1&o=40186. 
128 For example, after 25 years of service, federal law enforcement officers receive full pension 
benefits, which involve their pension annuity starting the day after they retire, complete with COLA 
adjustments tied to inflation and lifetime subsidized health benefits. Should a federal LEO choose to retire 
with fewer than 25 years of service, her annuity would be deferred until she turned 62, COLA would be lost 
in the interim years, the annuity would be reduced by 5 percent for every year younger than 62 at 
retirement, and she would lose access to federal health insurance. For details on these provisions, see Don 
Mace, ed., 2015 FERS Retirement Planning Guide (Glen Allen, VA: FEDweek LLC, 2014), 38–43.  
129 Johnson et al., How Long Must SLG Employees Work to Accumulate Pension Benefits, 2. 
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substantial from the employee’s perspective. Overall, backloading is a prominent if not 
character-defining feature of most public-sector DB plans. 
The vesting provisions inherent in most DB pensions create a significant financial 
incentive for employees to remain on the job and continue service with one particular 
employer. After all, in the years prior to reaching a longevity vesting threshold, an 
employee earning credit in a DB plan incurs a significant financial penalty should she 
choose to leave that employer for another. The critical characteristic here has to do with 
the lack of portability built into DB pension plans; that is, if one leaves her employer before 
fully vesting, she cannot transfer credit for years of service from her former employer to 
the next.130 In short, you can’t take it with you, so you have to complete a career to truly 
cash in. 
2. Portable Retirement Instruments 
If DB pension plans are non-portable, then defined-contribution (DC) plans are 
their portable opposites. Defined-contribution plans are expounded in the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) as follows: 
The term “individual account plan” or “defined contribution plan” means a 
pension plan which provides for an individual account for each participant 
and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the 
participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any 
forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such 
participant’s account.131 
Examples of DC retirement instruments include 401(k) plans and the Thrift Savings Plan 
available to the federal workforce. Named for the subsection of the Internal Revenue Code 
that addresses their provisions, 401(k) accounts are commonplace in the private sector. 
                                                 
130 Some may consider the case of military members transferring to civil service an exception here. 
Veterans who leave the military before reaching the 20-year cliff vesting threshold may receive credit for 
their years of military service in the FERS system. This, however, involves some payments from the 
veteran; the value of the FERS DB component does not compare favorably to the legacy military retirement 
system; and the veteran is essentially not changing employers as she is moving from one federal job (the 
military) to another. Therefore, the validity and degree of portability here is dubious. For details, see Mace, 
2015 FERS Retirement Planning Guide, 55–58.  
131 29 U.S.C. §1002 (34). 
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Defined-contribution plans offered by SLG employers are typically 457(b) plans.132 All 
such instruments, including Roth accounts, motivate employees to save for retirement by 
providing a means to defer taxes on current earnings or future associated investment 
returns, and most employers offer a nominal degree of contribution matching. Because 
monetary contributions from employees in such plans are not compulsory—and if an 
employee contributes nothing, there is nothing for the employer to match—some might 
argue that DC instruments are more “offerings” than employee benefits. Gaining the 
benefit from participation in such plans is an exercise in personal investing, tax-savings, 
and managing liquidity than a form of deferred compensation from one’s employer.133  
For the employer, DC retirement instruments have both cost- and risk-related 
advantages. Due to the accounting, regulatory compliance, and other noncore business 
activities involved in administering a pension plan, the provision of any sort of plan 
involves non-trivial overhead costs for the employer. However, as Bailey and Kirkegaard 
have observed, the regulatory environment had evolved in such a way that DB plan 
administrative costs outpaced that of DC plans by a ratio of three to two from 1981 to 
1996.134 More significantly, because any contributions by the employer are made up front, 
                                                 
132 Government Accountability Office, State and Local Government Pension Plans, 25. 
133 The term “deferred compensation” in reference to pensions may be politically charged for some 
readers. Union supporters and others with more labor-leaning political inclinations would likely 
characterize DB pensions as the payback of a loan. That is, workers loan their time, effort, and productivity 
in exchange for a future annuity. People with a contrary political inclination might see pensions as 
unearned benefits or an entitlement with dubious origins—the idea being that public servants earn wages 
while working, so any future payments made without commensurate time, effort, or productivity are 
illegitimate. One source that expresses this contrary view is the Reason Foundation’s Adam B. Summers. 
This thesis does not resolve such politically charged differences. Instead, it takes the position that DB 
pensions represent a promise of deferred compensation from the employer to the employee. Whether or not 
that promise is kept is another matter that is fleshed out in the scenario analysis in the conclusive chapters. 
Relatedly, readers interested in exploring the philosophical nature of the exchange between a government 
and its public servants and the practical implications of paying public-servant pensions in austere times 
should consider Lodge and Hood’s thoughts on these subjects. Adam B. Summers, Pension Reform Case 
Study: San Jose, Policy Study 429 (Los Angeles: Reason Foundation, 2014), 2–3, 32, https://reason.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2014/02/pension_reform_san_jose.pdf; Martin Lodge and Christopher Hood, “Into an 
Age of Multiple Austerities? Public Management and Public Service Bargains across OECD Countries,” 
Governance 25, no. 1 (January 2012): 82–85, 89–91, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01557.x. 
134 One caveat here is that the regulatory requirements levied on private-sector employers by ERISA 
far outweighed any levied on public-sector employers. Baily and Kirkegaard, U.S. Pension Reform: 
Lessons from Other Countries, 382–386. 
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there is no way a funding gap can develop between benefits and resources; there is no way 
such a plan can become insolvent because all the investment risk and longevity risk are 
passed on to the employee.135  
What may be most consequential about DC plans for this thesis, however, is the 
fact they are portable. Under a DC construct, a worker can amass wealth for retirement 
irrespective of her longevity or years of service with any one employer; she can move from 
one jurisdiction to another or between the public and private sectors without suffering the 
financial setbacks that would befall a DB participant attempting similar mobility during a 
career. As explored in the next chapter, pension portability has implications for employee 
turnover and the ability for some entities to retain human capital. 
3. Social Security  
The portability of Social Security retirement benefits is similar to that of DC 
instruments. As an employee moves from one employer to the next, her Social Security 
benefits move with her without incurring financial setbacks. Any discussion of Social 
Security in the context of government employees and pensions, however, needs to address 
the consequences of the legal evolution of the Social Security system. When first passed in 
1935, the Social Security Act prevented government employees from participating in the 
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security) program.136 At the federal 
level, civil service employees did not pay into the Social Security system or earn Social 
Security credit pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). 
This changed in the 1980s when legislation moved newly hired federal civil servants from 
CSRS to a new system named the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS). As 
Gale, Holmes, and John explain, “FERS combined a less generous defined benefit plan 
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than CSRS, mandatory enrollment in Social Security, and a new DC plan with extensive 
employer matching.”137 The CSRS-to-FERS transition represented significant, structural 
changes to the system and moved federal civil servants from a purely DB plan to a blended 
or hybrid system with multiple components. 
At the SLG level, employees were excluded from Social Security until legislative 
changes in 1950 gave states the ability to participate in the program.138 However, before 
an SLG entity could change its retirement system to include Social Security, it had to hold 
a referendum for voter approval and enter into a “Section 218 Agreement” with the Social 
Security Administration. All 50 states have successfully gone through the referendum 
process, but because different positions—police, firefighters, public administrators, and 
teachers to name a few—are covered under separate Section 218 Agreements, not all 
occupational groups in all states have moved to participate in Social Security.139 As a 
result, SLG-level pension systems fall into one of two categories: those that exclude Social 
Security and those that do not. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 24 percent of 
SLG workers are not covered under Social Security as of 2016.140 Significant from a 
homeland security perspective, Mitchell et al. have observed that a higher proportion of 
public-safety workers are in plans that fall into this category.141 Further, as Gale, Holmes, 
and John observed, “Virtually no [SLG workers] are covered by Social Security in Ohio 
and Massachusetts, and in five other states—Nevada, Louisiana, Colorado, California, and 
Texas—coverage rates are below 50%.”142 Thus, the distribution of pension plans that 
exclude Social Security is not uniform across the country.  
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As noted earlier, benefit multipliers among pension plans at the SLG level that 
exclude Social Security tend to be higher to make up the difference for lost Social Security 
benefits. This is consistent with Gale, Holmes, and John’s work, which showed a positive 
correlation between pension valuation for career public servants and the proportion of 
workers excluded from Social Security in a given state.143 In other words, there is a “link 
between pension generosity and Social Security” on a state-by-state basis: the higher the 
proportion of SLG workers not covered by Social Security, the more generous the public 
pension payouts.144 Despite this higher level of pension generosity, some might consider 
it an advantage to be a Social Security participant. After all, relying on more than a single 
source for one’s retirement finances is a means of diversification. Nevertheless, given the 
public’s lackluster confidence in the Social Security system, such diversification may have 
little value in the minds of SLG workers, and many may believe it more secure to receive 
their retirement income solely from a well-managed, well-financed pension fund than to 
be forced to rely on anything from Social Security.145  
Of course, this line of thinking would depend on the reliability of the individual’s 
pension fund. Along this line, Gale, Holmes, and John found an intriguing correlation 
between levels of Social Security participation and pension plan funding: “There is a 
positive correlation between states that have high unfunded liabilities as a share of annual 
tax revenue and states where a high share of [SLG workers] are not covered by Social 
Security.”146 To appreciate the significance of unfunded liability levels requires an 
exploration of pension plan finances, which is the subject of the next section.  
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B. PENSION FUNDING AND FINANCIAL HEALTH 
1. Federal Pension Funds  
For some readers, it may be important to stipulate that federal pension trust-fund 
balances are not what the Congressional Research Service describes as “stores of wealth” 
like private-sector or SLG-level public pension funds.147 As such, federal pension trust 
funds are a bookkeeping abstraction; the assets they hold “function solely as a record of 
budget authority” rather than anything that can be sold for cash.148 Despite the virtual 
nature of the accounting practices governing such pension funds, from an economic 
standpoint, they very much exist; federal pension trust-fund surpluses reduce the unified 
federal budget deficit, and shortfalls have the opposite effect.149  
For the federal civil service, DB pension payments are made from the Civil Service 
Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF), and the Office of Personnel Management acts 
as a fund manager. Contributions to the CSRDF come from federal employees, their agency 
employers, and investment inflows. Investment returns come exclusively from U.S. 
Treasury securities because, by law, 100 percent of the fund’s assets must be held in 
instruments “backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government.”150 While 
annuity payments to both CSRS and FERS annuitants come from the same fund, the FERS 
defined-benefit component is legislatively required to be fully funded using accrual 
accounting metrics. As the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) explains, “Employers of 
workers in FERS are required to set aside enough money each year from the combined 
contributions by employers and employees to pay the retirement benefits accrued by those 
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workers that year.”151 This requirement speaks volumes about the financial motivation 
behind the aforementioned federal transition from CSRS to FERS; it essentially required 
the system to pay for itself and, in doing so, shifted the system from pay-as-you-go 
financing to advance funding.152  
Paradoxically, the pay-as-you-go requirement does not mean that the CSRDF 
shows zero unfunded liabilities attributable to FERS in its current financial reports, but that 
has to do with an accounting practice that effectively has FERS employee contributions 
earmarked to partially fund CSRS payouts.153 CSRS and FERS pension payments 
combined exceed inflows from employee and employer contributions and investment 
revenue, so the system is still generating liabilities that must be covered by injects from the 
Treasury’s general fund.154 According to the Office of Personnel Management, as of the 
beginning of fiscal year 2016, the CSRDF’s net assets were $873.3 billion available for 
benefit payments under both CSRS and FERS.155 At the same time, the civil service trust 
fund had an unfunded actuarial liability of $789.6 billion, consisting of $739.6 billion 
attributable to CSRS and $50 billion to FERS.156 Projecting forward, the combined 
unfunded actuarial liabilities of CSRS and FERS are projected to peak in the mid-2020s 
and fall off precipitously from there.157 This may be a function of demographics with the 
number of CSRS recipients decreasing due to mortality. As a result, according to the 
Congressional Research Service, “the CSRDF will be able to meet its financial obligations 
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in perpetuity”; this result is due, in part, to the structural reform that switched federal civil 
servants from CSRS to FERS.158  
A separate federal-level pension fund, known as the Department of Defense 
Military Retirement Fund, is responsible for DB payments for the military retirement 
system.159 The Department of Defense reports that the fund “receives income from three 
sources: (1) normal cost payments from the Services and U.S. Treasury; (2) payment from the 
U.S. Treasury to amortize the unfunded liability; and (3) investment income.”160 Like the 
CSRDF, the investment income for the Military Retirement Fund comes exclusively from 
instruments “backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.”161 It should be 
emphasized that, like the CSRDF, the military retirement system receives injects from the 
Treasury whenever outflows exceed inflows. However, the Military Retirement Fund’s 
unfunded liabilities are projected to diminish in the future, and these projected reductions 
can be attributed in part due to the military’s full implementation of the Blended Retirement 
System starting in 2018.162  
In summary, the financial condition of both the federal civil service and military 
pension trust funds is projected to improve over time. These improvements are partially 
attributable to pension system reforms, and though it will take decades for the systems’ 
unfunded liabilities to be eliminated, injects from the Treasury enable the federal 
government to pay pensions today while making progress in amortizing pension debt.  
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2. State and Local Pension Funds  
Conventional wisdom dictates that state and local governments do not have the 
same budgetary flexibility as the federal government; their spending is more closely tied 
to revenue. In the funding of pensions, however, state and local governments have an 
advantage over the federal government in that they can invest in stocks, real property, and 
other private investment instruments. On a long-term investment horizon, such instruments 
have historically provided returns superior to those of government paper. Accordingly, 
subnational governments have come to rely on those investment returns to fund their 
pension commitments. Such investment returns are volatile, so in periods of 
less-than-expected investment performance, pension fund liabilities may exceed assets. 
When this occurs, the options available to state and local governments include increasing 
employer or employee contributions (incremental pension reform), cutting costs by cutting 
staff, or borrowing. Such measures can prove politically challenging for SLG officials; 
increased contributions get passed on to the public through increased fees or taxes; cutting 
staff means cutting services, which takes a political toll; and authorization for borrowing 
at the state level frequently involves challenging processes such as legislative or direct 
voter approval.  
There is another option with less immediate political and financial implications 
available to state and local jurisdictions when investments underperform: shortchanging 
pensions by not providing sufficient funds. Presumably, a jurisdiction would only do this 
in the hopes that future investment returns make up the difference. An observer can tell a 
pension fund has been shortchanged when a jurisdiction fails to meet its annual required 
contribution (ARC) target in a given year. The ARC is an amalgam of “the employer’s 
contribution to cover its share of normal cost (the cost of accruing benefits) and the 
payment required to amortize the unfunded liability.”163 Thus, a pension fund’s assets on 
hand diminish and debt increases when its controlling jurisdiction fails to meet the ARC. 
Josh Barro, journalist and former senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy 
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Research, refers to such “failure to pay for pension commitments as they accrue” as a 
“backdoor borrowing vehicle.”164 This practice may lead to financial challenges in the 
long run, but it alleviates the political will necessary to enact the aforementioned funding 
measures. In other words, such ARC shortfalls are financially imprudent but politically 
expedient. 
Some might wonder how such underfunding fits within a legal structure. After all, 
in the private sector, rules levied by ERISA require DB pension-plan funding levels to be 
maintained at pre-determined minimums.165 ERISA, however, does not apply to the public 
sector. Further, while some states have policies that require pension fund contributions to 
ARC target levels, legal challenges and other factors give these policies little meaning in 
practice.166 Thus, there is nothing compulsory about the annual required contribution.  
Nevertheless, most SLG jurisdictions made good-faith efforts to meet ARC targets 
between 2001 and 2013, according to the National Association of State Retirement 
Administrators (NASRA).167 Aggregating ARC funding levels over the same period, the 
NASRA further found that “the minority of states who fell well short of their ARC 
requirements disproportionately impact the overall average experience of public pensions 
receiving their annual required contributions.”168 The result for the period 2001–2013 
involved $657 billion of funds received against a combined nationwide ARC of $779 
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billion; this yielded a “weighted average ARC received” below 85 percent.169 Similar to 
the ineffectiveness of state policies requiring pension contributions meeting ARC targets, 
state balanced-budget requirements also have little positive impact.170 In fact, as argued 
by Chaney, Copley, and Stone, the existence of such balanced-budget requirements 
actually drives states to reduce funding of pensions under conditions of fiscal stress.171 In 
light of this, Barro’s characterization of pension underfunding as “backdoor borrowing” 
seems particularly apt.  
The chronic underfunding by states like New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Washington, 
and Colorado raises questions about the financial health and solvency of SLG pension 
plans. The answer to such questions lies in assessing the levels of pension debt or funded 
ratios—measures of the degree to which liabilities exceed assets—facing the nation’s SLG 
pension funds, but aggregates alone do not tell the whole story. After all, if the 
aforementioned underperformers are driving the nationwide ARC contribution rate, how 
does one account for states like Connecticut, Montana, Maine, and West Virginia, which 
exceeded ARC funding levels for the period 2001–2013?172 Analyzing the SLG retirement 
system as a whole does not convey the realities each pension plan or jurisdiction faces, and 
with over 299 distinct state-administered and 5,977 locally administered retirement 
systems, one can expect great diversity in the financial health of the numerous plans in the 
United States.173 Nevertheless, nationwide aggregates do show the system to be in a 
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tenuous financial condition overall, and this suggests that below-average pension funds are 
truly in dire condition. For the moment, then, this analysis will remain focused on 
aggregates as an avenue through which to explore government pension funding, discern 
broad trends, and highlight the impetus for reform. Later, when the thesis sets out to craft 
plausible future scenarios, the diversity of health of different pension plans (or groups of 
plans) will be a significant consideration.  
Access to the historically superior investment returns of the capital markets is a 
blessing for SLG pension funds, but the downside of the market cycle can be a curse. 
Indeed, much of the current pension debt can be attributable to the two financial crises 
since the early 2000s. As Munnell, Aubry, and Quinby from the Center for Retirement 
Research at Boston College explain, “State and local plans were making solid progress 
toward funding until they were thrown severely off course by the bursting of the dot.com 
bubble and the collapse of asset prices in 2008.”174 As of 2011, these scholars estimate 
that the Great Recession had caused aggregate SLG plan value to decline “by about $1 
trillion, substantially undermining the funded status of virtually all state and local 
plans.”175 The capital markets have rebounded since those remarks were made, but the 
national aggregate figures for SLG-level public pension debt remain extraordinary.  
Calculating the amount of pension debt for a given pension fund or group of funds 
involves estimating both investment returns and future benefit payments. The benefit 
estimates factor in future wage growth and the demographic characteristics of the covered 
population: the number of working and retired members, when they will retire, and how 
long they will live. Regarding investment returns, disagreement exists between economists 
and many actuaries over the correct discount rate to use when making projections. 
Economists Brown, Clark, and Rauh claim, “Many plan administrators, policy-makers, DB 
plan actuaries, labor unions, and at least one think tank” use an “inappropriately high 
discount rate, usually 7–9% instead of a rate closer to 4% that would approximate the real 
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rate.”176 Supporting this claim is the NASRA’s recent report that the median investment 
return assumption among SLG pension fund administrators was 7.25 percent.177 Data 
promulgated by the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) illustrate just 
how pension debt estimates can vary when using these different discount rate assumptions. 
According to SIEPR, the aggregate SLG-level pension debt as of 2017 was as follows:  
 
 $5.176 trillion or $43,113 per household on a market basis 
 $1.530 trillion or $12,752 per household on an actuarial basis178 
A conservative, economist-preferred discount rate was used to calculate the “market basis” 
figures while an aggressive, fund administrator–preferred discount rate was used to 
calculate the “actuarial basis” figures.  
Regardless of the basis used, when expressed in absolute and per household dollar 
terms, these funding gap estimates seem daunting. It is all the more concerning that the 
SLG debt levels as a share of the gross domestic product have remained at historically high 
levels since the depths of the Great Recession, according to Pew Charitable Trusts (see 
Figure 1).179 Some may find more revealing the ratios of aggregate pension-fund asset 
values over liabilities—funding ratios—using both bases: they are just 44.6 percent and 
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73.1 percent using SIEPR’s market and actuarial bases for 2017, respectively.180 Still, 
others may find the “per household” figures most meaningful. If one believes that pension 
funds can only achieve conservative investment returns—3 percent (market basis)—then 
every household would have to write a check for $43,113 just to make the nation’s SLG 
public-employee pension system whole.181 That is, checks collected from every household 
would hypothetically go into the pot of assets such that all the nation’s SLG pension plans 
would have a funding ratio of 100 percent with assets equal to liabilities. With a 100 percent 
funding ratio achieved, pension funds would not have to liquidate principal and dig an 
increasingly bigger hole to pay current annuitants, and the ARC would consist exclusively 
of the cost of pension benefits accrued each year (normal costs). Alternatively, if one 
believes these SLG funds will consistently achieve better investment returns—7.5 percent 
(actuarial basis)—then it will be much cheaper, but every household would need to come 
up with $12,752 just to make the aggregate SLG public employee pension system 
whole.182  
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Figure 1.  State and Local Pension Debt as a Share of GDP183 
As of this writing, 2017 was the most recent data available, and there are three key 
takeaways that emanate from this data point. First, the nation’s SLG pension system is 
underfunded in aggregate. Second, the magnitude of the funding gap depends on 
assumptions about pension funds’ expected investment returns (discount rate). Third, 
regardless of whether one makes conservative or optimistic discount rate assumptions, 
aggregate SLG pension debt amounts to a consequential five-figure sum on a per-
household basis. In addition to these points, the trends appear less than promising. Consider 
the graphic in Figure 2, which shows the summary findings from the NASRA’s Public 
Fund Survey.  
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Figure 2.  Summary Findings: 2017 NASRA Public Fund Survey184 
At face value, NASRA has illustrated how funding ratios have not improved commensurate 
with the rebounding capital market performance since the depths of the Great Recession. 
However, a caveat to this is that “the actuarial value of assets reflects the phasing-in, or 
smoothing, of investment gains and losses”; most plans had “completed recognition of the 
sharp investment losses incurred in 2008–09” such that those losses have since been offset 
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by market gains.185 Thus, absent this “smoothing” from fund accounting practices, the 
graphic would have shown a sharper decline and rebound between 2008 and 2016, but the 
end result would still be actuarial funding ratios in the low 70 percent range. This funding 
ratio represents a significant downward trend compared with the mid and early 2000s. 
The diminishing funding ratios beg the question of how long it will take for SLG 
retirement systems to run out of money, making them unable to meet the commitments 
made to current and former employees. The aforementioned 2011 article from Munnell, 
Aubry, and Quinby provides a metric for answering this question:  
The simplest place to start is the ratio of plan assets to benefits, which shows 
for how many years’ plans could—with no further investment returns, no 
additional contributions, and no growth in benefits—continue to pay 
benefits. . . . [For example], in 2001, assets were 23 times annual benefit 
payments, suggesting that with money on hand state and local plans in the 
aggregate could continue to pay benefits for 23 years. In the wake of the 
bursting of the dot.com bubble, this ratio dropped for the next 4 years to 19, 
and was headed back up until the financial crisis of 2008. The ratio now [as 
of 2011] stands at 13. Moreover, plans are distributed around that average 
ratio. . . . One plan—Kentucky ERS—has a ratio of 5, and 33 plans—
including large plans such as Illinois SERS, New Jersey PERS, and New 
York City ERS—have ratios between 6 and 10.186  
Applying this “starting point” to the 2015 data would yield much the same answer, as the 
funding ratios have been fairly consistent since 2011. So, this heuristic provides a quick 
and simple way to assess how long a given pension fund or group of funds has until its 
“exhaustion date” or insolvency. The heuristic itself, however, involves some fairly rigid 
assumptions about return on investments, contributions, and benefits, and as is discussed 
in the following section, from a financial perspective, the essence of retirement reform 
involves changing these assumptions to extend the life of the pension fund to perpetuity or 
to some target end date.  
Munnell, Aubry, and Quinby’s analysis, however, did not end with this 
straightforward heuristic. These scholars applied different approaches—“termination” and 
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“ongoing”—to refine their exhaustion date estimates for SLG pension funds.187 Further, 
because each SLG fund is a separate entity with its own unique funding ratio, their analysis 
projected a distribution of how many plans will fail sooner and later. The explanation here 
is not intended to delve too deeply into the work of these economists. Rather, the point is 
to stress that expert analysis projects over half of the nation’s SLG pension plans becoming 
insolvent before 2030 and most of the rest running out of money by 2040.188 This occurs 
before career SLG-level workers who are currently approaching retirement reach their mid-
80s. This result should be disconcerting to anyone expecting the government to meet its 
obligations and concerned about the effects if it fails to do so. It should be especially 
disconcerting for stakeholders in jurisdictions with pension funds whose financial health is 
below average. After all, their retirement system’s timeline to insolvency will be shorter 
than average.  
C. REFORM: EVOLUTION, TRENDS, AND ADEQUACY  
If the previous section framed pension reform as a financial necessity, then this 
section addresses questions of how government jurisdictions have responded, thus far, to 
address pension debt and achieve sustainability for public pensions. To some extent, the 
concepts introduced early in the chapter provide levers that can be manipulated by states 
and local jurisdictions to adjust their pension plans incrementally; reducing benefit 
multipliers, lengthening the periods used to determine terminal earnings, changing COLA 
provisions, or even introducing rules to curtail pension spiking could move pension plans 
toward a more solid financial footing. Beyond manipulating these levers, more 
fundamental, structural change—such as transitioning to hybrid plans or abandoning the 
DB pension construct altogether for DC instruments—will have a more significant 
financial impact. Federal reform is discussed in this section because of the instructive 
                                                 
187 Under the termination approach, benefits already accrued are put in one plan separate from future 
accruals; future benefit accruals are assumed to be fully covered by future contributions, so it provides a 
way to calculate how long existing accrued benefits can be paid using existing assets. In the “ongoing” 
approach, past and future accruals (and hence pension debt) are comingled. Munnell, Aubry and Quinby, 
“Public Pension Funding in Practice,” 264. 
188 Munnell, Aubry and Quinby, “Public Pension Funding in Practice,” 265. 
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example it provides, but the emphasis is on the SLG level and whether current reforms are 
adequate to address SLG pension debt in the long run.  
1. Federal Reform 
The most significant reform to the federal pension system was mentioned in the 
previous section: the 1980s’ transition from CSRS to FERS. That transition moved federal 
civil servants from a purely defined-benefit, non–Social Security pension to one offering 
employees a benefits triad consisting of DB and DC components along with access to 
Social Security. This structural reform came in reaction to daunting financial realities. 
When COLA adjustments from the inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s drove federal 
pension liabilities markedly higher, Congress passed and President Reagan signed into law 
the Federal Retirement Reform Act of 1986, which established FERS.189 Even though the 
FERS benefit multiplier is half that of its predecessor, this transition did not reverse the 
system’s financial fortunes overnight because it affected only new federal employees hired 
after January 1, 1987. Nevertheless, this structural reform weaned the federal system off 
an expensive pay-as-you-go system to one legally required to fund pension benefits as they 
accrue. Arguably, this has worked given the projected improvements in the CSRDF’s 
unfunded liabilities discussed previously.  
What is more significant for this thesis, however, is that this structural reform 
fundamentally changed the equation for federal employees. The addition of Social Security 
and matching in the DC component meant that they were earning retirement benefit value 
that they could take with them if they left federal service. Further, for federal employees 
who serve a full career, even though the benefit multiplier of the DB component was cut 
in half under FERS, the overall value of pension benefits under the FERS system was 
                                                 
189 Gale, Holmes, and John, Public Pensions in Flux, 2–3; Federal Employees’ Retirement System 
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comparable to CSRS.190 Therefore, from an employee’s perspective, the most significant 
change stemming from the CSRS-to-FERS transition was the creation of some degree of 
portability in their federal retirement benefits.  
In the decades since the FERS transition, the federal system has remained relatively 
unchanged, but recently, the federal government increased employee contributions to the 
DB component of FERS. Specifically, two changes in close succession increased 
participant contributions five-fold—from 0.8 percent of salary to 4.4 percent—for 
employees who started after January 1, 2014.191 This reform will help improve the 
financial health of the CSRDF, but it will also diminish the value of the DB pension benefit 
from the federal employee’s perspective. Overall, however, this employee contribution 
increase hardly equates to the structural changes made in the 1980s, so this recent reform 
may be characterized as more incremental than systemic.  
Likewise, the military’s transition to the so-called Blended Retirement System may 
also be characterized as incremental. The military’s new system involves a reduction in the 
benefit multiplier from 2.5 percent to 2 percent and offsets this modest 20 percent reduction 
by adding employer matching to the existing DC instrument, the Thrift Savings Plan.192 
Interestingly, it preserves the 20-year cliff vesting period but includes retention bonuses 
for mid-career employees, and it also offers a lump-sum payout option.193 This new system 
was intended as a way to recruit millennials who tend to favor more flexible retirement 
                                                 
190 According to Hyde and Naff, FERS “paid about the same in benefit levels as the old civil service 
retirement system (CSRS) after Social Security is factored in.” Hyde and Naff, “Public Sector Pensions and 
Benefits: Challenges in a New Environment,” 161. It should be noted that other observers provide slightly 
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CSRS because expected lifetime wealth is predicted to be greater” under a variety of assumptions. Asch 
and Warner, Separation and Retirement Incentives in the Federal Civil Service, xii, 47. 
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options than other generations.194 It may help accomplish that goal, but the changes seem 
less consequential than those involved in the civil service transition from CSRS to FERS.  
2. Reform at the State and Local Level 
While the financial challenges and low funding ratios facing SLG-level pension 
systems are unique in the system’s history, change and reform are not. Hyde and Naff 
delineate four phases or eras in the evolution of SLG-level public-sector retirement 
systems: the 1930–1950 “Social Security Exclusion Era,” the 1950–1980 “Social Security 
Inclusion Era,” the 1980–2000 “Growth and Investment Era,” and the 2000 to present 
“Return to Fiscal Realities Era.”195 The first era no longer affects anyone in the labor force 
(and a rapidly declining population of annuitants), and it represents the era when public 
servants were covered exclusively by employer-sponsored DB plans with relatively high 
benefit multipliers. As previously discussed, legislative changes in the 1950s allowed SLG 
employees to participate in the Social Security program, but not all plans made the 
transition, and numerous non–Social Security plans still exist today. Benefit multipliers 
dropped during the second era as plans enabled their employees to vest in Social Security, 
and the Growth and Investment Era was characterized by remarkable confidence in 
financial markets by state and local governments. During this third era, “governments 
realized that investment returns (i.e., earning on investments) could allow for more 
generous payments to beneficiaries without raising either employee or employer 
contributions levels and causing undue fiscal stress on governments.”196 Unfortunately, 
such generosity has proven difficult to pare down despite diminished investment returns 
during the Return to Fiscal Realities Era.  
Perhaps the strong market performance of the 1980s set state and local jurisdictions 
up for failure by providing false expectations about funding available for DB pensions. No 
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matter what the root causes, the market shocks of the 2000s ushered in the current era in 
which “many state and local retirement plans are on an unsustainable course, having failed 
to set aside enough money to fund the promises they have made.”197 This begs the question 
of what the state and local governments have done to adjust to these fiscal realities and 
whether any reforms pursued thus far have been adequate.  
Regarding recent reforms, NASRA researchers Brainard and Brown observed that 
change for the thousands of state and local government retirement systems in the United 
States fall in an observable pattern. Specifically, the most common types of reform include 
the following: (1) increased employee contributions, (2) decreased retirement benefits, (3) 
reductions in the plans’ COLA methodology, (4) increased vesting or longevity 
requirements to qualify, and in some cases, (5) the abandonment of defined-benefit 
retirement plans altogether.198 Across this spectrum, these changes have affected current 
and future employees exclusively, and in many cases, the steepest cuts or contribution 
increases applied only to newly hired employees (hereinafter “new hires”).199 As a result, 
there was generally no diminishment of benefits for current retirees. Further, every pension 
plan is unique. These researchers observed that “one overarching characteristic shared by 
most of the reforms is a shift from employers to employees of the risk associated with 
financing retirement benefits.”200 Indeed, any change that reduces the value of an 
employee’s DB pension shifts the risk from employer to employee.  
Other observers, including the Pew Center on the States and accounting scholar 
Adriana Cordis, have used legislative data compiled by the National Conference of State 
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Legislatures to analyze reform trends coming out of the great recession, and their 
assessments closely match those of NASRA.201 According to Pew, 
The most common actions included asking employees to contribute a larger 
amount toward their pension benefits; increasing the age and years of 
service required before retiring; limiting the annual cost-of-living (COLA) 
increase; and changing the formula used to calculate benefits to provide a 
smaller pension check. States also have cracked down on abuses, such as 
the practice of “spiking” final pay to get a larger pension check by including 
overtime pay and sick leave.202 
In addition to these trends, Cordis remarks that reform will increase the amount of risk 
borne by employees, concluding that “state pension and retirement legislation enacted in 
the recent years across the United States shows a clear trend: states are reducing the 
generosity of public pensions in an effort to control costs and enhance sustainability.”203 
Further, due to political considerations, most reforms apply exclusively to current 
employees and new hires; in some instances, reformers have attempted to make changes 
impacting current retirees—through attempts to freeze, trim, or eliminate COLA 
increases—but such attempts have resulted in legal challenges that leave ultimate outcomes 
uncertain.204  
As with recent reform at the federal level, most of the aforementioned reform 
activity may be characterized as incremental rather than systemic. Admittedly, a shift away 
from exclusive reliance on traditional DB pensions toward DC arrangements has taken 
place in some cases. It bears emphasis, however, that such reform activity among the states 
has been “modest” since the financial crisis, according to Munnell, Aubry, and Cafarelli.205 
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As of 2014, these authors note that only Michigan and Alaska introduced plans requiring 
newly hired state employees to participate in an exclusively DC plan, and six states 
switched from a traditional defined-benefit plan to a hybrid plan. 206 Further, in a unique 
development that drew legal challenges, three states introduced legislation to switch to cash 
balance plans.207 The motivation for such shifts, according to Munnell and her colleagues, 
lies in “a desire to avoid future unfunded liabilities, to reduce investment and [longevity] 
risk, and to provide some benefits to short-tenure workers.”208 Furthermore—and most 
significantly—wherever DC arrangements have been introduced, overall retirement benefit 
levels have diminished as a result.209 This stands in stark contrast to the federal shift to a 
hybrid construct under FERS, which, as previously discussed, was a value-neutral 
transition from the employee perspective.  
Considering all these assessments of SLG pension reform, reform trends can be 
summarized succinctly. “Pension reform” means a transition to a system with diminished 
retirement benefits for new employees where the employee bears more risk. Further, there 
has yet to be a rush to engage in a fundamental shift away from traditional DB 
arrangements, but where such shifts have taken place, the result is (again) diminished 
retirement benefits. Overall, these trends create a bifurcated system of pension benefits in 
which new hires are working toward a less lucrative pension than senior employees have.  
3. Adequacy and Responsiveness of State- and Local-Level Reforms  
Turning attention now to the adequacy of recent SLG-level reforms, a 2013 study 
by Munnell et al. considered a diverse sample of 32 of the largest plans across 15 states 
and explored the manner in which they changed subsequent to the 2007–2009 economic 
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crisis.210 Although the sample size seems small, these plans represented a majority of the 
pension liabilities and membership of nation-wide SLG retirement systems.211 As Munnell 
et al. explain, the study assessed the ARC for every plan under “pre-crisis, post-crisis, and 
post-reform” scenarios and compared the results of each scenario to illustrate the efficacy 
of the reforms made.212 Significantly, the study assumed that the plans studied were funded 
at 100 percent of ARC (zero shortfalls), so ARC was an effective measure of pension plan 
financial health because meeting ARC targets equates to amortizing existing levels of 
pension debt over time. The detail and level of analysis used in this study were remarkable 
and beyond the scope of this discussion, but the authors provided an overall assessment 
that was “encouraging” in their view:  
The results show that most of the sample plans responded with significant 
pension reforms, generally increasing employee contributions and lowering 
benefits for new employees; the changes were largest for plans with serious 
underfunding and those with generous benefits; in most cases, reforms fully 
offset or more than offset the impact of the financial crisis on the sponsors’ 
annual required contribution; and employer contributions to accruing 
benefits for new employees were cut in half, sharply lowering 
compensation for future workers. In short, states have made more changes 
than commonly thought. Whether these changes stick or not is an open 
question.213 [emphasis added] 
This view suggests that the situation may not be quite as dire as the unprecedented level of 
pension debt indicates. Furthermore, Munnell et al. conclude that the jurisdictions 
responsible for these plans are addressing their unfunded liability issues in a manner 
proportionate to the magnitude of the challenge faced. That is, when it comes to enacting 
pension reform, state and local governments seem responsive to their financial realities. 
Tellingly, however, the authors warn that jurisdictions will need both to stick with the 
reforms made and to meet ARC targets for their conclusions to hold true, and they admit 
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that the fiscal discipline required to consistently fund to ARC levels has been found lacking 
in many jurisdictions.  
Other pension experts seem to be less encouraged in their assessments of the 
adequacy of pension reform at the SLG level. Pew Charitable Trusts concluded that despite 
benefiting from reforms and strong investment returns since the financial crisis, “state and 
local policymakers cannot count on investment returns over the long term to close this gap 
and instead need to put in place funding policies that put them on track to pay down pension 
debt.”214 More negatively, Bloomberg journalist Josh Barro emphasizes that reforms 
applied exclusively to new hires produce only “negligible short-term savings” in positing 
that “while reform initiatives have been numerous, they have, for the most part, been 
ineffective.”215 Barro’s statements are somewhat dated, though, and despite his somewhat 
sweeping conclusion that “states need to abandon the defined-benefit model” altogether, 
he admits the number of states enacting major reforms had increased in number and 
aggressiveness.216  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced and expanded on a myriad of concepts and terms that could 
prove particularly valuable to a reader with limited or focused knowledge about retirement 
systems used in the public sector. It also gave some indication as to the financial incentives 
embedded in public pensions. Beyond this baseline delineation of concepts and terms, this 
chapter assessed the financial condition of public pension plans from a national, aggregated 
perspective, and it explored the current trajectory of reform efforts.  
From this discussion, it should be clear that something needs to change to shore up 
pension system solvency at the SLG level. The sheer magnitude of the aggregate pension 
debt is staggering, multiple think tanks have engaged in research projecting how long until 
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systems will run out of money, and the most common reforms pursued by government 
entities to this point have been incremental and applied exclusively to new hires. No one 
in the field seems to be suggesting that these concerns are overblown, and despite strong 
investment performance in the recent past, the level of aggregate SLG pension debt has not 
rebounded in a meaningful manner.217 While this may not be true for every pension plan 
at the state and local level—there are thousands of pension plans, after all, and some are in 
excellent shape—the condition of the aggregate system is such that reform would seem to 
be particularly urgent for plans with below-average financial health.  
Thus far, this thesis has focused on the past and present state of affairs with regards 
to public pensions and pension reform. Subsequent chapters refocus on the drivers of 
change and potential future outcomes. In light of current conditions, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that public pensions in many SLG jurisdictions throughout the nation are on the 
precipice of significant change. Such change will come either through proactive, voluntary 
reform or through the kind of forced adjustments that result from financial failure and 
bankruptcy.  
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IV. HUMAN CAPITAL AND LABOR MARKET EFFECTS 
In the effort to identify factors that may influence future scenarios, the previous 
chapter focused primarily on pension finances and present reform trends. This chapter 
shifts the focus away from the current financial realities to explore the potential 
implications of pension reform on the public-sector workforce and labor market. Insight 
into these implications can be gleaned from a variety of academic fields, but the principal 
sources in this chapter come from economics.  
A. IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGING INCENTIVE STRUCTURE  
It is a central theme of economics that incentives promote effort and 
performance.  
 —Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole218 
One need not be an ardent free-market idealist to embrace the notion that workers—
even public servants—behave as rational actors seeking to maximize utility and wealth.219 
Most observers would agree that the financial incentives embedded in an employer’s 
compensation structure not only impact worker productivity but also guide choices made 
by members of the labor force. Further, the influence of a compensation regime extends 
beyond the individual worker to the organization. As Jeffrey Pfeffer suggests, “Decisions 
about pay . . . help establish a company’s culture by rewarding the business activities, 
behaviors, and values that senior managers hold dear.”220 Thus, it seems that a 
compensation structure has the potential to drive profitability—or effectiveness in the case 
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of a public-sector entity—by aligning incentives for the workers with those of the firm or 
mission.  
Consider, for example, the manner in which many private venture-backed 
companies structure compensation for both members of the management team and 
employees with distinct abilities and talents. Before an initial public offering, such 
companies commonly grant stock options with vesting requirements to key members of 
their organizations as a means to retain and motivate them beyond going public.221 
Likewise, merit pay, profit sharing, and other gain-sharing schemes have a similar effect 
on employee motivation and performance, notes Kraizberg, Tziner, and Weisberg.222 In 
the public sector, however, compensation structures tend to be less diverse and, arguably, 
less interesting because there are no profits to share or initial public offerings, and merit 
pay has proven difficult to apply.223 Beyond salary, though, the defined-benefit pension 
construct persists widely in the public sector, but—as discussed in Chapter III—this 
construct is in the process of undergoing significant change. Because there are incentives 
embedded in any compensation scheme, assessing what these incentives are and how they 
will change deserves scrutiny. To the extent that such incentives drive the behavior of 
public servants, the prospect of pension reform raises questions about how pension reform 
will change public servant behavior, productivity, and organizational culture and 
effectiveness.  
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1. Turnover  
Concepts emanating from personnel economics suggest that employee turnover or 
quit rates will increase as a function of pension reform.224 Using an “option value 
approach,” Lazear theorizes that the financial incentives embedded in DB pensions 
motivate workers to remain in service and exert effort until a given age or tenure, at which 
point the incentives motivate them to retire.225 Up to a critical age or tenure, the NPV of 
an employee’s pension annuity increases, but after that critical point, the marginal value 
declines. Intuitively, this is what lies behind the retention incentive for midcareer 
employees mentioned in Chapter III: DB structural features, particularly vesting 
requirements and backloading, create a financial incentive for professionals to stay on the 
job with their employers. The longer an employee remains with a particular employer, the 
more significant these incentives become, and the lack of portability ties the employee to 
the employer. Such retention incentives—described by Thom Reilly and others as “golden 
handcuffs”—serve to keep professionals on the job until they reach a critical point in their 
tenure.226  
Lazear claims that DB pensions “have a profound effect on turnover rates. Far from 
being merely variations of a tax-free savings account, most pension formulas influence the 
entire age-tenure of the firm.”227 Lazear’s conclusion is distinctly instructive for this thesis. 
After all, to the extent that it alters the structure or reduces the value of public-servant 
retirement compensation, pension reform may facilitate the departure of an organization’s 
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most experienced employees. Speaking metaphorically, pension reform seems to be 
turning the golden handcuffs into something embrittled and more apt to crack, like pig iron.  
Much of the data supporting Lazear’s work focus on the private sector, but Lewis 
and Stoycheva establish an empirical correlation between pension reform and turnover 
rates in the public sector.228 Specifically, these public policy scholars analyzed three 
decades of data on mid-career federal employees, comparing turnover rates between 
employees covered under CSRS and FERS. Their conclusions show a remarkable increase 
in turnover between the cohort of federal workers covered under the purely DB, non–Social 
Security CSRS plan and the hybrid FERS plan:  
Removing federal employees’ “golden handcuffs” appears to have freed 
more mid-career employees to leave federal service. Among experienced 
employees in their late 30s to early 50s, turnover rates for FERS employees 
are typically one-third higher than those for comparable CSRS employees. 
This probably benefited the federal employees who chose to leave for better 
jobs or other options, knowing that they could take more of their pension 
benefits with them.229 
In light of these findings, it seems significant to restate that the CSRS-to-FERS transition 
was a value-neutral reform overall.230 As was pointed out in Chapter III, with the FERS 
DB component being worth half that of CSRS and the rest of the value being delivered 
through a DC component and Social Security, the only essential change was to make half 
an employee’s retirement benefits portable. Therefore, this increase in turnover seems to 
be associated with changes to pension plan provisions and not necessarily plan valuation 
or generosity. This seems compelling because it supports Lazear’s emphasis on plan 
provisions and structure—vesting requirements, a lack of portability, and backloading—as 
key factors driving worker behavior and decision making.231 Along these lines, Lewis and 
                                                 
228 Lewis and Stoycheva, “Does Pension Plan Structure Affect Turnover Patterns?,” 787–799. 
229 Lewis and Stoycheva, 797. 
230 Hyde and Naff, “Public Sector Pensions and Benefits: Challenges in a New Environment,” 161; 
Ippolito, “Stayers as ‘Workers’ and ‘Savers,’” 278–280; Asch and Warner, Separation and Retirement 
Incentives in the Federal Civil Service, xii, 47. 
231 Lazear, “Pensions and Deferred Benefits as Strategic Compensation,” 269–270. 
71 
Stoycheva comment that their findings may “understate the impact of a switch from a DB 
to a DC pension plan,” and they surmise that “converting to a full DC plan might double 
the impact on turnover.”232 Such remarks stress the significance of pension plan structure 
and portability as drivers of worker behavior; they suggest that if pension reform involves 
a full conversion to a DC construct, then implications for turnover will be significant even 
if the value or generosity of total lifetime compensation remains unchanged.  
Further, although Lewis and Stoycheva’s dataset was from the federal level of 
government, they extrapolate their findings to the state and local level. Lewis and 
Stoycheva temper their observations about increased turnover by pointing out that federal 
turnover rates are “relatively small” given the high degree of stability of the mid-career 
federal workforce. Citing BLS quit-rate figures, the scholars contend that the SLG 
workforce is inherently less stable such that “a one-third rise in turnover among mid-career 
employees could have more important implications for [SLG jurisdictions].”233 Other 
sources investigate SLG data directly: a study from the Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College, which is discussed in more detail later in this chapter, verifies the 
quantitative increase in employee turnover resulting from pension reform.234 These 
observations make the turnover concerns related to pension reform seem more pressing at 
the SLG level.  
Turnover rates warrant consideration in this thesis because of the negative impact 
increased rates have on organizational performance. As Hausknecht and Trevor explain, 
“Collective turnover can lead to undesirable outcomes because it entails the loss of firm-
specific human and social capital, disrupts operations and collective function, saddles 
remaining members with newcomer socialization and training, and increases recruitment 
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and selection costs.”235 However, because the relationship is curvilinear—“concave 
down”—these management scholars recognize that it is mostly turnover at either very high 
or very low levels that has negative consequences for organizational performance. In 
Hausknecht and Trevor’s words, “Some amount of turnover infuses the collective with new 
ideas, facilitates recruitment of more skilled workers, widens internal promotion 
opportunities, and reduces entrenched conflict.”236 Nevertheless, in meta-analysis testing 
of Hausknecht and Trevor’s model, Hancock et al. counter this point: “The separation and 
replacement costs, human capital losses, and social capital losses of increasing turnover 
rates” will likely outweigh the “functional effects” associated with turnover.237 Thus, 
turnover would seem to be a mixed bag with mostly negative implications. 
Emerging from this predominantly negative relationship between increased 
turnover and organizational performance is the following cautionary syllogism about the 
second-order effects of pension reform: If pension reform increases turnover rates, and 
such turnover diminishes organizational performance, then pension reform diminishes 
organizational performance. Admittedly, while the logic of this syllogism is 
straightforward, the impact here depends on the degree to which one thing leads to the next. 
Moreover, such a sweeping deduction fails to illuminate the types of organizations 
impacted, and it gives short shrift to the underlying factors—human capital and cost—
identified by Hausknecht and Trevor. Accordingly, this discussion turns to explore those 
underlying factors in more detail.  
2. Human Capital as a Driver of Organizational Performance  
Scholars in fields ranging from organizational behavior to sociology to psychology 
describe human capital as involving the knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience 
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embodied in an individual or workforce.238 The term human capital, however, originated 
from the field of economics and was developed most notably in the work of Gary S. Becker 
from the University of Chicago. Becker includes physical health, formal education, and 
values like punctuality and honesty as aspects of human capital. Human capital differs from 
other types of capital “because you cannot separate a person from his or her knowledge, 
skills, health, or values the way it is possible to move financial and physical assets while 
the owner stays put.”239 Human capital further differs from other types of capital in that it 
can be separated from an organization without its consent when an employee quits.  
It seems intuitive that the level of influence human capital has on organizational 
performance will be most significant insofar as it applies to an organization’s senior 
management and key decision-makers. In other words, leadership matters, so an 
experienced, talented, and capable leadership team would have a more positive impact on 
an organization’s performance than a team with less-developed human capital. Regarding 
line employees or “street level” members of organizations, the relationship between human 
capital and organizational performance seems less clear. Crook et al. explored these 
relationships in a meta-analysis of 66 different studies that tested the link between human 
capital and performance outcomes at the organizational level.240 These organizational 
behavior scholars examined whether “there were different performance implications of 
human capital depending on the referent level in the hierarchy from which data were 
drawn.”241 Their analysis confirmed that human capital endowed in the “top management 
team” and among “core employees” has a significant effect on organizational 
performance.242 Even more interesting, human capital “across multiple levels of hierarchy 
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(i.e., the collective organization)” had the most significant impact.243 This led Crook et al. 
to conclude the following:  
With regard to level of hierarchy, we found that when human capital is 
present across multiple levels of hierarchy, the performance implications 
are much stronger than when human capital is present at just one level. A 
key implication for managers is to not just focus on human capital at one 
just level—such as top managers or lower level employees—but instead to 
cultivate human capital across all levels within the hierarchy. Firms that 
invest in only one group are likely to miss important opportunities for 
enhancing performance.244  
This finding about the importance of human capital across the spectrum of a hierarchy 
highlights a facet of the public sector that could influence future scenarios: pension 
constructs in public-sector organizations tend to apply uniformly across all levels of the 
hierarchy, so all levels face similar financial incentives. This contrasts markedly with the 
private sector, where employers have more discretion to tailor and apply compensation 
packages selectively—including incentive instruments such as stock options, profit 
sharing, bonuses, or objectively high salaries—for employees with unique value to the 
firm.  
Crook et al. also differentiated between “valuable but general (e.g., industry 
experience) human capital” and “firm-specific human capital (e.g., years of experience 
with a firm)” in their analysis.245 Their findings showed firm-specific experience as having 
a greater impact on organizational performance, which led them to suggest that 
organizational leaders “should strive to develop a long-tenured workforce whose skills are 
tied to the firm’s unique context.”246 This conclusion supports Hausknecht and Trevor’s 
comments on turnover and organizational performance mentioned earlier. In the larger 
context of this thesis, the conclusions of Crook et al. about firm-specific experience are 
edifying; they intimate that incentivizing the long tenure of employees may positively 
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impact organizational performance. Thus, the retention of long-tenured employees should 
be a consideration when contemplating future scenarios.  
Although the discussion in this section has centered on human capital, a similar 
relationship exists between social capital and organizational performance, as noted by 
Hausknecht and Trevor as well as Hancock et al.247 Weatherly defines social capital as 
follows: “Social capital represents the value that can be found among the relationships 
within the organization to facilitate the transfer of knowledge. Examples of social capital 
could include mentor/mentee relationships, informal networks of long-term 
interdepartmental work associates, and peer relationships.”248 At the risk of giving cursory 
attention to social capital—insofar as some scholars choose to distinguish it from human 
capital—the same relationships and dynamics at play with human capital hold true for 
social capital.249 That is, social capital has economic value for an organization, affects 
organizational performance, tends to be more firm-specific, and is negatively impacted by 
higher rates of employee turnover.250 
3. Self-Selection and Worker Quality  
If workers were undifferentiated commodities, then the most significant aspects of 
human capital would be the knowledge, skills, and abilities that each worker develops on 
the job. Individuals, however, are not commodities, and à la Becker’s definition, human 
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capital includes traits, habits, values, or personal qualities that are developed outside the 
work environment.251 Such traits are imbued in the employee from her family upbringing, 
formal education, or outside life experience; along with job-related knowledge, skills, and 
abilities, such traits will impact the productivity, upward mobility, and overall quality of 
an individual worker.252 No one set of personal traits and skills leads to success or 
effectiveness within every firm or organization; success or effectiveness would depend on 
the degree to which an individual’s traits and skills—her full portfolio of human capital—
align with or match the firm’s culture and mission. According to Lazear and Oyer, 
“Matching the right firms to the right workers creates economic value of a magnitude that 
few other economic processes can,” so the process by which such matches are made may 
be significant to the profitability of the firm or effectiveness of the organization.253  
Economic theory predicts that the structure of compensation schemes affects the 
matching of workers with employers in the labor market. Early theoretical work by Salop 
and Salop in 1976 explains how differing compensation structures drive workers to self-
select or sort themselves among different firms.254 The process of self-selection has a 
positive economic value when the compensation structure attracts productive, high-quality, 
or well-matched employees. Lazear and Oyer succinctly describe how this mechanism 
works: “If some portion of compensation or other parts of the employment relationship 
differ in their value to prospective employees, and if these differences in value are related 
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to productivity, then more productive employees will self-select into an organization.”255 
Thus, the issue relevant to this thesis is whether post-reform public pensions will attract 
more productive, well-matched workers to the public sector. Unfortunately, it is difficult 
to see how an employee’s attraction to pension compensation relates to her productivity; 
unlike the golden handcuffs argument, economic theory offers little to explain this 
particular relationship. Fortunately, though, some compelling empirical studies examine 
the impact of selection effects vis-à-vis public pension reform directly. These studies 
explore and delineate the impact of pension reform in this vein at both the federal and SLG 
level.  
Analyzing federal employee data through the CSRS-to-FERS transition, economist 
Richard Ippolito concludes that the “deferred wage contracts” imbedded in public-sector 
pension arrangements attract better workers.256 In his analysis, Ippolito emphasizes that 
the economic process involved aligns with the theory of self-selection explored by Salop 
and Salop.257 He summarizes the mechanism as follows: 
Any compensation arrangement that emphasizes pensions (or other deferred 
wages) will attract savers, a quality that is positively correlated with an 
individual’s propensity to be a “better” worker. By this I mean that the 
propensity to save is correlated with some unobserved trait that makes an 
individual more likely to turn in a better job performance, holding all other 
observable qualities constant.258 [emphasis added] 
Though the mechanism is unclear because the traits involved are unobserved, there exists 
a correlation between a worker’s quality and her attraction to pensions, according to 
Ippolito. Thus, pension reform may hurt the public sector’s ability to attract the right 
workers to the extent that it diminishes such deferred wages.  
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Ippolito’s analysis is based on federal employee datasets involving “quit rates” and 
401(k) contribution rates as well as job performance ratings, promotion rates, and 
disciplinary actions. Again, his findings show that those who value pensions (“savers”) are 
superior performers (“workers”) who also tend to remain in service longer (“stayers”). 
Ippolito concludes that this relationship between pensions, worker quality, and worker 
retention (turnover) holds true whether the pension involved is a DB or DC 
arrangement.259 This conclusion is intriguing because it seems to contradict the discussion 
about increased turnover earlier in this chapter. However, Ippolito’s comments about the 
effects of DC arrangements are based on a comparison between FERS employee quit rates 
and BLS data on workers who have no employer-sponsored pension plan whatsoever, so 
there is no contradiction.260 Indeed, Ippolito stipulates that the attraction for high-quality 
workers is more profound “in firms that put more emphasis on deferred wages,” as is the 
case under a defined-benefit construct.261 Further, similar to Lewis and Stoycheva, Ippolito 
observes increased federal quit rates (turnover) in the federal employment data, which he 
attributes to the transition from CSRS to FERS.262  
Exploring whether pensions attract quality public servants at the SLG level, 
Munnell, Aubry, and Sanzenbacher merged data from the CRR’s Public Plans Database 
with those from the BLS to examine “the relationship between the generosity of state and 
local pensions and the quality of workers entering and exiting the state and local sector.”263 
The main motivation for this particular study was to test the ideas about savers being high-
quality workers attracted to public service by deferred compensation packages. The goals 
of the study closely paralleled those of Ippolito. Given the SLG focus, this study did not 
have access to the kind of direct measures of quality—job performance ratings, promotion 
rates, and disciplinary actions—available to Ippolito in his assessment of federal worker 
                                                 
259 Ippolito, 306. 
260 Ippolito, 297. 
261 Ippolito, 306. 
262 Ippolito, 290; Lewis and Stoycheva, “Does Pension Plan Structure Affect Turnover Patterns?” 
263 Munnell, Aubry, and Sanzenbacher, Recruiting and Retaining Quality State and Local Workers, 1. 
79 
quality. Instead, Munnell and her colleagues adopted an analytical technique created by 
Harvard economist George Borjas to assess worker quality on the basis of sorting effects 
and the level of wages workers commanded in the private sector.264 In essence, these 
scholars assumed that the salary level a worker commands in the private sector bears a 
direct relationship to her quality as a worker.265 Insofar as the labor market is economically 
efficient between the public and private sectors, this holds as a valid assumption. 
Ultimately, Munnell, Aubry, and Sanzenbacher’s conclusions are consistent with 
Ippolito’s—that pensions do matter in the labor market as firms try to attract high-quality 
workers.266 Moreover, they express concern over the potential consequences of pension 
reform for state and local governments. As these authors conclude, through the process of 
pension reform, “states and localities have reduced the generosity of their pensions for new 
hires. What will the impact of this be on state and local governments’ ability to recruit and 
retain high quality workers? . . . It may be detrimental.”267 Their conclusion about these 
damaging effects on the quality of workers in the public sector is a relevant factor in the 
conclusive chapters’ scenario analysis.  
Other aspects of this study are noteworthy in the context of this thesis. Similar to 
Ippolito’s comments, Munnell, Aubry, and Sanzenbacher acknowledge that the 
relationship between pensions, worker quality, and retention/turnover emerges with 
defined-contribution as well as defined-benefit pension plans.268 In doing so, these authors 
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emphasize pension generosity (valuation) and sorting effects over the effects of the 
retention incentives (golden handcuffs) embedded in DB pension constructs. Intriguing as 
this is, Munnell and her colleagues stop short of quantifying which construct has more 
weight. Nevertheless, if future public pension reform involves significant moves toward 
DC retirement instruments, projected scenarios should account for the influence of DC 
arrangements on worker quality and turnover.  
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED LABOR MOBILITY  
Pensions account for only one part of the compensation for public employees, and 
this fact raises the question of how salaries or wage rates may enter the picture. If, 
coincidentally, with pension reductions, employers were to hold the value of total lifetime 
compensation constant by increasing wages, then how might such increases address the 
maladies delineated in the prior section? Intuitively, wage increases should mitigate the 
negative implications of pension reform with respect to turnover, employee quality, and 
human capital. However, there is more to a job’s compensation scheme than its valuation; 
a scheme’s structure matters because of selection effects and the incentives embedded in 
different schemes. Regardless, as public employers undertake pension reform measures, 
they may have little choice but to rely on wage rates to compete effectively in the labor 
market.269 As public administration scholar Jared Llorens explains, 
Efforts to substantially reduce public sector retirement benefit levels will 
inevitably place a greater emphasis on wage rates within overall 
compensation packages. In other words, if the ability of public employers 
to provide relatively generous, secure retirement benefits is substantially 
reduced, then public employers will most likely be pushed to rely more 
heavily on the competitiveness of their wage rates in the broader recruitment 
and retention arena.270  
Furthermore—and ironically—the very fiscal imperatives that drive public employers to 
reduce their pension benefits negatively impact their ability to raise salaries or wage rates. 
Reforming jurisdictions will likely find themselves in a fiscal catch-22 where the 
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alternative of competing via wage rates requires them to increase tax revenue or reduce 
public services.  
Some think DB pensions distort the labor market, so—using a free-market 
argument—the switch to more wage-based competition will contribute to what economists 
would call “optimal social outcomes.”271 In other words, the more competitive and fluid 
the labor market, the more efficient the allocation of human capital throughout.272 Bailey 
and Kirkegaard apply this argument when they highlight the market-distorting effects of 
public pensions in the United States. These authors acknowledge that “pensions usually 
and rationally make up an important share of the total lifetime compensation package used 
to lure human capital to the public sector”; however, “a detrimental issue arises when 
public-sector pension promises hinder job mobility between the public and private 
sectors.”273 Indeed, a post-reform compensation structure in which current salary 
dominates deferred compensation is one that enhances worker mobility within the labor 
market. Such mobility is crucial for market mechanisms to function.274 Gone (or 
sufficiently diminished) are the golden handcuffs associated with DB pension schemes, 
and if reform shifts the pension from DB to DC arrangements, the portability of DC pension 
schemes still leaves workers capable of moving from one employer to the next without 
penalty. With the distorting effects of DB public pensions reduced through pension reform, 
                                                 
271 For a succinct explanation of how the free market works to “achieve optimal social outcomes,” see 
Andrew Schotter, Free Market Economics: A Critical Appraisal (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 1–
5.  
272 Borjas explains the ideal, economically efficient outcomes delivered by a perfectly competitive 
labor market as follows: “If markets are competitive and if firms and workers are free to enter and leave 
these markets, the equilibrium allocation of workers to firms is efficient; the sorting of workers to firms 
maximizes the total gains that workers and firms accumulate by trading with each other. This result is an 
example of Adam Smith’s justly famous invisible hand theorem, wherein labor market participants in 
search of their own selfish goals attain an outcome that no one in the market consciously sought to 
achieve.” George J. Borjas, Labor Economics, 144. 
273 Baily and Kirkegaard, U.S. Pension Reform: Lessons from Other Countries, 180. 
274 Borjas, Labor Economics, 188. It should be stipulated, though, that mobility costs other than 
pension-related penalties exist. Moving expenses, learning curve effects, job searches, and other mobility 
costs also cause inertia in the labor market.  
82 
wages throughout the market should reach equilibrium with workers sorting themselves à 
la Adam Smith’s invisible hand theorem, resulting in an optimal allocation of resources.275  
While pension reform nudges the public sector’s competition for labor closer to a 
free-market ideal, Adam Smith’s invisible-hand process is not one that spares every 
participant hardship or dislocation. On the contrary, achieving free-market efficiency 
depends on the failure of entities to respond as conditions change. This is the conclusion 
Schumpeter reaches when he argues that the benefits of capitalism come through an 
evolutionary process of “creative destruction” in which players must adapt or perish in the 
face of “competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of 
supply, the new type of organization.”276 In the provision of essential public services, 
however, a purely laissez-faire approach hardly seems apropos; consider the risk involved 
in sitting back and tolerating short-run lapses and disruptions in favor of long-run 
optimality in the homeland security domain. Further, the expectation that pension reform 
will not be enacted uniformly or simultaneously across the public sector introduces some 
questions about the impact on the leaders and laggards. This section explores some of the 
potential ramifications of the public sector’s switching to a more wage-based system, the 
implications as some individual organizations shift ahead of others, and potential 
advantages for public employers competing in a more fluid labor market.  
1. Competition between Public-Sector Entities 
The financial health of public pension funds is diverse across the nation and at all 
levels of government. Some states and local jurisdictions have well-funded, financially 
healthy DB pension funds, so they face little pressure to reform their pension systems. For 
simplicity, this discussion refers to such employers as “healthy” jurisdictions. By contrast, 
“unhealthy” jurisdictions are those with high amounts of pension debt; these are most in 
need of pension reform. Included in this group are states that warrant “serious concern,” 
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according to the Pew Center on the States in 2012.277 As employers, the healthy will be in 
a better position than the unhealthy to compete for human capital in the public sector on 
the basis of their legacy DB pension arrangements or presumed wherewithal to compete 
via wage enhancements.  
Over time, fiscal imperatives will drive unhealthy jurisdictions to diminish or 
abandon the DB component of their compensation structure before the healthy ones. That 
is, unhealthy employers will likely be the early reformers, forced to rely, as Llorens posts, 
on wage rates to compete in the broader labor market.278 In addition, given that the value 
of pension promises made by an employer is ultimately a function of the financial backing 
behind such promises, it seems reasonable to expect upward pressure on the wages in 
unhealthy states and jurisdictions even before material reforms are made. Some evidence 
suggests that such wage pressure and wage-based competition is already taking shape at 
the state level. In 2015, Llorens found that wage rates for SLG employees in unhealthy 
states—specifically those on Pew’s 2012 list—were measurably higher than SLG wage 
rates elsewhere.279 In Llorens words,  
In six out of the ten years observed, wage gap estimates at the state and local 
levels are found to be slightly lower for ‘at risk’ states which implies that 
state and local government employees in these states enjoy higher relative 
wage rates than their counterparts in states with more robust pension 
reserves.280  
To be fair, Llorens stipulates that there may be “overlapping determinants” in explaining 
this divergence in wage rates between the healthy and unhealthy, and his assessment 
includes a call for further research in this area. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
pension fund financial health and wage rates is measurable today, and basic economic 
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concepts dictate that as an employer reduces the value of pension compensation, it has to 
make up the difference in other ways to remain competitive in the labor market.  
At the local level, government employers with unhealthy, locally managed pension 
funds face some distinct challenges given the impact of pension reform on worker mobility. 
After all, the poor funding levels of their existing pension plans will fiscally inhibit their 
ability to compete for new employees on the basis of wages. Therefore, if they enact abrupt 
or sweeping pension reforms, they may lose their current experienced employees to 
neighboring jurisdictions that happen to be healthy. Healthy neighbors will be well 
positioned to cherry-pick experienced mid-career employees from early reformers, and this 
advantage will last as long as the healthy can continue to offer DB plans.  
To illustrate, consider the case of San Jose, California. Unwise financial 
management practices by San Jose’s pension board beginning with the tech bubble of the 
late 1990s left the city’s pension funds woefully underfunded. In the aftermath of the 2008–
2009 financial crisis, the city faced the possibility of municipal bankruptcy. 281 Thus, San 
Jose clearly would have fit the unhealthy category just described. In 2012, city officials 
took the unprecedented step of cutting pensions for current employees (not just new hires), 
which was approved through a ballot initiative, Measure B.282 This bold reform move 
stood to measurably improve the city’s finances. From a short-term political perspective, 
it seemed effective given that the ballot measure was “overwhelmingly approved” with 69 
percent of the vote.283 In the implementation of Measure B, however, there were 
complications, which the Wall Street Journal described as follows:  
What happened next proved sobering for other cities in the same pickle. 
Hundreds of police officers quit. Response times for serious calls rose. 
Faced with labor-union litigation, San Jose this year [2017] restored 
                                                 
281 Summers, Pension Reform Case Study: San Jose, 1–4, 16–17. 
282 Summers, 2–3. 
283 “San Jose Pension Reform, Measure B (June 2012),” Ballotpedia, accessed March 10, 2018, 
https://ballotpedia.org/San_Jose_Pension_Reform,_Measure_B_(June_2012). 
85 
previous retirement ages and cost-of-living increases for existing police 
officers, and last month it gave them a raise.284  
The attrition of officers in the San Jose Police Department (SJPD) was noteworthy. Media 
sources reported that SJPD staffing declined by one-third between 2012 and 2015, and the 
lion’s share of officers transferred to law enforcement agencies of nearby communities, as 
documented by the San Jose Police Officers’ Association.285 The city also struggled to 
staff its police academy with experienced training officers and attract new recruits.286 
Facing this predicament, in 2015 Mayor Sam Liccardo commented, “We’ve got work to 
do on both ensuring that we can get enough officers in the academy that are going to be 
able to help us staff up, and to ensure we create compensation structures that will attract 
those officers to the academy.”287 Ultimately, in 2016, San Jose voters returned to the issue 
of pensions, passing a new ballot measure to replace Measure B. This new measure—
Measure F, which passed with 61 percent voter approval—aims to settle ongoing legal 
battles by reinstating pension benefits for current employees and shifting most reform 
impacts to new hires.288  
The San Jose example may be instructive in a variety of ways in the context of this 
thesis, but this city’s experience seems particularly illustrative of how pension reform may 
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reinstatement of pension benefits effectively solves SJPD’s staffing problems or sets the city up for another 
financial crisis; ultimately, as is the case with many unhealthy states and jurisdictions, the outcome may 
ride on what happens in the capital markets over the next decade or two.  
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affect a local jurisdiction’s competitiveness in the intra-public-sector labor market. In the 
initial days of this case, SJPD Sergeant John Robb, the San Jose Police Officers’ 
Association vice president, explained the dynamics underway: “The laws of supply and 
demand are always in effect and other police agencies have already taken notice that the 
passage of Measure B in San Jose is providing them with an excellent opportunity to recruit 
top talent while saving millions of dollars in training costs.”289 Sergeant Robb’s 
explanation has, thus far, proven prophetic; steps taken with broad public support to 
remedy San Jose’s financial condition ultimately led to a hemorrhage of experienced police 
officers. As a consequence, the loss of seasoned human capital had deleterious implications 
for the department’s effectiveness and the overall security of the community.  
This delineation of San Jose’s recent experiences may be oversimplified in that it 
omits caveats stemming from the San Jose Police Officers’ Association’s efforts to 
persuade new recruits to quit.290 Such efforts distorted the market, exacerbating the SJPD’s 
ability to attract new employees.291 Union activity notwithstanding, the resignations of 
current employees and their impact on public safety metrics are remarkable. Among 
unhealthy jurisdictions, San Jose is not alone. Dallas and Memphis experienced similar 
effects both in terms of police staffing and public safety metrics after implementing pension 
reforms, according to the Wall Street Journal.292 Also, while geography puts Alaska in a 
different category, police staffing levels have suffered since Alaska’s Public Employee 
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Retirement System switched to a purely defined-contribution plan for new hires in 2006.293 
If the maladies faced by these early reformers play out with other unhealthy jurisdictions 
as they compete with their healthy neighbors, the result may be a concentration of human 
capital in healthy jurisdictions. Over time, successive cohorts of workers may start out in 
unhealthy jurisdictions; get the requisite training, certifications, and experience to become 
marketable; and then jump to a healthy employer where they can earn credit toward a DB 
plan. Ironically, the unhealthy could mitigate this flight of human capital with more 
competitive wages or high levels of employer matching under a defined-contribution 
construct, but these hardly seem workable solutions given the fiscal pressure under which 
unhealthy jurisdictions presumably find themselves.  
2. Competition with the Private Sector: The Educational Divide 
Of course, public entities are not just wrestling with each other for human capital; 
they also have to compete with the private sector, but in this market, the post-reform 
dynamics will be different for a variety of reasons. First, for many public-sector functions, 
employers get some relief here because the kind of human capital their current workers 
have developed on the job does not translate readily for many prospective employers in the 
private sector.294 Second, because few employers in the private sector offer DB pension 
plans, the competition in terms of pay is predominantly wage-based. Third, and most 
significantly for this thesis, post-reform public employers may have to offer high-skill 
workers with more education markedly higher wages than at present.  
The first two of these reasons stand on their own, but the third requires some 
explanation. The underlying issue has to do with a clear pattern that public administration 
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scholar Thom Reilly refers to as an educational divide when comparing the public and 
private sectors in terms of pay. Reilly describes this divide as follows: “Without college 
degrees, workers do better working for the public sector while public sector workers with 
degrees do worse.”295 Further, citing others’ data and analysis, Reilly highlights that the 
educational divide is the “clearest pattern to emerge” when assessing public-sector wages 
and salaries.296 In a recent comparison of federal and private-sector compensation, the 
Congressional Budget Office illustrates this divide graphically—perhaps unintentionally—
as shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3.  Average Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Workers by 
Educational Attainment297 
When interpreting this graph and the federal–private divide overall, according to 
the CBO, “the most important factor contributing to differences between the two sectors in 
the costs of benefits is the defined benefit pension plan that is available to most federal 
employees.”298 Additionally, the wage disparity between federal and private sectors does 
not invert—that is, flip to the private sector offering more—until educational attainment 
reaches a master’s degree. At the master’s level, it is the CBO’s valuation of (pension) 
benefits that places federal compensation higher in this side-by-side comparison.299 Thus, 
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the public-versus-private educational divide is quite apparent from the CBO graphic: over 
the spectrum of federal workers, the more educated the worker, the less competitive her 
total compensation, and the critical component of that compensation is a benefits package 
consisting predominantly of DB pension benefits.  
This same educational divide exists at the SLG level. In a similar public–private 
compensation comparison that excluded federal employees, labor economist Jeffrey Keefe 
found that  
state and local governments pay college-educated labor on average 25 
percent less than private employers. . . . The earnings differential is greatest 
for professional employees, lawyers, and doctors. On the other hand, the 
public sector appears to set a floor on compensation. The compensation of 
workers with a high-school education is higher for state or local government 
employees when compared to similarly educated workers in the private 
sector.300  
Further, Keefe’s analysis shows that across all levels of education, the private sector pays 
higher wages, but SLG benefit levels make the total compensation slightly higher for 
employees with education levels below a bachelor’s degree.301  
In the context of this thesis, the current educational divide matters due to pension 
reform’s effect on the relative competitiveness of public compensation at different levels 
of educational attainment. In all likelihood, pension reform will reduce benefit levels—
and, hence, total compensation—in a proportional manner across a given employer’s 
workforce. This will have little impact on the competitiveness of that employer in the 
market for workers with less than a college degree. However, in the market for workers 
with college or, especially, advanced degrees, the competitiveness of public pay vis-à-vis 
the private sector will suffer disproportionately. Thus, the educational divide puts public-
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sector employers that undertake pension reform measures in a bind, and the quandary they 
face is over how to recruit and retain more highly educated workers in a post-reform setting.  
For employers facing this post-reform bind, their response will likely fall 
somewhere between two extremes: (1) do nothing special vis-à-vis wage rates for more 
educated workers, or (2) adjust wage rates across the educational spectrum to match the 
private sector. Under the former, employers accept a reduced level of pay-competitiveness, 
particularly for workers with higher levels of educational attainment. Under the latter, 
employers must increase wages commensurate with pension reductions for more educated 
workers to hold total compensation constant. Each of these responses may have interesting 
second-order effects, which could be factors in determining future scenarios, so the 
subsequent discussion explores each of these responses in turn. 
a. Do Nothing 
If public entities reform pension plans but neglect to address the loss of pay-based 
competitiveness for educated workers—that is, “do nothing”—prospective workers with 
higher levels of education will, in greater numbers, rationally choose the private sector over 
public service. Further, current workers who subsequently enhance their human capital by 
attaining advanced degrees will have elevated their marketability to outside employers; 
such workers should choose to exit at increased rates for similar reasons. In the case of past 
federal reform—where wage rates remained identical for CSRS and (post-reform) FERS 
employees—one would have expected to see evidence of this dynamic at play. Indeed, 
Lewis and Stoycheva observed this pattern in their analysis of post-reform federal 
employee data:  
We expected turnover to be higher for better-educated employees at the 
same grade level. This appears to be true under FERS: graduate degree 
holders have been more likely to exit than high school graduates, with the 
difference largest for those with professional degrees (3.7 percentage 
points). Under CSRS, however, federal employees with bachelor’s, 
master’s, and doctoral degrees have been 0.5–1.4 percentage points less 
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likely to leave federal service than comparable employees with high school 
diplomas.302  
Overall, Lewis and Stoycheva’s conclusion that “graduate degree holders are markedly 
more likely to leave under FERS than CSRS” seems telling.303 Furthermore, in their 
conclusions, Lewis and Stoycheva warn that the increased turnover of the more educated 
“could contribute to a federal brain drain,” effectively leaving “the pipeline of future 
federal leaders” empty.304 To the extent that high levels of educational attainment are 
associated with leadership abilities, the potential for such a brain drain seems disconcerting 
for the future of the public sector in general and the homeland security enterprise in 
particular. 
b. Adjust Wage Rates 
In order to be competitive, public entities that reform their pension plans and choose 
to commit resources to compete for educated workers on the basis of wages must increase 
the wages of high-skilled, educated workers—or, rather, the wage offered the market for 
positions requiring higher levels of educational attainment—relative to less-educated 
workers.305 This will widen or decompress the pay distribution such that it will more 
closely resemble the relatively dispersed distribution of the private sector.306 As a result, 
the educational divide, as described by Reilly, will become less relevant, which should 
mitigate the potential brain drain concerns just described.  
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While this may seem an opaque series of interactions, there is research from Borjas 
to support the notion that the relative compression of wages between the public and private 
sectors has an impact on the public sector’s ability to attract and retain high-skilled 
workers.307 In a historical exploration of shifting public and private wage structures from 
1960 to 2000, Borjas framed the dynamics at play as follows:  
Differential changes in the wage structure between the public and private 
sectors can be reasonably expected to alter the behavior of many economic 
agents. Suppose (as is actually the case) that wage dispersion has been rising 
at a faster rate in private sector jobs than in public sector jobs. The relative 
change in the wage structure would then suggest that private sector workers 
who belong to highly skilled groups (such as college graduates), or private 
sector workers who have relatively high earnings within a particular skill 
group, will have reduced incentives to enter the public sector. Conversely, 
public sector workers who belong to highly skilled groups, or public sector 
workers who have relatively high incomes within a particular skill group, 
will have increased incentives to leave the public sector and enter private 
sector jobs. In short, the relative changes in the wage structure should 
influence labor supply decisions, and alter the sorting of workers between 
the two sectors.308  
Using U.S. Census Bureau data, Borjas verified that this sorting response between the 
public and private sectors had, in fact, occurred.309 His analysis revealed that as the shape 
of pay distributions evolved between the sectors—with the public sector becoming less 
dispersed or more compressed vis-à-vis the private sector over time—the public sector 
came to experience particular difficulty in competing for high-skill groups of workers.310 
In light of this analysis, it should be noted that response (1) stands to exacerbate a problem 
that the public sector is already experiencing. What may be most instructive, though, for 
the purpose of this thesis is Borjas’s conclusion that “the difference in the shape of the 
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wage distributions between the two sectors plays a significant role in determining the 
public sector’s ability to attract and retain a high-quality workforce.”311 To the extent that 
pension reform or wage adjustments made after reform alter this shape, this conclusion 
reveals potential second-order effects that may drive future outcomes.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Drawing primarily from economic concepts and the work of economists, this 
chapter offered some insight into a number of secondary effects that may come about as a 
result of pension reform. Along with sorting effects, much of the discussion in this chapter 
involved employee career choice—that is, whether an individual chooses to work in the 
public sector, remain in the public sector, or remain with a particular employer for a full 
career or extended period. Within the academic literature on the subject of choice, 
economists tend to focus on the role of wage rates for employees and the nature of financial 
incentives embedded in different compensation schemes. As pension reform changes these 
incentives, the choices made by workers in the labor market will also change, altering the 
composition of the public-sector workforce in interesting ways. What makes these effects 
particularly compelling for this thesis is the influence pension reform may have on the 
quality of public-sector workers as well as the ability of individual organizations to retain 
developed human capital. Taken together, all these effects seem to lay out a syllogistic 
chain that infers pension reform will ultimately have a deleterious impact on the 
performance and effectiveness of reforming organizations. This chain and the individual 
effects revealed in this chapter are considered as factors in the scenario analysis presented 
in the conclusive chapters of this thesis.  
This chapter also presented a picture of what the labor market will look like for 
organizations ex post to reform. After enacting pension reform measures, SLG employers 
will compete for labor more through immediate salary and portable DC instruments than 
through the deferred compensation of DB pension plans. Their workforce, including their 
most effective and experienced mid-career employees, will become more mobile within 
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the labor market. Employers may have to decompress their salary structures, offering 
higher pay rates to attract, recruit, and retain their leaders and more educated employees. 
In these ways, the public sector will more closely resemble the private sector. In the words 
of Westerman and Sundali, this shift in emphasis toward current wages will alter the 
employer–employee relationship, making it more “transactional” than “relational,” so this 
shift deserves attention beyond finance, accounting, and economic disciplines.312 It is with 
this sentiment that the next chapter turns to theories and observations from other academic 
disciplines including sociology, social psychology, public administration, and 
organizational behavior.  
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V. MOTIVATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
EFFECTS 
The concepts explored and factors identified in the prior chapter relied 
predominantly on rational choice theory—that is, how workers may behave in the face of 
pension reform, presuming they are informed, rational actors seeking to maximize their 
own personal utility and wealth.313 Rational choice theory represents a baseline 
perspective in economics generally, and it stands as a fundamental assumption underlying 
personnel economics specifically.314 However, when it comes to worker motivation and 
individual career decisions, academic disciplines outside economics present alternative 
views that suggest humans are anything but homo economicus.315 As economists Frey and 
Osterloh explain, economic theory seems at odds with fields such as traditional sociology 
and psychology, which “assume that human conduct is shaped by standards and 
preferences that are by no means stable and often reap no financial reward.”316 Of 
particular relevance to the public sector in this arena is work emanating from the field of 
public administration, which questions the applicability of rational choice to public 
servants. Prominent scholars in this arena offer a construct stipulating that workers in the 
public sector tend to be driven by motives other than self-interest.317 Notably, one of the 
founders of this construct underscores its superiority to rational choice theory in explaining 
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the behavior of public servants.318 To the degree that non-economic motivation holds sway 
over future cohorts of public servants, many of the concepts and factors explored thus far 
in this thesis may diminish or even be rendered moot. Accordingly, this chapter considers 
salient non-economic forms of motivation as potential mitigating factors.  
The prior chapter highlighted the role of human capital as a determiner of 
organizational effectiveness; it explored how pension reform may impact the public 
sector’s ability to attract and retain human capital, and it laid out a somewhat intuitive 
syllogism delineating how pension reform may diminish organizational effectiveness as a 
second-order effect. However, the effects of pension reform may extend beyond an 
organization’s ability to accumulate human capital. Stemming from its alteration of the 
reforming entities’ compensation structure, pension reform may also impact the norms and 
values of the organization itself.319 In light of these effects, this chapter probes some of 
the ways changes in compensation structure, likely in the face of pension reform, may 
influence an organization’s culture.320 Of particular emphasis are the effects on social 
cohesion, behavioral norms, and ethical standards within an organization. 
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A. THE MITIGATING EFFECT OF NON-EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
Scholars analyzing work-related motives of individuals tend to juxtapose two types 
of motivation: intrinsic and extrinsic.321 Psychologists Ryan and Deci define intrinsic 
motivation as “the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some 
separable consequence. When intrinsically motivated a person is moved to act for the fun 
or challenge entailed rather than because of external prods, pressures, or rewards.”322 In a 
career context, Frey and Osterloh contrast this with extrinsic motivation, which “stems 
from a desire to satisfy directly one’s non-work-related needs, [and therefore,] a job is 
simply a tool with which to satisfy one’s actual needs by means of the salary it pays.”323 
Extrinsically motivating rewards (hereinafter “extrinsic rewards”) encompass all forms of 
financial remuneration including wages, DC retirement accounts, and traditional DB 
pensions. Thus, public pension reform alters the extrinsic incentive structure for 
organizations undergoing reform.  
Individuals can be driven by both types of motivation, but different individuals may 
be more responsive or sensitive to one type over the other.324 The possibility that, for some 
individuals, intrinsic motivation outweighs extrinsic motivation challenges the conclusions 
of the prior chapter. After all, if large segments of the public-sector workforce are more 
intrinsically motivated, the changes to the extrinsic reward structure from pension reform 
should have less of an impact. More fundamentally, the potential primacy of intrinsic 
motivation undermines many of the principals in personnel economics. Lazear and Oyer 
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acknowledge this, but they stress that intrinsic motivation has its limits: “Economic 
principles about motivation and incentives apply even when workers ‘like’ their jobs.”325 
This statement, however, allows for the converse proposition to also be true—that 
psychological principles about intrinsic motivation apply even when workers face 
substantive extrinsic rewards. Thus, in the yin–yang duality of intrinsic–extrinsic 
motivation, the existence of one mitigates the effects of the other.  
The juxtaposition of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation seems particularly relevant 
in a public-sector context because, as Nicola Bellé explains, “abundant literature has shown 
that public sector employees tend to be more intrinsically motivated compared with private 
sector workers.”326 In a word, public servants are different. They display a motivational 
composition different from the rest of the workforce. Does this mean that the public sector 
can ignore the concerns raised in Chapter IV? Put differently, in the face of pension reform, 
can public employers rely on the intrinsic motivation of prospective and current employees 
to attract and retain human capital? That would hardly seem the case given Lazear and 
Oyer’s point about the limits of intrinsic motivation—not to mention the empirical studies 
of the public sector referenced in Chapter IV.327 Nevertheless, the potential for high levels 
of intrinsic motivation in the labor force could diminish the influence of financial, extrinsic 
rewards, so issues surrounding the motivations of current and future public-sector workers 
are worth exploring.  
1. Unique Forms of Motivation Attributed to Public Servants  
Why public servants do what they do and why they perform well or poorly are areas 
of keen interest to scholars in the academic field of public administration. Within this field, 
experts agree that public servants are endowed with an ethic that sets them apart from 
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workers in the private sector.328 In a seminal 1990 article, Perry and Wise classify these 
unique motives in a construct they coin public service motivation (PSM).329 Perry and 
Wise define PSM as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded 
primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations.”330 Given PSM, 
management principles for public organizations need to be different from those in private 
industry because public employees derive energy and direction from motives other than 
self-interest and monetary rewards.331  
In 1996, Perry developed a method of quantifying levels of PSM based on measures 
of an individual’s psychological needs or predispositions.332 As Perry explains, individuals 
with a high PSM possess strong predispositions across the following four dimensions: 
“attraction to public policy making, commitment to the public interest and civic duty, 
compassion, and self-sacrifice.”333 Over the past 20-plus years, research on the unique 
motivations of public servants has yielded a number of nuanced definitions of PSM; despite 
their distinctions, PSM-related constructs have converged into what Perry, Hondeghem, 
and Wise call the “other orientation—represented by notions of self-sacrifice, altruism, and 
prosocial—across the motivation definitions.” (original emphasis).334 In short, what truly 
separates public servants from workers in private industry is a desire to help other people 
over their own self-interest.  
Notably, while PSM includes intrinsically rewarding elements, its altruistic 
emphasis makes it conceptually distinct from intrinsic motivation in some academic 
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circles.335 This is because the drivers of effort under intrinsic motivation are hedonic by 
nature. On the other hand, prosocial motivation, “the desire to expend effort to benefit other 
people,” according to psychologist Adam Grant, involves eudaimonic drivers associated 
with meaning and purpose rather than personal enjoyment.336 For other scholars, there is 
no distinction; prosocial motivation is merely a specific form of intrinsic motivation.337 
For their part, economists have neglected to formally consider the PSM construct that has 
been deemed so important in the public administration field, according to Francois.338 This 
is not to suggest that economists have neglected prosocial behavior or intrinsic motivation, 
but they seem somewhat at odds with other scholars—and each other—in accounting for 
such concepts.339 Whatever disagreement exists among academics, it will not be resolved 
here. On the subject of pension reform, the parsing of prosocial from intrinsic motivation 
is tantamount to making a distinction without a difference. After all, individuals who are 
predominantly driven by non-extrinsic motivators—be it intrinsic, prosocial, or an 
amalgam of the two such as PSM—will be less responsive to pecuniary reward changes 
made by their employers. Such individuals’ workplace behavior and career decision-
making should diverge from the self-serving, wealth-maximizing homo economicus 
assumed in conventional economic theories. On that point, economists, psychologists, and 
public administration academics should all agree. 
As mentioned at the outset, Perry argues that the PSM construct “better accounts 
for behaviors observed in many government and voluntary organizations than does rational 
choice theory.”340 Speaking more directly to issues raised thus far in this thesis, Perry and 
Wise posit, “The level and type of an individual’s public service motivation and the 
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motivational composition of a public organization’s workforce . . . influence individual job 
choice, job performance, and organizational effectiveness.”341 Given that the arguments 
in Chapter IV dealt with these very elements—job choice (turnover and retention), 
employee performance, and organizational effectiveness—Perry and Wise’s PSM 
construct presents a direct challenge to the ideas presented therein. Of significance, 
empirical research supporting this challenge emanates from other sources in the public 
administration field. Regarding job choice, Crewson observes higher levels of PSM among 
public servants, empirically linking PSM to high levels of organizational commitment; this 
link, he argues, should lead to reduced levels of turnover in public service.342 Similarly, 
Naff and Crum observe a negative relationship between levels of PSM and turnover 
intention; that is, the higher an individual worker’s PSM, the less likely she would intend 
to leave the public sector.343 In an analysis of Dutch workers, Steijn confirms the positive 
retention effects of PSM in addition to showing an inclination among workers with high 
levels of PSM to seek work in the public sector.344 Looking beyond job choice to worker 
quality, Naff and Crum tie PSM to performance measures among federal employees.345 
Similar analyses using different datasets—by Vandenabeele as well as Bright—reach the 
same conclusions about the PSM-to-performance relationship but share the common 
weakness of employee performance being self-reported.346 Research on organizational 
effectiveness is more sparse. Brewer and Selden find PSM to be among a list of 
“moderately important predictors of organizational performance” within the federal 
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bureaucracy.347 Confirming Brewer and Seldon’s results, Kim finds that PSM correlates 
with strong public organizational performance, using data from South Korea’s public 
sector.348 
All these empirical findings contrast with the effects explored in Chapter IV, which 
are rooted in rational choice theory. Thus, as stated at the outset, non-extrinsic motivation 
in the workforce stands to mitigate the impact of pension reform as the public sector looks 
to attract and retain human capital. As pension reforms are implemented in the future, the 
question of which matters more—PSM or self-interest in the face of extrinsic incentives—
depends on the motivational composition of the prospective labor force. Thus, a central 
question to contemplate is what that composition will be. To what degree will future 
workers respond to extrinsic rewards over non-extrinsic—and seemingly non-economic—
drivers embodied in PSM?  
In seeking possible answers to these questions, public administration scholar 
Madinah Hamidullah suggests “the idea of generational cohorts” may provide some 
interesting insight.349 Running with Hamidullah’s suggestion, the discussion turns to 
emerging evidence about the employment preferences of the nation’s youngest workers; at 
issue is whether their preferences and motivations draw them toward service in and loyalty 
to the public sector.  
2. Generational Employment Preferences  
Following sociologist Karl Manheim’s theory of generations, the distinct historical 
experiences shared by members of different cohorts endow each with distinct values and 
impulses.350 In the workplace, as Smola and Sutton explain, such shared experiences cause 
generational cohorts to develop work values and “a personality that influences a person’s 
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feelings toward authority and organizations, what they desire from work, and how they 
plan to satisfy those desires.”351 Regarding the work-related personality traits of 
Generation X (hereinafter Gen X), Hamidullah posits their experiences “would not align 
cohort members with traditional values included in PSM.” 352 If members of this cohort 
possess relatively lower levels of PSM, the ideas of Perry, Wise, and the other public 
administration scholars should carry less weight; Gen X workers should behave more like 
homo economicus, making them more sensitive to the economic implications of pension 
reform.  
For the timeframe under consideration in this thesis, however, the more relevant 
cohorts are those following Gen X—millennials and post-millennials.353 These newest 
cohorts will be in the middle of their working years between 20 and 40 years from the date 
of this writing, so they will dominate the labor force in the timeframe of the forthcoming 
scenario analysis. Early observations of millennials in the workforce have offered that this 
cohort possesses more prosocial interests and tendencies than its Gen X predecessors.354 
As millennials have aged, however, these early observations have not held. In 2013, 
psychologists Jean Twenge concluded that the generational shift with this cohort “is toward 
more extrinsic values (money, image, and fame) and away from intrinsic values 
(community feeling, affiliation, and self-acceptance).”355 In a separate study from the same 
period, Twenge, Campbell, and Freeman further observed that millennials actually exhibit 
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less concern for others—prosocial orientation—and are less likely to seek work 
“worthwhile to society” or helpful to others.356  
The conclusions of Twenge and her colleagues seem compelling, but others differ. 
In a review of research on generational differences in the workplace, management and 
organizational behavior scholars Lyons and Kuron highlight that various sources find “no 
significant differences . . . in intrinsic or altruistic work values” between generations.357 
They posit that the relative importance of intrinsic over extrinsic rewards may have more 
to do with the workers’ age and stage of life than any generational personality.358 Lyons 
and Kuron further assess that the body of research on work-related generational differences 
is theoretically deficient; in their view, much of the evidence available tends to be 
inconsistent and, in some cases, contradictory.359 Overall, with respect to work preferences 
and motivational composition, the evidence on millennial traits seems muddled and has 
shifted over time. Thus, any projections made on the basis of such traits about labor market 
reactions to pension reform offer little value.  
Regarding evidence on the work-related traits of post-millennials—also known as 
“homelanders” or “Gen Z,” in the words of Twenge, Campbell, and Freeman—there are 
no longitudinal data because the first members of this cohort are just entering the labor 
market.360 Notwithstanding, scholars focused on generational differences hypothesize that 
the Great Recession will profoundly impact Gen Z’s work/life values and preferences.361 
Some social observers speculate that because the difficulties associated with this recession 
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hit Gen Z during their formative years, this young cohort will come to be more frugal and 
more concerned for others than their predecessors.362 Sentiments about the sociological 
impact of the Great Recession are common in the press, too. A recent Wall Street Journal 
article described Gen Z as a “scarred generation, cautious and hardened by economic and 
social turbulence,” and as a result, “Gen Z’s attitudes about work reflect a craving for 
financial security.”363 Again, such speculation comes without longitudinal data, so it seems 
unpersuasive.364 Nevertheless, Gen Z’s emerging work preferences should not be ignored 
just because they are enigmatic. The potential for high levels of PSM or sensitivity to 
intrinsic motivation could influence the cohort’s sensitivity to the economic implications 
of pension reform, so considering such potential seems apropos when contemplating future 
scenarios.  
Beyond traits pertaining to motivation, other work-related generational traits could 
affect the labor market’s reaction to public pension reform. Prevalent among them is the 
popular notion that millennials eschew lifetime employment, instead preferring to “job 
hop” as a means of career development and on-the-job fulfillment.365 In other words, 
worker mobility itself holds innate value for this generational cohort. If the preference for 
mobility persists for future cohorts, it could profoundly impact the labor market’s reaction 
to pension reform. Employers with well-funded DB pensions would have less of an 
advantage in the market for labor; young workers would avoid employers offering non-
portable, deferred compensation, even in cases where they may be choosing less lifetime 
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compensation. Metaphorically speaking, the golden handcuffs of DB pensions would not 
fit job-hopping millennials.  
The belief that millennials value mobility in their careers has some support in 
academic circles. Despite their criticism of existing research on generational differences, 
Lyons and Kuron found sufficient support for this generational preference.366 
Additionally, public administration scholar Nevbahar Ertas found that millennial civil 
servants express higher rates of turnover intention (a desire to quit and change jobs) than 
members of previous cohorts at the same age.367 Ertas indicates that this finding may be a 
function of different career expectations among younger workers who “may no longer plan 
on staying with the same organization for extended periods of time,” and who, instead, 
seek to develop skills and networks from different employers to move on to the next better 
opportunity.368 Emerging longitudinal data, however, suggest that this perception about 
job-hopping preferences may be off the mark. Analyzing U.S. Census Bureau data from 
2016, the Pew Research Center’s Richard Fry found, “Millennial workers . . . are just as 
likely to stick with their employers as their older counterparts in Generation X were when 
they were young adults.”369 In fact, according to Fry, college-educated millennials are 
accruing longer tenures with employers than their counterparts from Gen X.370 Again, the 
evidence about work-related generational preferences and traits seems muddled, yet the 
belief that younger generations prefer career mobility persists. Intriguingly, it seems to 
have affected the trajectory of pension reform itself; the perceived job-hopping preference 
of millennials was among the reasons that the Military Compensation and Retirement 
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Modernization Commission (MCRMC) advocated for portable features in the military’s 
new Blended Retirement System.371  
Overall, Hamidullah seems correct in her suggestion that the theory of generations 
may provide insight into the work preferences of successive cohorts.372 However, with 
regard to the two identifiable generations relevant to the upcoming scenario analysis—
millennials and Gen Z—emerging information on their traits offers little predictive insight. 
Regardless, the potential of a sociological zeitgeist moving labor to seek (or avoid) long-
term careers in public service is worth considering because it could mitigate or overwhelm 
the dynamics predicted by personnel economics ex post to pension reform. Thus, the 
influence of sociological trends is considered as a factor in the forthcoming scenario 
analysis.  
3. Crowding Theory  
As described at the outset of this section, public pension reform alters the extrinsic 
rewards and the related incentive structure for organizations. Intriguingly, through 
processes explained by motivation crowding theory, extrinsic rewards have been shown to 
undermine the intrinsic motivation of individuals, and this has further implications for labor 
supply.373 Crowding theory raises questions over whether the extrinsic reward structure 
that pension reform creates could trigger such crowding effects. If so, pension reform itself 
could influence the motivational composition of the public workforce as a third- or fourth-
order effect, which should be accounted for in the forthcoming scenario analysis.  
At the individual or micro level of analysis, the relationship between extrinsic 
rewards and intrinsic motivation stems from a process dubbed the “crowding-out effect” 
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by Bruno Frey in the early 1990s.374 Economist David Kreps explains the mechanism 
behind this effect as follows:  
The idea is that when a person performs some act, he looks for rationales 
that justify his actions. Specifically, if an employee undertakes some effort 
without the spur of some extrinsic incentive, he will rationalize his efforts 
as reflecting his enjoyment of the task. And since he enjoys it, he works 
harder at it. But if extrinsic incentives are put in place, he will attribute his 
efforts to those incentives, developing a distaste for the required effort.375 
Regardless of whether Kreps’s foray into cognitive and social psychology adequately 
describes the mental or emotional processes involved, the undermining effect extrinsic 
rewards have on intrinsic motivation has been well researched in psychology circles with 
numerous experiments confirming the relationship.376  
Among behavioral economists, the interaction between extrinsic rewards and non-
extrinsic motivation seems a salient issue. Frey and Jegen find that crowding theory works 
in reverse—that is, reduced extrinsic rewards can elicit or “crowd in” intrinsic 
motivation.377 Additionally, Frey finds that the theory applies to prosocial behavior in the 
provision of voluntary labor and to “civic virtues.”378 Benabou and Tirole expand 
economic theory to explain prosocial behavior in economic terms and, like Frey and Jegen 
before them, highlight that extrinsic rewards crowd out such behavior.379 Similarly, 
economists Francois and Vlassopoulos apply crowding theory to prosocial activity, but 
they also draw PSM into their analysis, focusing on the unique motivations of workers in 
the non-profit sector.380 These applications of economic concepts to the inner workings of 
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the human mind are intriguing, and they reveal the extent to which economics has evolved 
to overlap with psychology.381 These articles also reveal the broad appeal crowding theory 
has for behavioral economists.  
At a market or macro level of analysis, the widespread occurrence of crowding-out 
within a subject workforce has a cumulative effect on the motivational composition of that 
workforce. At this higher level, though, more traditional economic mechanisms involving 
sorting/selection come in to play; that is, high wages attract more extrinsically motivated 
people who compete with and supplant some of the more intrinsically or prosaically 
motivated.382 This can have negative consequences, particularly in a public service 
context. Indeed, such crowding and sorting/selection effects receive heightened attention 
within public administration circles due to concerns over the application of pay-for-
performance and other business-like compensation schemes in the public sector.383 
Francois and Vlassopoulos encapsulate these concerns as follows:  
The insights offered by the literature on crowding out of pro-social 
motivation have important implications for the on-going debate regarding 
public service reform, as they indicate that the uncritical introduction of 
high-powered incentives, which have been proven to be effective in the 
private sector, may backfire when altruistic workers are selecting into the 
public sector.384  
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Benabou and Tirole illustrate these same concerns with the following memorable 
exemplar: “One argument for relatively low pay for the military is to select true patriots 
rather than mercenaries whose main loyalty is to whoever pays more.”385 Thus, these 
economists imply that enhancing extrinsic rewards in the public sector may lead to a lower-
quality, less-effective workforce as a result of adverse selection.386 The converse seems to 
apply as well; that is, lower pay ensures that only the most prosocial or intrinsically 
motivated join the public sector.387 Of course, whether sufficient numbers of such workers 
exist in the future depends on factors such as the generational work preferences, as 
discussed in the previous section. 
How pension reform may trigger crowding effects depends on the manner in which 
it alters the extrinsic reward structure. If, as Llorens suggests, pension reform will cause 
public jurisdictions to rely on competitive wage rates (and conceivably other pecuniary 
instruments) to compete for human capital, then crowding effects could come into play.388 
Consider the cascading series of potential events stemming from pension reform in the 
following hypothetical vignette:  
A given local jurisdiction facing pension fund insolvency switches 
completely from a DB to a DC plan for new hires in 2018. Ten years later, 
suppose that jurisdiction finds itself unable to retain its most valuable 
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human capital—experienced mid-career workers. Organizational 
effectiveness in critical public services—specifically law enforcement and 
fire services—declines as a result with measurable negative implications for 
public safety and security.  
Given this set of circumstances, a consensus eventually emerges within the 
local government and among the polity that the staffing problems in these 
critical services deserve budgetary priority. The jurisdiction secures 
additional tax revenue and cuts non-essential services to offer retention 
bonuses and enhanced salaries to forestall further turnover of experienced 
police and fire personnel. To help with 24/7 service coverage requirements, 
the jurisdiction enhances overtime compensation. Additionally, to attract a 
greater quantity and higher quality of applicants for entry-level positions, 
the jurisdiction increases starting salaries and offers signing bonuses. 
Through the lens of crowding theory, this vignette raises a number of interesting 
possibilities. First, even though the subject jurisdiction faces staffing challenges, crowding 
and sorting/selection effects suggest that whatever staff remains will be highly committed 
and of high quality; that is, the workers who choose to join and remain under these 
circumstances would be those with high intrinsic or prosocial motivations for the job. 
Second, while basic supply-and-demand dynamics suggest that a jurisdiction offering 
higher wages will be able to fill vacancies, crowding theory presents the possibility that 
the jurisdiction will, over time, wind up with an increasingly mercenary workforce—in 
other words, a workforce whose motivations do not align with the mission or interests of 
the public institutions it serves. Overall, crowding and sorting/selection effects suggest that 
higher wages could attract a workforce of lower quality for public-service mission sets.  
To be sure, the vignette lacks details, and its embedded assumptions could be more 
clearly identified.389 Nevertheless, it illustrates how pension reform could ultimately 
trigger crowding and sorting/selection effects through a cascading series of third- or fourth-
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order effects. Such effects are considered in the scenario analysis presented in the 
conclusive chapters.  
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR  
Westerman and Sundali posit that the transformation of public pensions underway 
will have broad implications in terms of organizational behavior.390 In a brief paper they 
label an “incubator article,” these management scholars call for additional research.391 
This thesis may help answer their call (to a small extent) from its synthesis of prior work 
from multiple academic disciplines. The thin organizational behavior literature directly 
targeting the effects of pension reform on public-sector entities, however, makes anything 
more than a limited answer difficult. Nevertheless, existing research suggests that some 
aspects of the post-reform compensation structure will have predictable effects on an 
organization’s behavioral norms, social cohesion, and standards of ethical probity.  
1. Social Comparison, Fairness, and Organizational Cohesion 
Chapter III highlighted a trend among SLG jurisdictions to apply pension reform 
measures exclusively to newly hired employees.392 Consequently, successive generations 
of employees have been covered under different retirement plans across the public sector: 
the most senior officials may be covered under generous legacy DB plans, mid-career 
officers under more complicated hybrid plans, and the most junior cohort of employees 
under yet another. Public administration scholars Hyde and Naff lament the application of 
pension reforms exclusively to new hires for the following reason:  
[It] inserts in the public service work contract equation a potential disturbing 
trend toward the bimodal workforce. That is that new employees are offered 
a less valuable pension and benefit than current employees. It is a trend that 
may be perceived by new employees as establishing a compensation 
dichotomy between the privileged, better paid and the less privileged and 
underpaid. One can only guess how fundamental values and core constructs 
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like public sector motivation, commitment, and engagement would be 
affected.393 [emphasis added] 
In essence, Hyde and Naff are expressing concern over what Lazear calls “equitable pay 
treatment”—the creation of winners and losers—within public service organizations.394 
These public administration scholars do not further develop what the implications of this 
inequitable bimodality may be, but there seems little doubt that they anticipate deleterious 
effects for an organization under this kind of two-tiered pay structure.  
The impact of pay inequality, however, is something that other scholars have 
explored with some rigor.395 For Lazear, as is discussed later, the behavior of winners and 
losers in an organization can be modeled to show the impact such behavior has on 
economically efficient outcomes.396 For other scholars interested in organizational 
outcomes, a central concern around equitable pay treatment relates to the influence of 
fairness on employee performance.397 Over decades, research in this arena has been 
influenced significantly by equity theory, which was first articulated by psychologist John 
Stacy Adams in 1965.398 Applied to the workplace, the essential notion behind equity 
theory is that employees can be expected to engage in pay/input comparisons with their 
coworkers; if employees perceive an imbalance between their pay/input ratio to that of 
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their peers, they perceive inequity (unfairness), which influences their performance and 
behavior.399  
Textbooks intended for aspiring business leaders draw from the tenets of equity 
theory to emphasize the importance of social comparisons in the workplace, and they 
emphasize the profound effect perceptions of fairness have on employee morale, attitudes, 
and cooperation 400 These texts point to a body of organizational research on procedural 
justice and distributive justice—which grows out of equity theory—to provide insight into 
how employee perceptions of fairness affect organizational outcomes.401 The concepts of 
procedural and distributive justice are distinct but interrelated. As Folger and Konovsky 
explain, “Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of the amounts of 
compensation employees receive; procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the 
means used to determine those amounts.”402 Stated in analogies, procedural justice is to 
distributive justice as means are to ends, as process is to outcome, or as fair is to equitable. 
The operative feature in both of these concepts is social comparison among colleagues. 
Thus, when it comes to perceptions of equitable or fair pay treatment, there is no objective 
measure; what matters is how they are being paid compared to their co-workers and 
whether any existing pay differences are fair considering differences in effort, impact, 
ability, or experience.403  
                                                 
399 “Inequity exists for Person whenever he perceives that the ratio of his outcomes to inputs and the 
ratio of Other’s outcomes to Other’s inputs are unequal. This may happen either (a) when Person and Other 
are in a direct exchange relationship or (b) when both are in an exchange relationship with a third party and 
Person compares himself to Other. The values of outcomes and inputs are, of course, as perceived by 
Person.” Adams, “Inequity in Social Exchange,” 280–281. Notably, Adams found that inequity results 
when a person perceives himself to be relatively overpaid as well as relatively underpaid. 
400 Milkovich, Newman, and Gerhart, Compensation, 84–90; Baron and Kreps, Strategic Human 
Resources, 106–108; Weibel and Rota, “Fairness as a Motivator,” 173–189. 
401 Milkovich, Newman, and Gerhart, Compensation, 84–90; Baron and Kreps, Strategic Human 
Resources, 106–108; Weibel and Rota, “Fairness as a Motivator,” 173–189. 
402 Folger and Konovsky, “Effects of Justice on Reactions to Pay Raise Decisions,” 115. 
403 Baron and Kreps, Strategic Human Resources, 256–261; Weibel and Rota, “Fairness as a 
Motivator,” 175–177. 
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The empirical research on distributive and procedural justice in organizational 
settings confirms a relationship that may seem intuitive: compensation regimes and reward 
structures that are perceived to be fair by employees foster positive, functional employee 
attitudes and harmonious, collaborative work environments while employee perceptions of 
injustice elicit opposite, negative effects.404 Thematically, the variables identified in this 
research revolve around a cohesive organizational culture; salient variables include trust in 
supervision, conflict/harmony, employee job satisfaction, turnover intention, and 
organizational commitment (loyalty).405 Thus, to the extent that a cohesive culture drives 
a particular organization’s effectiveness, high levels of distributive and procedural justice 
should enhance the organization’s ability to fulfill its mission. The magnitude of the effects 
across these variables depends on the levels of justice or injustice perceived; it also depends 
on whether workers perceive the organization’s pay regime as just or unjust in accordance 
with the tenets of distributive justice alone, procedural justice alone, or both. On its own, 
procedural justice has a more significant impact than distributive justice across most of the 
variables and effects identified.406 Further, on its own, procedural justice has been shown 
to correlate positively with two unique variables significant for organizational 
effectiveness: “organizational citizenship behaviors” and the transfer of knowledge.407  
Given the results of this research, if future pension reforms bring about pay changes 
that employees perceive as unjust in a distributive or procedural manner, organizations that 
rely on cohesion will experience negative effects. Moreover, if the perceptions of injustice 
                                                 
404 Folger and Konovsky, “Effects of Justice on Reactions to Pay Raise Decisions,” 122–128; 
Alexander and Ruderman, “The Role of Justice in Organizational Behavior,” 192–194; McFarlin and 
Sweeney, “Distributive and Procedural Justice as Predictors of Organizational Outcomes,” 633–634. 
405 Folger and Konovsky, “Effects of Justice on Reactions to Pay Raise Decisions,” 122–128; 
Alexander and Ruderman, “The Role of Justice in Organizational Behavior,” 192–194; McFarlin and 
Sweeney, “Distributive and Procedural Justice as Predictors of Organizational Outcomes,” 633–634. This is 
a partial list of the variables identified in these articles. 
406 Alexander and Ruderman, “The Role of Justice in Organizational Behavior,” 177. 
407 “Organizational citizenship behavior describes the behavior of employees who go beyond the 
duties stipulated in their employment contract or job description. They provide voluntary inputs, so-called 
extra-role behavior, which are not demanded by line managers, and the lack of which cannot be punished.” 
Weibel and Rota, “Fairness as a Motivator,” 184. 
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cut across both distributive and procedural dimensions, then more severe effects should 
result. In the case of the bimodal or two-tiered workforce trend described by Hyde and 
Naff, the issue seems exclusively distributive in nature.408 Established employees (the 
winners) are not being dispossessed as a result of pension reform, and new hires (the losers) 
know what they are getting into in terms of their idiosyncratic pay structure and could opt 
out by not accepting employment. Because the date of hire represents an objective, non-
negotiable criterion in determining the compensation tier of an employee, the bimodal pay 
regime should be viewed as legitimate by workers—i.e., procedurally fair or just—even if 
the ends are inequitable.409 Thus, the organizational implications of the bimodal workforce 
remain worrisome, but the potential for dysfunction within the organization would be 
greater if the process creating the winners and losers was arbitrary or capricious or if the 
losers did not understand their plight from the beginning.  
Exclusively distributive injustices may have less severe effects, but they can still 
prove problematic for an organization. Baron and Kreps point to examples from the private 
sector where two-tier structures led to poor organizational outcomes even though the 
different tiers were legitimated by an objective criterion (date of hire).410 One of the 
additional issues these scholars identified was that a tiered pay structure creates distinct 
subgroups within an organization. Again, this effect hits on the theme of organizational 
cohesion. As Baron and Kreps state, “Differentiating among employee subgroups is also 
particularly divisive when a strong, cohesive organization culture is sought. It is difficult 
to persuade people to identify with a single overarching goal or identity while 
simultaneously promoting rampant distinctions among segments of the workforce.”411 
                                                 
408 Hyde and Naff, “Public Sector Pensions and Benefits: Challenges in a New Environment,” 169. 
409 Organizational psychology scholars McFarlin and Sweeny explain the kinds of dynamics at play 
here as a function of referent cognition theory, and they verify it empirically. A detailed explanation is 
beyond the scope of this writing, but in McFarlin and Sweeny’s words, “referent cognitions theory predicts 
that when people perceive procedures to be fair, resentment will be minimal, even when distributive justice 
is low.” McFarlin and Sweeney, “Distributive and Procedural Justice as Predictors of Organizational 
Outcomes,” 628. 
410 Baron and Kreps, Strategic Human Resources, 51–54. 
411 Baron and Kreps, 53. 
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Directing this point to the homeland security focus of this thesis, if one accepts the 
proposition that a collaborative culture and strong organizational cohesion matter 
significantly for organizations with homeland security mission sets, then the array of 
effects stemming from organizational injustice seems particularly disconcerting.412  
In this vein, the array of potential maladies identified in this section may have 
contributed to the staffing crisis and reported low morale at the USSS, introduced in 
Chapter I. After all, as Leonnig and others suggest, the change to the USSS’s retirement 
plan was the seminal cause of the service’s ostensible decline, and one of the key 
ramifications of that change was the creation of a bimodal workforce, which the service 
endured for three decades.413 Unfortunately, documentation about the USSS case is not 
sufficiently available to allow a more rigorous exploration, so the links between pension 
changes and the USSS’s reported problems will have to remain a matter of some 
conjecture.414  
Looking to the future, there seems more reason for concern because there is no 
guarantee that future reforms will conform to either (1) the policy of being applied 
exclusively to new hires, or (2) the pattern of being inequitable but procedurally just. Recall 
                                                 
412 This proposition is explored in the next section. 
413 Leonnig, “Critical Decisions after 9/11 Led to Slow, Steady Decline in Quality for Secret 
Service”; Ken Kurson, “Four Secret Service Executives Fired, Stunning an Already Shaken Agency,” New 
York Observer, January 14, 2016, http://observer.com/2015/01/four-secret-service-executives-fired-
stunning-an-already-shaken-agency/. Recall that in the early 1980s, new-hire USSS agents were enrolled in 
FERS while established employees remained under a considerably more generous plan. This created a 
clearly bimodal workforce of the type described in Chapter V. Separately, some might contend that the 
CSRS-to-FERS transition also made the rest of the federal workforce similarly bimodal. However, given 
the value neutrality between CSRS and FERS (discussed in both Chapters III and IV), the compensation 
disparity between CSRS and FERS employees did not create a significant disparity between the haves and 
have-nots; as was stressed in Chapter IV, the difference between CSRS and FERS had more to do with 
structure than valuation.  
414 Insightful and experienced Secret Service agents of this writer’s acquaintance (peers in an 
academic setting) object to inferences that the USSS is an organization in general decline. This author 
respects their judgement on that subject implicitly. The use of the reporting on the USSS in these pages is 
for illustrative purposes. Continuing in this illustrative vein, the USSS case reveals a temporal dimension to 
the challenges stemming from the creation of a bimodal workforce; if the pension reform at issue is a one-
time change, then eventually (after decades) it will be rendered moot. At the USSS, for example, the last of 
the entry cohort covered under the old pension plan is about to retire, Thus, to whatever extent a bimodal 
workforce may have caused challenges at the USSS, the service is about to get relief as a function of time.  
120 
from Chapter III how some observers assess current reforms and reform trends as 
insufficient to solve the long-term financial issues facing many pension funds.415 Thus, for 
those states and jurisdictions with the most severe solvency challenges, more drastic 
pension reform measures, which cut pension benefits for current established employees, 
seem likely if not inevitable. The likelihood of more drastic measures raises the 
possibility—some might consider it an inevitability—of creating more groups of perceived 
winners and losers among employees working closely together. If this occurs, subject 
organizations should expect to develop cohesion-related problems.  
2. The Effects of Pay Dispersion  
The creation of different tiers within the public-sector pay structure is not the only 
way that pension reform may lead to pay inequality—wide distributions of pay rates within 
the same organizations may have similar effects. Recall from Chapter IV that pension 
reform could ultimately lead public entities to alter the pay distribution within their 
organizations. Due to second- or third-order effects attributable to pension reform, public-
sector pay distributions may come to resemble the more relatively dispersed distribution of 
the private sector.416 Assessing the correlation between different forms of wage 
distribution within organizations—compressed (or egalitarian) versus dispersed (or 
hierarchal)—and organizational and individual performance, industrial and labor relations 
scholar Matt Bloom finds that “more compressed pay dispersions are positively related to 
multiple measures of individual and organizational performance.”417 Significantly, 
though, this depends on the organizational outcomes sought. As Bloom explains,  
  
                                                 
415 See Chapter III, Section C, Subsection 3.  
416 “Two types of pay distributions are common. When a pay distribution is hierarchical, a greater 
proportion of pay is concentrated in relatively few levels, jobs, or individuals that are near the top of the 
distribution. Pay is more widely dispersed and less equal across pay levels. A hierarchical distribution may 
also have many pay levels and many tiers. A compressed pay distribution is one in which pay is less 
dispersed and is spread more equally across jobs or individuals, and it may have fewer pay levels than a 
hierarchical distribution.” Bloom, “The Performance Effects of Pay Dispersion,” 25. 
417 Bloom, 25.  
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Hierarchical [or dispersed] pay distributions may be more appropriate when 
individual characteristics are closely tied to organizational outcomes (as in 
law, accounting, and consulting firms, research and development units, 
surgical teams) or when the contributions of individuals are more easily 
separated from organizational performance (as is the sales performance of 
stock brokers or research performance in academia). . . . In other types of 
organizations—fire fighting and rescue squads, theatrical casts, 
manufacturing teams, and hotel customer service staffs, for example—the 
situation is quite different because the poor performance of a particular 
worker can be compensated for by the better performance of the other 
workers, and the outstanding performance of one person is unlikely to 
influence organizational outcomes over the long term if the performance of 
others is lacking.418 [emphasis added] 
Thus, a key variable here relates to the mission of the organization and whether successful 
mission accomplishment relies more on the contribution of individuals or on collaborative 
team efforts. Directing the spotlight again on the homeland security focus of this thesis, it 
would seem that a compressed pay structure is more appropriate given that success in 
homeland security missions requires (one can reasonably surmise) more collaboration and 
teamwork than in law, accounting, consulting, research, or stock sales.419  
Bloom points to a myriad of factors to explain why this positive relationship exists 
between pay distributions and organizational performance. Among these are perceptions 
of justice within the organization, as was discussed in the previous section. Bloom further 
draws from Jeffrey Pfeffer, who supports the notion that pay compression can be beneficial 
for the performance of certain organizations. As Pfeffer writes, “In a strong-culture 
organization, one will tend to find and will indeed want to have, more compressed pay 
because pay dispersion lessens the sense of community and common fate that strong-
                                                 
418 Bloom, 36. 
419 For-profit firms in the listed professions undoubtedly improve overall revenue by incentivizing 
individual contributors with profit-sharing or sales commissions. Thus, a dispersed pay distribution may be 
beneficial for an organization if the process by which winners and losers are chosen furthers the 
organization’s goals or mission. See Milkovich, Newman, and Gerhart, Compensation, 86–88, 92–93 for an 
exploration of what constitutes appropriate pay distributions for different types of firms. See Baron and 
Kreps, Strategic Human Resources, 26–29 for appropriate pay distribution for different types of jobs: 
“stars” versus “guardians” versus “foot-soldiers.” 
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culture organizations seek to build as a source of competitive success.”420 Thus, it would 
seem that the benefits of pay compression extend beyond mere cooperation among 
employees to the realm of organizational culture. Moreover, it matters most wherever a 
strong culture is integral to mission effectiveness.  
Another factor Bloom points to stems from Lazear’s economic efficiency argument 
(introduced previously), which considers the positive and negative effects of competition 
between employees under a dispersed pay structure. Pursuant to this argument, pay 
dispersion and competition among workers have a positive effect on employee effort, 
which positively affects the firm’s output; however, such competition also creates an 
incentive for uncooperative behavior and may even lead to sabotage.421 According to 
Lazear, “The larger is the spread between the compensation that the winner and loser 
receive, the more important is each of these effects.”422 Hence, there is a balancing act for 
the organization with respect to economic efficiency, which leads Lazear to conclude the 
following:  
Perhaps the most important result is that some pay compression is efficient. 
The argument by union leaders and personnel managers that pay dispersion 
leads to disharmony is correct. If harmony is important, pay compression is 
optimal on strict efficiency grounds. Thus, the ability to sabotage one’s rival 
provides an efficiency argument for equitable treatment within a firm.423 
A key stipulation for Lazear here involves defining the relevant group within the 
organization; what matters is pay dispersion among peers (or near-peer competitors) at the 
same level and not dispersion between the top and bottom of the organizational ladder.424 
In essence, this model highlights the economic friction that can arise when peer-versus-
peer competition leads to dysfunctional behaviors that work to the firm’s detriment. It 
deserves emphasis here that a key assumption for Lazear is that pay compression has 
                                                 
420 Pfeffer, Competitive Advantage through People, 52–53. 
421 Lazear, “Pay Equality and Industrial Politics,” 561–563. 
422 Lazear, 562. 
423 Lazear, 579. 
424 Lazear, 562. 
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benefits where “harmony is important.”425 That is, mission accomplishment relies on 
effective teamwork and collaboration over individual contributions and star performers.  
The overall implication here is that if an organization in the homeland security 
enterprise decompresses its wage structure, then it may come to see a less collaborative 
working environment, weaker culture, and poorer organizational outcomes. Chapter IV 
discussed how such wage decompression might be necessary for organizations to compete 
for human capital in a fluid, post-reform labor market. That discussion focused on the so-
called educational divide and how the public sector might have to increase the wages of 
more high-skilled, educated workers relative to less-educated workers to prevent a 
potential “brain drain” to the private sector.426 Trevor, Reilly, and Gerhart refer to this sort 
of decompression, where there is a spread in pay between different organizational levels, 
as vertical pay dispersion.427 It is conceptually distinct from horizontal dispersion, which 
Pfeffer describes as pay variation among jobs at the same level.428 Significantly, vertical 
dispersion does not fit Lazear’s model well because the dysfunctional industrial politics 
Lazear describes involves peer or near-peer competitors. Likewise, as Baron explains, 
vertical dispersion does not have the same social psychological implications as horizontal 
dispersion in an organization.429  
Notwithstanding, it seems reasonable to speculate that wage decompression of the 
horizontal variety might well be required subsequent to public pension reform at the higher 
levels of organizational hierarchy. That is, to attract or retain supervisory talent in a post-
reform labor market, public-sector organizations might have to compete for individual 
proven leaders with individually tailored (and higher) compensation packages. After all, 
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with disappearing golden handcuffs, talented, ascendant leaders will be free to pursue 
opportunities beyond their current employer, so organizations in need of proven, 
experienced managers or star leaders may find themselves in bidding wars. Additionally, 
the higher the level of responsibility, the more opportunity to differentiate a professional’s 
performance—and this ease of differentiation enhances the likelihood of greater pay 
dispersion.430 Should these dynamics come to fruition, then the concerns surrounding pay 
decompression raised by scholars such as Lazear and Baron apply well.  
Ultimately, whether pay dispersion comes about and whether it comes in a vertical 
or horizontal form will serve as variables in the forthcoming scenarios; the impact such 
dispersion has on future outcomes will revolve around the negative effects pay dispersion 
may have on organizations that rely on teamwork and a collaborative culture to achieve 
their mission. The potential severity of these effects is unclear, but a key determiner of 
their magnitude would have to be the nature of the organization’s compensation structure 
in the first place. In this sense, SLG law enforcement stands out because of the remarkably 
compressed structure of wages for police management positions. In a 2008 study using 
National Compensation Survey data for both the private sector and the public sector at the 
SLG level, the BLS found that wage structure for police management positions ranks 
among the most compressed in the nation.431 In fact, SLG-level “supervisors of police and 
detectives” comprised the sole public-sector career on the BLS’s list of 12 occupations 
with the lowest median wage spreads.432 Should salaries for police management positions 
decompress as a second- or third-order effect of pension reform, then the resulting negative 
impacts delineated in this section may be particularly striking for law enforcement.  
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3. Ethical Probity in a Post-Reform Organization 
In addition to its impact on social cohesion and norms, pension reform may also 
have implications for the ethical behavior within an organization. Given incentives created 
by the vesting requirements and backloading of pensions, as described in Chapter III, DB 
pensions act as an instrument of discipline that deters corruption or malfeasance. 
Essentially, if a significant portion of employees’ lifetime earnings is tied up in a DB 
pension, then it is in their calculated economic interest not to commit any act that might 
lead to their dismissal. With the advent of public pension reform, that calculus is going to 
change. 
Becker and Stigler modeled this deterrent effect using variables including (1) the 
NPV of the employee’s pension (and with it an assumed interest rate) at different points in 
time, (2) the potential “gain from malfeasance,” and (3) the “probability of detection” of 
an offence that could lead to dismissal.433 These variables are used by Becker and Stigler 
to calculate a “temptation of malfeasance”; they conclude that from the perspective of the 
state, the most appropriate pay structure is one in which an employee’s salary and pension 
value—analogous to a bond—are equal to this temptation.434 The focus for Becker and 
Stigler was on pensions for law enforcement officers:  
Malfeasance can be eliminated, therefore, even when the probability of 
detection is quite low, without lifetime payments to enforcers that exceed 
what they could get elsewhere. The appropriate pay structure has three 
components: an “entrance fee” equal to the temptation of malfeasance, a 
salary premium in each year of employment approximately equal to the 
income yielded by the “entrance fee,” and a pension with a capital value 
approximately equal also to the temptation of malfeasance. As it were, 
enforcers post a bond equal to the temptation of malfeasance, receive the 
income on the bond as long as they are employed, and have the bond 
returned if they behave themselves until retirement. Put differently, they 
forfeit their bond if they are fired for malfeasance.435 
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Under this model, the deterrent effect increases the closer one gets to retirement. 436 Thus, 
while new employees may be relatively more tempted to engage in malfeasant behavior, 
their supervisors and mentors will face increasing incentives to avoid unethical or corrupt 
conduct on the job.  
Crucial to Becker and Stigler’s model are the structural features of backloading and 
vesting typical of DB pension schemes; those features along with an assumed interest rate 
determines the value of the bond. In all its conceivable variations, public pension reform 
reduces this bond’s value and, commensurately, the deterrence effect pensions have on 
malfeasance and corruption. Indeed, in cases where pension reform involves a complete 
shift to a DC benefit construct, the residual value of Becker and Stigler’s bond would be 
zero. This is because DC benefits are fully portable and paid to the employee with every 
paycheck; in effect, they can be thought of as vesting immediately.437  
The manner in which DB pensions deter malfeasance need not be thought of in such 
complicated terms, though. In a memoir reflecting on his career and 18-years as chief of 
the New York Police Department (NYPD)’s Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB), Charles 
Campisi delineates the straightforward way he would convey this deterrence to new NYPD 
trainees:  
As chief of IAB, I would regularly go to the Academy and talk to the recruits 
about what I called “the Million Dollar Mistake.” If you get caught up in 
corruption, I tell them, not only have you given up your honor, and your 
job, and your salary, and your freedom, but we’re also going to take away 
your pension—a pension that over the course of twenty years can amount 
to well over a million dollars. I tell them, even if you can’t think of another 
reason not to be a corrupt cop—and there are many—do yourself a favor 
and do the math.438 
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Reflecting on the DB pension valuations discussed in Chapter III, Campisi’s seven-figure 
estimate for a law enforcement DB pension does not seem an exaggeration.  
Throughout his memoir, Campisi expresses his incredulity over a number of cases 
where sworn officers have committed acts costing them their pensions. One instance he 
found particularly galling was a case in which an officer was dismissed over a sexual 
offense just one month shy of hitting 20 years of service—one month short of achieving 
the tenure required to secure a cliff-vesting, backloaded DB pension.439 Notwithstanding 
the myriad of police corruption cases chronicled in this memoir, Campisi emphasizes that 
over “99 percent of cops do their jobs honestly and correctly” in the NYPD.440 He submits 
that the same holds true with the professionals of the New York City firefighters as well.441 
From his expressed incredulity over the million-dollar mistakes that have occurred, it is 
clear Campisi believes in the corruption deterrence embedded in DB pension arrangements. 
It is an open question, however, whether the prevailing NYPD and firefighter pension 
regimes are significantly responsible for the low levels of corrupt behavior (in Campisi’s 
opinion) in these large organizations.  
Do economists provide any empirical evidence to address this open question? 
Stated differently, do data from economic research support the notion that pensions deter 
malfeasance or, conversely, that corruption exists at higher levels where DB pension 
arrangements are less generous? The answer here seems a qualified “no.” Rijckeghem and 
Weder come close with what they call an “empirical estimate of the effect of pay in the 
civil service on corruption.”442 However, while these economists acknowledge the 
“incentive to honest behavior” provided by pensions, they exclude pensions from their 
analysis due to data limitations and the difficulty associated with factoring the value of 
deferred compensation into their “fair-wage” model.443 This is not unusual, though. As 
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Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier note, similar data challenges face economists 
attempting to test theories about how pensions positively impact worker effort and 
productivity.444 
There may, however, be empirical support from the field of comparative politics. 
In his doctoral dissertation explaining the variations in levels of police malfeasance across 
Latin America, political scientist Diego Esparza compared different police organizations 
empirically across geography and time. Esparza’s general conclusion is “that police 
malfeasance is a function of centralization and professionalization.”445 In this context, 
“professionalism” is rooted in the Weberian concept of a rational bureaucracy; it is a 
means “to effectively structure public administration to compel organizational behavior 
toward efficient, expedient, effective outcomes that are free of malfeasance.”446 
Significant for this thesis, a critical element in the development of a professional police 
force, according to Esparza—or a modern bureaucratic state in the writings of Max 
Weber—is the provision of a DB pension to officials.447 Esparza’s field research shows 
the most professional and least corrupt police forces offer “a pension of 75–100% of salary 
after 25–30 years of service.”448 By contrast, levels of police malfeasance are higher in 
weaker systems where pensions amount to 50 percent of salary or less.449 Of course, 
pensions are but one element in Esparza’s assessment of what creates a professional police 
force less prone to corruption or malfeasant behavior. Nevertheless, the correlation 
between pensions and corruption is clear throughout his comparative analysis of numerous 
police organizations in Chile, Columbia, and Mexico.  
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Overall, considering Becker and Stigler’s economic theory, Campisi’s seasoned 
intuition, and Esparza’s academic fieldwork in Latin America, it is possible that pension 
reform in the United States may serve to diminish the professionalism and standards of 
ethical probity in police forces and other organizations with homeland security missions. 
Thus, such effects should be considered in any scenario-planning exercise assessing the 
impact of pension reform on the homeland security enterprise.  
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter served two purposes that will prove useful in the forthcoming scenario 
analysis: (1) it expanded the list of potential secondary effects that may result from pension 
reform, and (2) it identified caveats or mitigators in the effects identified in Chapter IV. 
While many of the potential effects and factors explored in this chapter emerge from 
academic disciplines outside of economics, the work of economic thinkers—among them 
Becker, Francois, Frey, Kreps, Lazear, Benabou, and Tirole—still provide significant 
insight in many of the subjects explored here. It should be noted that not all of the factors 
and avenues of inquiry explored in this chapter deserve equal weight. The discussion over 
how the theory of generations applies when contemplating the effects of pension reform, 
for example, may show a negative result; existing research provides only muddled 
conclusions about the work-related traits of millennials and younger generations, so it 
remains unclear whether these or future cohorts will react any differently than others in the 
face of pension reform. Still, conceptions of generational preferences have reportedly had 
an influence on pension reform itself, so this subject deserves exploration and consideration 
despite the negative result. 
Where the previous chapter focused on career choice and human capital effects, 
this chapter spotlighted the impact pension reform may have on worker motivation and 
organizational behavior. If an organization’s success or failure depends on its ability to 
attract, retain, and motivate its workforce while fostering a cohesive workplace 
environment, then Chapters IV and V have covered the angles relating to organizational 
effectiveness. With these angles thus explored, the thesis is now on a firm foundation from 
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which to engage in a scenario exercise synthesizing the myriad factors identified in the 
preceding chapters.  
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VI. SYNTHESIS  
Scenario-planning exercises involve narratives or storytelling about possible 
futures looking forward 20 years or longer.450 The intent of such a narrative art is not to 
make meticulous or even accurate predictions. Rather, scenarios are a tool to enhance the 
foresight of decision-makers, enabling them, in Schwartz’s words, to “make better 
decisions about the future.”451 Kees Van der Heijden similarly describes scenarios as 
providing a language through which managers can engage their organizations in “strategic 
conversations”; such conversations help overcome “group think” and pave the way for 
what he calls a “skillful strategy process.”452 This chapter provides an organizational 
structure for the factors explored in the preceding chapters, which can be used by a team 
wishing to enter such a strategic conversation about the future of the homeland security 
enterprise (HSE) in the face of pension reform. Chapters VII, VIII, and IX use this structure 
to present a scenario exercise that addresses the research question of this thesis: What 
impact will pension reform have on public-sector organizations with homeland security 
missions?  
Schwartz and other practitioners of scenario planning stipulate that one should look 
for factors emanating from five dimensions: economic, social, political, technological, and 
environmental.453 The preceding chapters focused on factors from the economic, social, 
and organizational dimensions, but a scenario-planning exercise should allow for a full 
spectrum of potential drivers shaping the future world. Thus, this exercise recognizes a few 
factors that may seem exogenous to the research and analysis presented thus far.  
As laid out in the research design section of Chapter I, a useful technique in scenario 
planning involves the separation of different factors into the loose categories of 
                                                 
450 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Foresight Workshop How-to Guide, 2. 
451 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 9 
452 Van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, viii–ix. 
453 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 110; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Crisis 
Response and Disaster Resilience 2030, 6. 
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predetermined elements and critical uncertainties.454 For this exercise, the consequences 
of a changing public-sector compensation structure shape the predetermined elements; 
these are the second- and third-order effects of public pension reform. Factors that could 
alter those consequences and factors that influence the course of pension reform itself 
constitute critical uncertainties.  
A. PREDETERMINED ELEMENTS: WHAT WE KNOW WE KNOW 
The factors revealed in Chapter IV fit the predetermined element category well 
because they are, for the most part, second-order effects stemming from pension reform: 
As the public sector moves away from a structure in which a significant portion of the 
employee’s lifetime earnings come in the form of post-retirement annuities, the incentives 
associated with such deferred compensation diminish. In turn, employee turnover 
increases, human and social capital challenges ensue, and the quality of workers who 
choose to pursue public service diminishes.455 Further, as public entities are faced with an 
increasingly mobile labor pool, they will be forced to compete with themselves and the 
private sector for seasoned human capital through enhanced wages (i.e., non-deferred 
compensation).456 The term “predetermined” applies vis-à-vis these factors because there 
is robust academic literature to support the cause-and-effect dynamics at play. What is not 
so clear, however, is the magnitude of these effects. Thus, when contemplating possible 
future outcomes, a scenario planner should vary the salience and severity of these effects 
while accepting as “predetermined” the direction indicated in the literature.457 
A number of the patterns and dynamics explored in Chapter V also fall into the 
predetermined element category: specifically, the intraorganizational collaboration effects 
stemming from social comparison, motivation crowding, and the potential for increased 
                                                 
454 See Chapter I, Section C. 
455 See Chapter IV, Section A.  
456 See Chapter IV, Section B. 
457 This is consistent with Van der Heijden’s explanation of predetermined elements. In his words, 
“while the overall direction of movement may be predetermined the specific outcomes may be highly 
uncertain.” Van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, 87. 
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malfeasance stemming from the elimination of anti-corruption incentives. These three 
factors, however, seem less cogent than the factors from Chapter IV because either they 
are third-order effects or the links are not as well established in current academic 
literature.458 Although these factors may seem founded on less solid ground, the thrust of 
scenario planning is not about projecting the most likely or precise predictions.459 Again, 
for the scenario planner, a logical task in constructing future outcomes is to vary the 
magnitude of such effects while accepting the essence of these effects revealed or inferred 
by the existing research and literature.  
Schwartz delineates predetermined elements as “what we know we know.”460 
Table 2 summarizes the predetermined elements used in this exercise.  
Table 2. Predetermined Elements 
Factor Chapter Order of Effect 
Turnover Effects: The degree to which pension 
reform increases employee turnover.  
IV 
2nd order effect of 
pension reform 
Human Capital Effects: The human capital–
related implications of pension reform. These 
involve the quality of entry-level workers, the 
effectiveness of line employees, and capabilities of 
mid- and upper-level management. 
IV 
2nd order effect of 
pension reform 
Wage-Based Competition: The extent to which 
homeland security organizations need to enhance 
wages and disperse their pay structures to attract 
and retain human capital ex post to reform.  
IV 
2nd order effect of 
pension reform 
Motivation Crowding: The sensitivity of workers 
to the crowding out of intrinsic motivation, 
prosocial motivation, and/or PSM in the face of 
enhanced wages. 
V 
3rd order effect of 
pension reform; 
2nd order of wage-
based competition 
 
                                                 
458 The effects stemming from pay-dispersion or crowding from enhanced extrinsic rewards would 
represent a third-order effect of pension reform; the dispersion itself would be a second-order effect.  
459 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 4–9; Van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic 
Conversation, 15. 
460 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 114. 
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Factor Chapter Order of Effect 
Intraorganizational Pay Structure Effects: 
Morale and collaboration-related maladies 
associated with dispersed pay structures and 
employee perceptions about the fairness 
underlying their compensation.  
V 
3rd order effect of 
pension reform; 
2nd order of wage-
based competition 
Corruption Deterrence Effects: The degree to 
which the removal of pension-related deterrence 
diminishes the professionalism and ethical 
standards within homeland security organizations. 
V 
2nd order effect of 
pension reform 
 
In the context of this thesis, these factors matter because they will influence the 
effectiveness of public-sector organizations after reforming their pension structure. At least 
they will if one makes three core assumptions about pension reform: (1) that the future 
vector of pension reform follows its current trajectory, (2) that individual jurisdictions take 
purposeful steps to enhance wages and disperse their pay structures ex post to reform, and 
(3) that human capital and organizational cultures will remain key determiners of 
organizational effectiveness in the future HSE. Recognizing these assumptions helps 
develop the next type of factor used in this exercise: critical uncertainties.  
B. CRITICAL UNCERTAINTIES: QUESTIONING CORE ASSUMPTIONS 
Schwartz warns that there is ambiguity in categorizing factors in scenario 
planning.461 Writing in 1991 and providing examples from scenario work at Shell and 
elsewhere, Schwartz describes the “critical uncertainty” category as follows:462  
Critical uncertainties are intimately related to predetermined elements. You 
find them by questioning your assumptions about predetermined elements: 
what might cause the price of oil to rise again? What might AT&T do to 
lose its domination over the long-distance business, and resulting cash cow? 
Shell’s scenarios, for example, still include the U.S. deficit as a 
predetermined element. But Shell also asks: what might happen to change 
the deficit? It would have to involve drastic cuts in defense spending and 
                                                 
461 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 113. 
462 Schwartz points to Pierre Wack’s work at Shell, which enabled the company to anticipate the 
1970s’ energy crisis. Wack’s work made Shell the only oil company prepared to respond when the first oil 
price shocks occurred in 1973. Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 7–9. 
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Social Security. Thus, the American debate over military cutbacks and the 
“peace dividend” is a critical uncertainty when considering scenarios for the 
late 1990s. Another critical uncertainty is real income growth in America. 
If it returned to the levels of the 1960s, people might feel more generous 
about taxes.463 [original emphasis] 
Despite the ambiguity underlying the factor categories, pondering critical uncertainties 
forces the scenario planner to recognize underlying assumptions and imagine what might 
alter them. Such a task involves speculation, but for this exercise, one need not be purely 
creative because the earlier chapters provide some insight into all three of the assumptions 
numbered above.  
The first core assumption posits that pension reform will continue at its current pace 
and on its current trajectory. As delineated in Chapter III, current reform trends involve the 
diminishment or abandonment of deferred compensation for public servants. Further, such 
reforms are being pursued in an incremental manner in that they apply only to new hires.464 
When contemplating future outcomes, a scenario planner could assume that pension reform 
will continue to unfold as it has thus far. Following Schwartz’s lead, however, one should 
question this assumption: What might change the vector? That is, what might lead public 
pension reform across the nation to accelerate or decelerate? What might cause the public 
sector to pursue reform in a more or less uniform manner, or cause reform efforts to be 
suspended across the board? What conditions might require jurisdictions to engage in 
drastic measures that dispossess current annuitants and vested employees?  
The answers to these questions lie predominantly in the realm of finance. As 
discussed in Chapter III, the unprecedented levels of SLG-level pension debt—the impetus 
for pension reform—came about as a result of disappointing capital market performance 
over the last 20 years. Whether actual rates of return meet or exceed the 7–8 percent 
discount rates used in actuarial valuations of pension debt will determine much of what 
happens at the SLG level over the next few decades.465 If the return on investment (ROI) 
                                                 
463 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 114. 
464 See Chapter III, Section C, Subsections 1–2.  
465 Munnell, Aubry, and Quinby, “Public Pension Funding in Practice,” 248. 
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in the capital markets exceeds actuarial expectations, then many of the concerns raised in 
this thesis will be moot. On the other hand, if rates of return fall in line with the 3–4 percent 
assumed by many financial economists, then the timeline to insolvency form many SLG 
pension funds will fall in the multi-decade timeframe under consideration.466 Therefore, 
market performance over the next 20–30 years should be considered as a factor—
specifically, a critical uncertainty—when constructing future scenarios. 
Market performance, however, involves more than just the ROI: market volatility 
or the possibility of significant booms or busts as the market makes its random walk into 
the future is also a consideration. Capital market volatility matters most when 
contemplating the pace of reform in jurisdictions with “unhealthy” pension funds, as 
described in Chapter III. Such funds would be less resilient in the face of investment losses; 
for them, accelerated or even drastic pension reform measures may be required to forestall 
insolvency after a market correction. Thus, volatility may make the vector of pension 
reform less uniform insofar as it may drive some jurisdictions to reform differently than 
others.  
While moderate market corrections could push unhealthy funds over the brink, 
economic shocks that lead to longer-term market declines would have more extensive 
implications. Given the poor aggregate state of pension fund finances today, a significant 
recession in the coming decade could trigger widespread pension fund failures. The 
resulting municipal, county, and (potentially) state bankruptcies could leave swaths of 
public servants and retirees dispossessed of their DB pensions.467 In turn, this could erode 
overall worker confidence in DB pension promises. Even employees in jurisdictions with 
funds resilient enough to absorb significant investment losses might sour on the whole DB 
construct.  
                                                 
466 Munnell, Aubry, and Quinby, 248. 
467 Under current law and the contracts clause of the U.S. Constitution, a state cannot declare 
bankruptcy. Facing mounting pension debt and other fiscal woes, however, some in state government are 
contemplating how legislative changes could enable states to access the bankruptcy system. Jennifer 
Burnett, “3 Questions on State Bankruptcy,” E-Newsletter, Council of State Governments, July–August 
2017, https://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/enews/issue65_3.aspx. 
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Financial realities, however, only provide the rationale, impetus, and need for 
reform. Tangible change to public pension arrangements depends on political outcomes. 
Indeed, the reform trends tracked painstakingly by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures came about through actions taken by state legislatures; they are the result of 
win–lose power plays and political compromises.468 Although political considerations had 
not been a central focus of the preceding chapters, the reform trends and financial 
assessments explored in Chapter III reveal that state and local governments have little 
appetite for proactive, far-sighted action with respect to pensions. Reform efforts to date 
have been tepid, leaving pension funding inadequate; in many jurisdictions, the failure to 
meet ARC funding targets has only increased pension debt, and the brunt of reform has 
targeted new hires while preserving the status quo for annuitants and tenured workers.469  
Why has the political process failed to produce more prudent responses to the public 
pension debt crisis? The answer to this question may lie in the (relatively) short-term nature 
of election cycles and strong political influence of constituencies interested in preserving 
the current system. At the SLG level, these constituencies include public employees 
themselves and the unions that represent many of them.470 Because the personal finances 
of annuitants, tenured workers, and union members are inexorably tied to the existing DB 
system, there is a strong incentive for public employees to fight cuts, seek enhanced 
benefits, or at least maintain the status quo.
 471 Elected officials at the SLG level thus adopt 
                                                 
468 See Chapter III, Section C, Subsection 2. Snell, Pensions and Retirement Plan Enactments in 2012 
State Legislatures; “Pension and Retirement Legislation Information by State,” National Conference of 
State Legislatures, last modified March 11, 2019, http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/pension-
legislation-database.aspx. 
469 See Chapter III, Section C, Subsections 2–3. 
470 Patrick McGuinn, Pension Politics: Public Employee Retirement System Reform in Four States 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2014), 4–6, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/06/Pension-Politics_FINAL_225.pdf; Brown, Clark, and Rauh, “The Economics of State and Local 
Pensions,” 168; Josh Barro, “Dodging the Pension Disaster,” National Affairs, Spring 2011, https://www. 
nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/dodging-the-pension-disaster.  
471 McGuinn, Pension Politics, 5–6. McGuinn explains that because union leadership positions are 
elected, short-sighted political dynamics apply in unions as well as in state and local government. Elected 
officials need to satisfy the short-term interests of those who will re-elect them, so they oppose cuts and 
support generous pension policies irrespective of underlying financial realities.  
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pension-benefit-friendly positions to curry favor with this key constituency every election 
cycle.  
However, in light of mounting fiscal challenges, should one expect these well-
established political dynamics to continue in perpetuity? As revealed in Chapter III, 
aggregate pension debt levels are profound and daunting. Even under optimistic financial 
assumptions, it is hard to envision how the system can recover, and keeping today’s 
unhealthy pension funds afloat will demand extraordinary resources over decades.472 In 
the face of such overwhelming pension bills, state and local governments will be forced to 
redirect resources away from other services. Indeed, as documented by SIEPR’s Joe 
Nation, such redirection has already taken hold in California; the result is diminished 
resources “needed for public assistance, welfare, recreation and libraries, health, public 
works, other social services, and in some cases, public safety.”473 Voters will take notice 
should stark service cuts become necessary to keep pensions afloat, and as voter awareness 
increases, it follows that the political landscape will become susceptible to change. 
Legislative reform efforts may progress in unexpected or extreme ways, making pension-
friendly legal constructs fungible.474 Thus, political dynamics and outcomes vis-à-vis 
pension policies represent a critical uncertainty that the scenario planner should consider 
when contemplating future scenarios.  
The second core assumption posits that pension reform will lead to dispersed pay 
structures within HSE organizations. Recall from Chapter IV that public-sector workers 
will be increasingly mobile ex post to pension reform. Facing a mobile labor pool, it seems 
a given that public-sector employers will be forced to compete with themselves and the 
private sector for seasoned human capital through enhanced wages (i.e., non-deferred 
                                                 
472 See Chapter III, Section C, Subsection 3. 
473 Joe Nation, “Pension Math: Public Pension Spending and Service Crowd Out in California, 2003-
2030,” Working Paper No. 17-023 (Stanford: Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 2017), iii, 
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/17-023.pdf. 
474 It will be especially interesting to see how political dynamics and legal decisions play out in the 
seven states that (to date) have pension protections written into their constitutions. Liz Farmer, “How Are 
Pensions Protected State-by-State?” Governing Magazine, January 28, 2014, http://www.governing.com/ 
finance101/gov-pension-protections-state-by-state.html. 
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compensation).475 In the process of bidding for more educated, experienced, or proven 
workers through wages, disperse pay structures should result.476 Is it reasonable to assume 
that all employers can and will use wage enhancements to compete for human capital in a 
similar manner? That is, will all players compete with the same level of aggressiveness 
using comparable wage rates and pursuing similar priorities?  
As with the questions surrounding the first core assumption, financial and political 
considerations underlie the answers to such questions about the second. A given 
jurisdiction’s ability to compete by means of enhanced wages depends on its fiscal 
resources, so wealthy jurisdictions with robust tax bases have an advantage in wage-based 
competition for labor.477 Political will, however, may be more significant than fiscal 
wherewithal in determining the aggressiveness with which a given jurisdiction engages in 
wage-based competition. After all, as pension reform moves a jurisdiction away from DB 
compensation for its employees, it will be deprived of the “back door borrowing vehicle” 
Josh Barro describes, so bidding for labor through wages will necessarily involve the kind 
of hard, political tradeoffs required in raising and expending cash from public coffers.478 
Such tradeoffs are the purview of elected officials, and it is hardly a given that all 
jurisdictions will pursue human capital for their homeland security organizations with the 
same priority. Political considerations here, however, go beyond setting priorities in 
government spending; another wrinkle to consider involves the amount of authority granted 
future HSE hiring managers in targeting individual workers. While the flexibility to 
negotiate salary or offer bonuses may be commonplace in the private sector, allowing 
public-sector hiring managers to tailor compensation packages in this manner would only 
come through legislation or policy changes. Simply put, only through political action can 
                                                 
475 See Chapter IV, Section B. Llorens, “Compensation Reform and Threats to Human Capital 
Capacity in the Public Sector,” 33. 
476 See Chapter IV, Section B. 
477 See Chapter IV, Section B. Recall that reforming jurisdictions face a fiscal catch-22 here; the very 
same fiscal imperatives that may drive them to reduce pension benefits also impact their ability to compete 
with higher wages.  
478 Barro, “How Congress Can Help State Pension Reform,” 99. 
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hiring managers have the discretion to negotiate. Overall, therefore, the form wage-based 
competition takes and the outcomes it produces will depend on different players’ political 
will and budgetary wherewithal. Because such will and wherewithal involve both political 
and fiscal dimensions, it will hereinafter be referred to as the political finance of wage 
rivalry, and scenario planners should consider it as a critical uncertainty when 
contemplating future worlds ex post to pension reform.  
A more elemental set of questions surrounding the second core assumption and, 
indeed, about post-reform wage-based competition generally may be found in the 
sociological realm. Chapter V explored the idea that the motivational composition of 
people entering public service sets them apart and that future generational cohorts may be 
more or less swayed by financial incentives or extrinsic rewards.479 If, as the result of 
sociological trends, the labor pool is more inclined to enter public service due to high levels 
of intrinsic motivation, PSM, or generational preferences, then wage-based competition for 
public servants may be less effective.480 This would mitigate the need to enhance wages, 
and the degree of pay dispersion would diminish ex post to pension reform. However, as 
Chapter V pointed out, concepts such as Manheim’s theory of generations do not provide 
compelling insights into the future workforce’s motivational composition, job-related 
attitudes, or other traits.481 That does not mean that sociological influences should be 
disregarded. Unanticipated societal traits and attitudes may emerge that undermine or 
bolster the degree to which financial incentives drive the actions of public servants.482 If 
future workers are markedly more or less sensitive to wages—i.e., extrinsic incentives—
or develop new and different job-related preferences, then such influences may heavily 
influence outcomes in a future world after the implementation of pension reform. Thus, 
sociological influences are a critical uncertainty for scenario planners to consider.  
                                                 
479 See Chapter V, Section A, Subsections 1–2. 
480 See Chapter V, Section A, Subsections 1–2. 
481 See Chapter V, Section A, Subsection 2.  
482 See Chapter V, Section C. 
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Finally, regarding the third core assumption—that human capital and 
organizational cultures remain key determiners of organizational effectiveness in the future 
HSE—critical uncertainties from the technological domain may influence future outcomes. 
Chapters IV provided support to the link between human capital and organizational 
effectiveness, and Chapter V explored the link between collaborative culture and 
organizational outcomes in the homeland security domain.483 However, these linkages 
may change if technological advances render the HSE less reliant on collaboration or the 
existence of standing, geographically dispersed police, fire, and emergency management 
resources. Already, police departments facing staffing challenges point to the power of 
“predictive policing” as a force multiplier for thinning staff.484 Artificial intelligence, 
sensing capabilities, and other yet-unimagined technologies may evolve to the point where 
accurate forecasting becomes possible in the homeland security domain. Such advances 
could enable the proactive application of police, fire, and emergency service capabilities, 
which will effectively reduce the need for overall HSE staffing. Future technology could 
also enable officials to maneuver reduced HSE capabilities to where they are needed on a 
just-in-time basis.  
There are a number of caveats here, however. Technologies that diminish the 
number of workers needed may require the workers who remain to be of a higher caliber 
or to undergo extensive training. In other words, the headcount may diminish, but the 
requisite human capital imbued in each contributor/employee may increase. Further, the 
types of information sharing (social capital) and organizational culture required to be 
effective in an organization with a public safety, disaster management, or public security 
mission may change in unexpected ways with technological advancements. Should jobs in 
these organizations become more about leveraging technology than about line-worker 
judgment, commander intuition, and teamwork, then a different kind of organizational 
culture may become desirable. Regardless, if jurisdictions need fewer employees, then the 
                                                 
483 See Chapter IV, Section A, Subsection 2; Chapter V, Section B, Subsection 2. 
484 Martin Kaste and Lori Mack, “Shortage of Officers Fuels Police Recruiting Crisis,” NPR, 
December 11, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/12/11/675505052/shortage-of-officers-fuels-police-
recruiting-crisis.  
142 
burden of funding pension annuities or competing through enhanced salaries will diminish. 
The impact of technology could be significant enough to render the problem considered in 
this thesis moot. Thus, even though it may seem exogenous to the topic of public pensions, 
the technological domain presents a critical uncertainty for scenario planners to consider 
when projecting pension reform’s impact on the homeland security enterprise.  
Schwartz delineates critical uncertainties (somewhat opaquely) as “the dwelling 
places of our hopes and fears.”485 Table 3 summarizes the critical uncertainties used in this 
exercise. 
Table 3. Critical Uncertainties 
Factor Chapter Influence on Future Outcomes 
Market Performance: Capital 
market investment performance and 
volatility over the next two to three 
decades. 
III 
Will drive the type and degree 
of pension reform necessary to 
prevent pension fund 
insolvency.  
Pension Politics: Legislative and 
macro-level policy outcomes that 
dictate public pension structures.  
III 
Will define the options available 
to jurisdictions seeking to 
reform their pension systems. 
Political Finance of Wage Rivalry: 
Micro-level political vectors and 
fiscal limitations related to 
compensation for public employees.  
IV486 
Will determine how individual 
jurisdictions engage in wage-
based competition for human 
capital. 
Sociological Influences: Social 
trends influencing the choices, 
attitudes, and motivational 
composition of the workforce.  
V 
May mitigate the effectiveness 
of enhanced wages or otherwise 
short-circuit the predetermined 
elements.  
Technological Evolution: The 
potential for technological 
innovations to supplant human 
capital in homeland security 
organizations.  
IV and V487 
Could influence the degree to 
which human capital and 
organizational culture matter in 
determining organizational 
effectiveness.  
                                                 
485 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 120. 
486 Political considerations are mostly exogenous to this thesis, but Chapter IV provides background 
on the dynamics of wage rivalry and fiscal constraints. 
487 Technological evolution is mostly exogenous to this thesis, but Chapters IV and V provide 
background on how human capital and organizational culture influence HSE effectiveness. 
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C. FACTOR WEIGHTING AND A REFRAIN FOR THREE SCENARIOS 
The process for developing scenarios begins with varying the impact, salience, or 
characteristics of the identified factors. In a sense, the factors are akin to the dials of an 
equalizer in a recording studio; change the levels of treble and bass or change the 
synthesized filters, and the music sounds remarkably different. The filtering and weighting 
of different factors—i.e., turning the dials—in the following exercise is based on the 
author’s judgment, which has been informed by his professional experience and his 
developed familiarity with the literature supporting the preceding chapters. Others who 
may use this thesis as a launching point might highlight factors explored in the preceding 
chapters but not emphasized in the scenarios presented. The reliance on one individual’s 
experience and judgment (informed or not) reveals a methodological shortcoming in this 
scenario exercise. That shortcoming, however, does not detract from the provocative 
purpose of this exercise, and it provides a course for the ultimate recommendations of this 
thesis.  
Author Steven Johnson claims that “a common refrain in scenario planning” 
involves the building of three different models.488 Scenario planners following Johnson’s 
structure force themselves to tell three stories: “one in which things get better, one in which 
things get worse and one in which they get weird.”489 This three-part refrain guides the 
scenario-planning exercise presented in Chapters VII, VIII, and IX. Each chapter offers a 
possible vision related to the central research question: What impact will pension reform 
have on public-sector organizations with homeland security missions? Through the lens of 
this question, the “things getting better” scenario relates to the effectiveness of the 
homeland security enterprise; better outcomes equate with a more potent HSE than might 
be envisioned in alternate scenarios ex post to pension reform. In light of Chapter III’s 
conclusion that the challenge of pension reform lies primarily at the state and local level, 
                                                 
488 Steven Johnson, Farsighted: How We Make the Decisions That Matter the Most (New York: 
Riverhead Books, 2018), 113. 
489 “Steven Johnson Farsighted,” Steven Johnson, Book TV, aired September 15, 2018 on CSPAN, 
https://archive.org/details/CSPAN2_20180916_005000_Steven_Johnson_Farsighted. 
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the factors considered and narratives presented are biased toward projecting the impact 
pension reform may have on state and local homeland security organizations.  
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VII. SCENARIO 1: CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE AND CENTERS 
OF DISARRAY  
In constructing this scenario, the author envisioned what would happen if the 
identified factors play out in a banal manner. That is, there are no significant disruptions in 
the capital markets, investment returns meet the conservative expectations of financial 
economists, and there are no unexpected twists in the predetermined elements or other 
factors.490 As a consequence of these eventualities—summarized in Table 4—how might 
the homeland security enterprise look in 20–30 years?  
Table 4. Factor Summary: Centers of Excellence and Centers of Disarray 
Factor Salience  Notes  
Predetermined Elements   
Turnover Effects Significant 
Negative implications for organizations that 
move away from DB pension constructs. 
Human Capital Effects Significant 
Negative implications for organizations that 




DB pensions remain in place for some 
jurisdictions, so not all players need to key on 
wages to compete for human capital.  
Motivation Crowding Moderate 
Negative implications for organizations offering 





Negative implications for organizations offering 





Though not widespread, incidence of 
malfeasance for law enforcement increases, 
which has a significant impact on those 
organizations affected.  
  
                                                 
490 Scenario practitioners Shearer et al., would call this the “‘surprise free’ alternative future” where 
“there are no significant changes in the social, political, economic, technical, or environmental aspects of 
the world.” Allen W. Shearer et al., Land Use Scenarios: Environmental Consequences of Development 
(Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009), 4. 
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Factor Salience  Notes  
Critical Uncertainties 
Market Performance Significant 
ROI aligns with financial economists’ 
expectations, and capital markets remain stable 
with no significant economic disruptions. This 
leads to unsurprising rates of insolvency among 
public pension funds.  
Pension Politics Moderate 
Legislation and policy moves execute pension 
reform along its current, incremental trajectory. 
Pension generosity diminishes, but most 
reforms apply exclusively to new employees.  
Political Finance of 
Wage Rivalry 
Moderate 
For players that find the political will to 
compete aggressively through wages, policies 
and rules change to give hiring managers more 
discretion over compensation packages. 
Sociological Influences Low 
There are no sociological trends that impact the 
overall outcome. Though public servants still 
have relatively high PSM/intrinsic motivation, 




No technological changes impact the role of 
human capital in the homeland security 
enterprise.  
 
A. THINGS GET WORSE 
The year is 2045. At the SLG level across the nation, there is a marked disparity in 
the effectiveness of organizations in the homeland security domain. While some 
communities enjoy the benefits of stable, professional, and effective organizations with 
public safety, disaster management, and public security missions, the story in other 
communities is quite different. The key variable correlating with whether an organization 
seems effective or challenged is the organization’s compensation structure. Generally 
speaking, organizations are solid wherever a healthy DB pension structure exists; employee 
morale and the professional ethos within these organizations are robust, the internal sharing 
of information is functional, institutional memory seems strong, and these organizations 
prove resilient when challenges arise. By contrast, in jurisdictions where pension reform 
led to the abandonment of the DB pension construct—“non-DB” jurisdictions—homeland 
security organizations are less functional and less effective; they suffer from low morale, 
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poor leadership, and low levels of experience in aggregate.491 If such problems were 
isolated cases, then the state affairs might not seem so bad. However, by 2045, about half 
the nation’s SLG jurisdictions have witnessed a decline in the potency of their public safety 
and security systems.492  
For a number of public employees who retired over the preceding decades, the 
financial road has been a rocky one; they watched as pension funds backing their promised 
annuities became insolvent. In the worst cases, retirees and long-tenured employees were 
left high and dry as bankruptcy judgments dispossessed them of the pension annuities they 
had earned over the course of their careers. The experience of this group of public servants 
left a lasting impression. Nowhere has this impression been more influential than among 
the children of workers in the HSE. Public service remains something that runs in families 
in 2045, and transgenerational firefighters and law enforcement officers continue to rank 
among the most dedicated and capable. However, the mentorship these young professionals 
receive comes with strong advice to choose their employer wisely. One can imagine family 
conversations playing out this way:  
So, you want to be a cop like me? That’s great! Just don’t be like your uncle 
and give your heart and soul to the wrong department because someday 
you’ll want to retire with a pension like mine. Cut your teeth with whomever 
hires you in the beginning, but after you have some experience, you need to 
understand that you’re in the driver’s seat. At that point, choose the place 
you want to spend the rest of your career—a place with a pension—but pay 
close attention to the resources behind whatever they are promising you. If 
there’s not real money in their retirement fund, it’s an empty promise, and 
you’ll see the pension you think you’ve earned pulled out from under you, 
like what happened to your uncle.  
Such mentorship gives the progeny of HSE professionals an advantage, but other high-
quality first responders manage their careers in a similar manner.493 Thus, among young 
professionals in the HSE, there is a sorting effect underway in 2045; the highest quality 
                                                 
491 The factors are turnover and human capital effects. 
492 The factors are market performance and pension politics.  
493 The factor is human capital effects.  
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employees are migrating to those jurisdictions with DB pension plans on firm financial 
footing. Meanwhile, less-fortunate jurisdictions offering little or financially dubious DB 
retirements have become mere training grounds for the talented and repositories for the 
second-rate.  
The least-fortunate non-DB jurisdictions never competed well in the labor market. 
Due to a lack of financial wherewithal or political will, their wage rates remained constant 
after abandoning their DB pensions, and their organizations continue to suffer in 2045 as a 
result; the labor force they attract is mobile, so they continually hemorrhage capable and 
promising employees for more lucrative opportunities.494 The salary disparities between 
jurisdictions are stark, but the decision-making of public servants in these jurisdictions is 
not driven purely by financial considerations. High vacancy rates lead managers to make 
up the difference through forced overtime. As a result, the workload and operations tempo 
for employees in these jurisdictions are higher than elsewhere. Additionally, in dire need 
of experienced, mid-career officials, these jurisdictions attempt lateral recruitment, but that 
does not go well. Because their wage rates are not particularly attractive, they can only 
succeed by accepting candidates with shoddy records.495 Even worse, rates of fraud, abuse, 
and outright corruption within police departments in these jurisdictions have increased; 
investigating such malfeasance distracts leaders, drains precious resources, and hurts the 
credibility of law enforcement in immeasurable ways.496 Generally, these jurisdictions 
face extraordinary human capital challenges. Their HSE organizations have become less 
professional and less effective compared to peer organizations or their own past pre-reform 
performance.  
Other jurisdictions that abandoned the DB compensation construct but have more 
robust financial reservoirs are faring better in 2045. These non-DB jurisdictions compete 
aggressively in the market for public safety, security, and emergency management 
                                                 
494 The factors are wage-based competition and political finance of wage rivalry. 
495 The factor is wage-based competition. 
496 The factor is corruption deterrence effects. 
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professionals with higher, competitive wage rates.497 They do not face the same human 
capital challenges as their less-endowed cousins because they are successful in hiring 
employees away from others.498 Poaching talent in this way, however, ratchets up 
competitive wage rates for proven, experienced professionals. This causes the pay structure 
to become increasingly dispersed—mid- and upper-level employees command salaries that 
are remarkably higher than junior employees.499 As a consequence, organizational cultures 
within these jurisdictions shift in dysfunctional ways; the shift is insidious, but over time 
the work environment becomes less harmonious and collaborative, and the labor force 
becomes less motivated and more mercenary in their orientation.500 Given the 
collaborative nature of work in the realms of public safety, disaster management, and 
public security, the effectiveness of wage-competitive organizations operating in these 
domains suffers.501  
Perhaps the most intriguing way in which organizational culture and employee 
behavior have changed in non-DB jurisdictions is at the middle-management levels and 
above. Ambitious careerists working in these jurisdictions jump around as a means of 
climbing the ladder to senior leadership; they work in one organization only long enough 
to develop a track record and reputation, and then they jump to more senior positions 
elsewhere. These opportunists have come to be known as “butterflies” for their propensity 
to flit about from one place to the next. They are often talented and highly educated, and 
they demand high salaries, but their sense of institutional history, their knowledge about 
the served community, and the credibility they garner from subordinates are limited.502 
Nevertheless, genuinely successful butterflies learn key skills with each career move. Not 
                                                 
497 The factor is political finance of wage rivalry. 
498 The factor is wage-based competition. 
499 The factors are wage-based competition and political finance of wage rivalry. 
500 The factors are motivation crowding and intraorganizational pay structure effects. 
501 See Chapter V, Section B, Subsection 2. 
502 See Chapter IV, Section B, Subsection 2. See also the discussion on “social capital” in Chapter VI, 
Section A, Subsection 2. 
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all are so capable, though, and many stagnate in their assent. These butterflies rise until 
they reach their level of incompetence à la the Peter Principle; with such stagnation, they 
wind up stuck with an employer, and that employer is stuck with having to deal with a 
marginal but critically placed manager.  
Among the most effective leaders across the HSE, however, butterflies are the 
exception; the best HSE leaders find their way to those jurisdictions still offering stable, 
secure DB pension plans early in their careers.503 The lure of pension-providing employers 
goes beyond mere pecuniary interest. HSE organizations that offer DB pensions in 2045 
enjoy more unit cohesion than their non-DB peers, and they tend to be led by competent, 
stable leadership teams with deep-seated community ties.504 As a result, these 
organizations have a way of luring leaders with a long-term orientation who are dedicated 
to their employers and the communities they serve.505 Such organizations continually 
prove themselves capable and effective, but they represent less than a third of the nation’s 
SLG homeland security enterprise.  
B. EPILOGUE 
In this “things get worse” scenario, it is the lack of uniformity in the vector of SLG 
pension reform that drives the ultimate end state. In this future world, haves and have-nots 
develop within the HSE. Through the mechanics of a brain drain, human capital 
concentrates in those jurisdictions fortunate enough to still be offering employees DB 
pensions in 2045. The HSE trifurcates into first-, second-, and third-tier employers with a 
commensurate pecking order in terms of mission effectiveness. The advantages of the first 
tier go beyond the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the employees; first-tier organizations 
also enjoy more functional organizational cultures than their second- and third-tier 
counterparts.  
                                                 
503 The factor is human capital effects. 
504 The factor is intraorganizational pay structure effects. 
505 The factor is turnover effects. 
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Under this scenario, a significant proportion of HSE organizations winds up in the 
second or third tier. This division is concerning because it comes about under reasonable 
assumptions about capital market performance and a presumption that pension reform 
continues along its current trajectory. If scenario planning were about making predictions, 
then this scenario could be assessed as the most likely outcome. The fact that such a high 
proportion of the HSE suffers a loss of effectiveness under such reasonable or banal 
assumptions does not bode well for the state of homeland security in 2045. 
The key to preventing this kind of outcome lies in altering the vector of pension 
funding in those jurisdictions that are financially unhealthy. Prudent funding-focused 
reforms that prevent these jurisdictions from shirking their pension payments could break 
the chain of events that lead to this scenario’s end state. At least such reforms could if they 
were initiated today. Unfortunately, given the short-term bias at the SLG level and within 
labor unions, it seems naïve to suggest that key leaders just need to be proactive.506 That 
is why federal intervention here makes sense. Along these lines, Josh Barro makes a 
compelling appeal for federal legislation that would do for the public sector what the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and, later, modifying laws did for the 
private sector.507 As Barro explains,  
These federal laws are much stricter than the standards the GASB now 
recommends for state and local governments. The discount rates that must 
be used to adjust future liabilities are lower, meaning that the estimates of 
present value of liabilities are higher. And unfunded liabilities must be 
amortized over seven years, not 30. Unlike the GASB’s recommendations, 
moreover, the federal requirements for private companies are binding. As a 
result, while private and public pensions currently report about the same 
funding ratios, the private plans are actually significantly better funded 
(because the estimates of liabilities they use to arrive at the ratios are 
higher), and they will close their funding gaps more quickly.508 
  
                                                 
506 See Chapter VI, Section B.  
507 Josh Barro, “How Congress Can Help State Pension Reform,” 101. 
508 Josh Barro, “How Congress Can Help State Pension Reform,” 101. 
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In short, such legislation applied to the public sector would make it difficult for many 
jurisdictions to remain in their pension-debt hole without taking appropriate action.509 It 
will force their hand to enact real reforms that could rescue their DB constructs from 
impending insolvency.   
                                                 
509 The private sector may also provide an historical example of what could happen to public-sector 
DB pensions subsequent to an ERISA-style federal action. For a discussion of this historical example, see 
Baily and Kirkegaard, U.S. Pension Reform: Lessons from Other Countries, 381–404.  
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VIII. SCENARIO 2: A PENSION REVOLUTION UNSHACKLES 
THE LABOR MARKET  
For this scenario, there are no surprises among the factors within the predetermined 
element category and no significant technological developments. The most significant 
factor lies in the financial realm, and financial developments lead to significant political 
and some sociological realignments. As a consequence of these eventualities—summarized 
in Table 5—how might the homeland security enterprise look in 20–30 years?  
Table 5. Factor Summary: A Pension Revolution Unshackles the Labor 
Market 
Factor Salience  Notes  
Predetermined Elements 
Turnover Effects Significant 
The negative effects of increased turnover at the 
organizational-level are present, but they are 
outweighed by the positive market-level effects 
of worker mobility across the entire HSE.  
Human Capital Effects Negligible 
Present but transitory as the scenario develops. 
At the scenario’s end state—the year 2045—
there are no DB pensions, so no player has the 
sorting advantages associated with them.  
Motivation Crowding Moderate 
Negative implications for those organizations 





Wages become the dominant method through 




Negative implications for those organizations 
that have dispersed their pay structures 
markedly to attract and retain key employees 
and managers.  
Corruption Deterrence 
Effects 
Low Present but not central to the overall outcome.  
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A market crash/recession abruptly drives a third 
of the nation’s SLG pension funds to 
insolvency.  
Pension Politics Significant 
Political currents and action play out in a 
uniform way across the nation. Formerly 
powerful constituencies that favor the 
preservation of DB constructs lose their 
political clout.  
Political Finance of 
Wage Rivalry 
Moderate 
Jurisdictions with the political will and financial 
resources win in the market for human capital. 
Paradoxically, the positive effects of winning 
are mitigated by other factors.  
Sociological Influences Significant 
Historic events shape the attitudes of a 
generation of workers. Specifically, they 
become biased against DB pensions, and this 
shift in work-related preferences helps bring 




No technological changes impact the role of 
human capital in the HSE.  
 
A. THINGS GET BETTER 
The year is 2045. Following a period of extraordinary tumult and bitter political 
battles over the funding of public pensions, an era of calm and stability has come about. 
Through most of the 2020s, the business cycle did not produce any particularly harmful 
recessions or booms worthy of mention. Capital market returns kept pace with inflation, 
and the overall level of public pension debt did not change much from that in 2017.510 
Then, in 2029, a series of unfortunate events led to a market crash. Major capital market 
indices experienced declines of 20 percent or more.511 A bitter three-year recession 
followed during which market values stayed in the doldrums, GDP remained flat, and 
                                                 
510 Aggregate U.S. rates for 2017 were just 44.6 percent funded on a market basis or 73.1 percent 
funded on an actuarial basis. Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, “U.S. Pension Tracker.” 
511 The factor is market performance. 
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unemployment rates hovered in the 7–9 percent range. In short order, the market crash of 
2029 led to the insolvency of prominent state-level DB pension funds.  
The ramifications of such insolvencies were succinctly delineated by Certified 
Financial Analyst and political consultant Girard Miller 20 years earlier. In the midst of 
the Great Recession, Miller warned a California government commission about the perils 
of failing to enact bold pension reforms:  
Without significant structural reforms to the defined benefit system, . . . it 
will inevitably collapse under its own weight, and the disparity between 
public pensioners and the taxpayers who support them will worsen to the 
point that a severe backlash could ensue. California must provide a legal 
framework to enable dysfunctional and unsustainable benefits plans to be 
modified, frozen or converted to a viable structural form that enables the 
employer to resolve a financial crisis without resorting to bankruptcy or 
defaults on other obligations. Otherwise bond ratings throughout the state 
will suffer, and financing costs for vital facilities will rise even higher, if 
California’s legislature allows one or more public employers to drag down 
the entire state because of mismanaged retirement plans.512 [emphasis 
added] 
Miller’s warning proved prophetic for California and other states following the market 
crash of 2029. The first states to experience these political reverberations were the 11 with 
extraordinarily high levels of debt per household: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Hawaii, 
Ohio, New Jersey, Nevada, New Mexico, Washington, Massachusetts, and Kentucky.513 
These states had to cut government services back significantly to honor DB pension annuity 
payments, and the public took notice.514 Public employee unions enjoyed significant 
                                                 
512 “Executive Summary: Little Hoover Commission Testimony of Girard Miller,” Little Hoover 
Commission, accessed October 6, 2019, https://lhc.ca.gov/sites/lhc.ca.gov/files/Reports/204/ 
WrittenTestimony/MillerApr2010.pdf. 
513 Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, “U.S. Pension Tracker.” These states were 
selected from SIEPR’s list of states with the highest pension debt per household from 2017 data. The states 
selected were those with >$50,000 pension debt per household (on a market basis). Note that for 2017, the 
U.S. average pension debt per household was $32,574. Alaska was excluded given that it has already 
abandoned DB pensions. 
514 The cutbacks in this scenario are stark and rapid. In present-day California, however, such 
cutbacks are already manifest, albeit in a more insidious way. For a discussion, see Joe Nation’s assessment 
of the degree to which California pensions are, in his words, “crowding out” government services. Nation, 
“Pension Math: Public Pension Spending and Service Crowd Out in California,” iii. 
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influence in state politics up to that point, but their predominance was overwhelmed by a 
recession-stressed body politic that quickly energized against pension-friendly agendas. 
Facing an intractable financial predicament and strong pressure from voters, legislatures in 
these states moved in short order to dismantle their DB pension regimes to restore other 
services.515 Pension funds were liquidated with the proceeds (meager or not) distributed 
among vested employees and annuitants. Within just a few months of the recession’s onset, 
other states with high levels of pension debt per household, including Idaho, Mississippi, 
Michigan, Maryland, Wyoming, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Colorado, followed suit.516 
In rapid succession, a third of the nation’s state-level DB pension systems evaporated in 
the wake of 2029’s market crash. 517   
At the local level, rapid change came through the court system, as numerous 
municipalities filed for bankruptcy in 2029. These filings effectively ended the DB regimes 
in affected jurisdictions as retirees and vested employees became claimants in federal 
bankruptcy court. Given the harsh financial conditions, public employees and the unions 
that represented them proved unable to preserve traditional pension arrangements. As 
municipalities emerged from bankruptcy protection, they resolutely left their DB pensions 
behind in light of the growing political consensus hostile to traditional public pension 
arrangements.518  
The specter of so many public employees dispossessed of their pension wealth had 
chilling effects after 2029. The failure of SLG pension was so abrupt and widespread that 
it affected the attitudes and beliefs of all public servants, even those from jurisdictions with 
                                                 
515 The factor is pension politics. 
516 Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, “U.S. Pension Tracker.” Again, states were 
selected based on SIEPR’s data from 2017 on pension debt per household. The states selected were those 
not listed earlier with >$39,000 pension debt per household (on a market basis). 
517 Note that the constitutions for Hawaii and Illinois protect pensions, so any change in this arena 
will require amending those state constitutions. The conditions in this scenario are stark enough that such 
constitutional flexibility seems possible. Liz Farmer, “How Are Pensions Protected State-by-State?”  
518 The factor is pension politics. 
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pension funds resilient enough to weather the recession.519 In effect, an entire generation 
of SLG workers came to doubt any promise of DB pensions. Yearning to control their own 
retirement finances, SLG workers across the nation pressed for ways to cash out their 
vested benefits. New recruits insisted on the ability to opt out of whatever DB 
compensation arrangements remained. Employers who succeeded in preserving traditional 
DB pension structures lost out in the competition for labor; the advantage in recruiting 
went to organizations where salaries were unencumbered by the compulsory tithing that 
comes with traditional DB schemes.520 Ultimately, the market crash of 2029 led to a 
paradigm shift in the minds of the public and those considering work in the public safety, 
disaster management, or public security domains. From 2029 onward, the zeitgeist for these 
workers involved a compelling distrust of DB pension promises.521  
Facing myriad financial, political, and sociological pressures, DB pension 
constructs did not last for long anywhere after 2029. Many plans liquidated under sudden 
acute financial pressure while others terminated in a more orderly fashion. Public 
administration scholars tracking the trajectory of pension reform came to refer to this 
abandonment of DB compensation schemes throughout the nation as a pension 
revolution.522 The revolution subjected many public servants and retirees to significant 
financial losses. This unfortunate reality hurt the morale of employees, which had negative 
implications for the organizations employing them, but these problems proved transitory. 
During the recession, the HSE lost some high-quality employees to outside opportunities, 
but such opportunities were scarce as the broader economy struggled. Then, as general 
economic conditions improved, organizations throughout the HSE found themselves 
competing for employees through wages more than ever before.523  
                                                 
519 The factor is sociological influences. 
520 The factor is wage-based competition. 
521 The factor is sociological influences. 
522 See Chapter III, Section C, Subsection 2. For a historical perspective, see Chapter III’s discussion 
of past eras in the evolution of SLG-level public-sector retirement systems.  
523 The factor is wage-based competition. 
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After the pension revolution, employers found themselves on an equal footing in 
that no state or municipality enjoyed the sorting and retention advantages that flowed from 
DB pensions.524 On the other side of the equation, HSE workers found themselves 
unshackled; gone were the golden handcuffs that had hindered their movement from one 
employer to the next, and they could move between the public and private sector without 
the penalty of losing future DB compensation. This common ruleset for employers and 
increased worker mobility moved the labor market closer to a perfectly competitive 
ideal.525 From this, the HSE benefited over time.  
One benefit of this post-revolutionary order came from increased efficiency in the 
allocation of human capital across the HSE. Organizations in need of a technical specialty 
or a particular skill set could more readily draw from other employers that might have a 
glut of people with those capabilities. Potential leaders stymied by the presence of an able 
management team above them could move without penalties to organizations in need of 
their talents. Another benefit of this post-revolutionary order emerged from the positive 
implications of turnover. Lateral hiring increased, which helped disseminate best practices 
across the HSE. The number of workers jumping between the HSE and private-sector 
opportunities also increased; employees with these bi-sector career paths brought unique 
perspectives and skills, enabling organizations to innovate and address previously 
intractable problems.526 Overall, the HSE evolved to become more meritocratic with 
leaders and workers sorted by ability over longevity. By 2045, the HSE has become more 
efficient, effective, and nimble than before the pension revolution.  
Of course, not all the developments stemming from the pension revolution were 
positive for the HSE. In the early 2030s, there was a spike in police corruption cases as 
some pension-dispossessed officers abused their positions to recoup lost wealth.527 This 
spike subsided by the end of the 2030s, but academic studies revealed an increase in 
                                                 
524 The factors are turnover and human capital effects.  
525 See Chapter IV, Section B, Introduction. 
526 See Chapter IV, Section A, Subsection 1.  
527 The factor is corruption deterrence effects. 
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malfeasance vis-à-vis the beginning of the 21st century. Another seemingly negative trend 
involved a shift in the ethos of what it meant to be a first responder. Although difficult to 
quantify, a common observation was that the police and firefighters of 2045 were less 
personally invested in their organizations and the communities they served.528 Upon seeing 
this shift, older retirees who maintained close ties with their former employers became 
vocal critics. From their perspective, HSE work was becoming like any other job—more 
of a gig or career to manage than a profession or higher calling—and these retirees 
lamented the decline in unit cohesion that this change brought about.529 
Interestingly, this ethos shift seemed most pronounced in wealthy jurisdictions with 
robust tax bases and a willingness to pay handsome salaries for talent and experience. As 
noted, the demise of DB pensions has given jurisdictions in 2045 a common ruleset in the 
competition for labor, but the playing field is hardly level—wealthy jurisdictions have the 
means to outbid others.530 Wherever they do, though, their workforce seems less dedicated 
and more risk-averse. The higher the salaries, the worse this dynamic, and this has a 
particularly chilling effect on the effectiveness of front-line first responders.531 The 
experience of poor jurisdictions offering relatively low pay is quite different. Though they 
faced thinning staffing levels and recruiting challenges coming out of the pension 
revolution, their employees seem the most dedicated, and their organizations seem to enjoy 
intense esprit de corps.532 By 2045, a paradox has emerged whereby lower-paying 
organizations get more for their salary expenditures. This dynamic has a positive leveling 
effect on the functionality and effectiveness of different organizations across the HSE in 
this post-revolutionary world.  
                                                 
528 The factor is motivation crowding. 
529 The factor is intraorganizational pay structure effects. 
530 The factor is political finance of wage rivalry. 
531 The factor is motivation crowding.  
532 The factors are motivation crowding and intraorganizational pay structure effects.  
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B. EPILOGUE 
Things get better in this scenario because labor market distortions imposed by DB 
pensions are removed. This, in turn, leads to more efficient or optimal outcomes for the 
HSE. The predominant driver in this future world is free-market economics, and the 
scenario draws attention to the positive aspects of labor mobility.533 Further, two non-
economic domains provide leveling effects that prevent the kind of stark HSE divisions 
found in the first scenario. First, from psychology, motivation crowding tempers the 
financial advantages enjoyed by wealthy jurisdictions.534 Second, drawing on concepts 
from sociology, the scenario offers a twist on Manheim’s theory of generations by 
suggesting that a historic event could bias a generational cohort of workers against pensions 
generally.535 This bias is key to creating the scenario’s pension revolution, which allows 
the free market to drive the HSE to a more effective end state.  
The pension revolution here involves the termination of all DB pension plans. For 
many plans, the scenario stipulates that this is done in “an orderly fashion.” Just how might 
this work, though? An orderly termination could take the form of Milton Friedman’s 
solution for terminating Social Security, whereby individuals would receive a bond equal 
to the present value of the benefits to which they are entitled.536 This is the approach 
suggested by the Independent Institute’s Lawrence J. McQuillan for terminating SLG 
public pensions:  
Applying Friedman’s solution, state and local governments across the 
country would close their defined-benefit pension plans and issue bonds to 
beneficiaries equal to the current expected value of the stream of benefits 
owed. The bonds would be due today or at retirement depending on the 
beneficiary’s stage of life. As with Social Security, this approach would 
                                                 
533 See Chapter IV, Section B, Introduction.  
534 See Chapter V, Section A, Subsection 3. Economists such as Francois and Vlassopoulos, Benabou 
and Tirole, or Anne Preston might argue that economics explains as much a psychology here.  
535 See Chapter V, Section A, Subsection 2.  
536 BasicEconomics, “Milton Friedman vs Bill Clinton,” February 10, 1999, in Uncommon 
Knowledge with Peter Robinson, produced by the Hoover Institution, YouTube video, 26:35, https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=UlNxIc9gUMc#action=share. Friedman discusses his solution for Social Security 
between timestamp 11:40 and 12:40 in this video. 
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ensure that people receive what they have been promised. It would force 
governments to acknowledge the true extent of the unfunded pension 
liabilities and establish a specific financing plan (something they refuse to 
do today). And it would permanently close these politically mismanaged 
defined-benefit plans.537 
Thus, a jurisdiction with a financially healthy plan could make its employees whole with 
the issue of such bonds followed by the complete shutdown of its DB system.538 
The end result of this scenario may be unexpected for some readers because things 
get better despite (or rather because of) poor market performance. One might alternatively 
argue that positive market performance would also make things better. After all, 
exceptionally strong investment returns that are sustained for decades could enable the 
SLG pension system in total to rebound; this would enable the public sector’s DB 
compensation structure to survive without reform. Arguably, such a scenario would yield 
positive results in terms of HSE effectiveness. Tangentially, it would also yield positive or 
at least neutral results for HSE workers spared the financial loss associated with pension 
fund insolvency. The wishful financial thinking required, however, would make such an 
alternate scenario less than instructive.  
  
                                                 
537 Lawrence J. McQuillan, “Milton Friedman’s Solution for Social Security Would Work for 
Government Pensions, Too,” Beacon (blog), October 20, 2015, https://blog.independent.org/2015/10/20/ 
milton-friedmans-solution-for-social-security-would-work-for-government-pensions-too/#disqus_thread.  
538 Further insight on how pension plans terminate can be gleaned from private-sector examples 
subsequent to passage of ERISA in 1974. For a discussion of such historical examples, see Baily and 
Kirkegaard, U.S. Pension Reform: Lessons from Other Countries, 381–404.  
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IX. SCENARIO 3: WHEN A JURISDICTION HAS TO HIRE 
A ROCK STAR  
For this scenario, there are few surprises among the predetermined elements. 
Regarding critical uncertainties, market performance is mundane—similar to the first 
scenario, there are no disruptive sociological influences, and developments in the political 
and statutory domains allow employers in the HSE a good deal of discretion over individual 
employee salaries. There is a curveball in this scenario, though, from the technological 
domain. The immediate effects of pension reform create incentives for technological 
innovations that supplant or augment HSE workers, and an unprecedented kind of “star” 
worker emerges.539 As a consequence of these eventualities (summarized in Table 6), how 
might the homeland security enterprise look in 20–30 years?  
Table 6. Factor Summary: When a Jurisdiction Has to Hire a Rock Star 
Factor Salience  Notes  
Predetermined Elements 
Turnover Effects Significant 
Negative implications for organizations that 
move away from DB pension constructs. 
Human Capital Effects Significant 
Negative implications for organizations that 
move away from DB pension constructs. 
Motivation Crowding Significant 
Negative implications for organizations that 





DB pensions remain in place for some 
jurisdictions, so not all players need to key on 




Perceptions of fairness determine whether the 
high salaries offered to star workers have 




Low Present but not central to the overall outcome.  
  
                                                 
539 The defining feature of a star worker in this scenario is that her individual capabilities and 
contributions drive organizational outcomes. Baron and Kreps, Strategic Human Resources, 26–29. 
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Factor Salience  Notes  
Critical Uncertainties 
Market Performance Significant 
ROI aligns with financial economists’ 
expectations, and capital markets remain stable 
with no significant economic disruptions. This 
leads to unsurprising rates of insolvency among 
public pension funds.  
Pension Politics Moderate 
Legislation and policy moves execute pension 
reform along its current, incremental trajectory. 
Pension generosity diminishes, but most 
reforms apply exclusively to new employees.  
Political Finance of 
Wage Rivalry 
Significant 
Non-DB jurisdictions compete aggressively to 
recruit star workers. Policies and rules change 
for all players giving hiring managers wide 
discretion over compensation packages. 
Sociological Influences Low 
No sociological trends impact the overall 
outcome. Though public servants continue to 
have relatively high PSM/intrinsic motivation, 
they are not insensitive to financial incentives.  
Technological Evolution Significant 
Technologies evolve that make it possible to 
execute SLG-level homeland security missions 
with fewer workers. Fervent demand develops 
for star employees who possess the unique 
abilities required to leverage these technologies 
effectively. 
 
A. THINGS GET WEIRD 
The year is 2045. Over the preceding decades, an inability or unwillingness at the 
SLG level to enact sufficient pension reforms, combined with temperate, 4 percent per 
annum market performance, led to many pension fund failures.540 By the early 2030s, the 
SLG pension system had suffered a partial collapse, with nearly a quarter of the nation’s 
public pension funds becoming insolvent.541 This created winners and losers among the 
different organizations in the HSE. Those jurisdictions with failed funds—the losers—had 
to abandon their DB compensation construct completely, and they lost out in the 
competition for labor to other jurisdictions able to continue offering DB pensions. The 
                                                 
540 The factors are market performance.  
541 See Chapter III, Section B, Subsection 2. 
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losers’ labor problems came in both quantitative and qualitative terms: they found 
themselves lacking in raw manpower as well as talent and experience.542 In short, the 
losers faced a vacuum of human capital, and the seminal cause of their woes was the 
collapse of their DB pension system. 
It is often said that the free market abhors a vacuum and will inevitably move to fill 
it. The human capital vacuum in this future world came to be filled by innovation as less 
fortunate jurisdictions became eager consumers of any product or service that enabled them 
to fulfill their missions with fewer people. By the late 2030s, this demand drove remarkable 
technological advancements in the realm of homeland security.543 For a creatively minded 
fan of science fiction, it would be entertaining to imagine how technology could supplant 
human labor working in fire protection, disaster management, and law enforcement.544 
Entertainment notwithstanding, what is significant in the context of this thesis is the human 
capital—advanced knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience—needed in organizations 
seeking to use this new technology.  
If the history of technological evolution is one of quantum leaps, then with each 
leap comes the need for people with unique skills to effectively leverage the technologies 
that emerge. Of course, technocrats who can debug and maintain complex systems along 
with data analysts and algorithm developers come to be invaluable, but in the HSE of this 
future world, other uniquely capable workers are more important. These people are the 
visionary few who possess the uncanny ability to apply new, constantly evolving tools in 
the execution of homeland security missions. They can adroitly manipulate the capabilities 
or information that these tools provide to direct thinly staffed HSE teams in the field to 
great effect. They are neither middle managers nor strategic decision-makers. Rather, they 
                                                 
542 The factors are turnover and human capital effects.  
543 The factor is technological evolution. 
544 Given emerging advancements in artificial intelligence and sensing technologies, the crime 
predictive work of “The Machine” from the television series Person of Interest seems plausible to this 
author while the dystopian vision of police from the 1987 movie RoboCop seems farfetched. “Person of 
Interest,” IMBd, accessed 19 May 2019, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1839578/; “RoboCop,” IMBd, 
accessed 19 May 2019, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0093870/. 
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are people with a combination of tactical-level experience and intellectual curiosity who 
serve as ring leaders or quarterbacks orchestrating operational resources day-to-day. In the 
homeland security setting of this scenario, the skilled few who fill this role are called 
intelligence application officers (IAOs). IAOs are not created overnight; they sprout after 
about 10–15 years of experience working on the line, and they often have advanced 
degrees. Their individual impact in the field is profound and readily apparent in thinly 
staffed organizations. In 2045, IAOs are in short supply, so what becomes tricky for 
employers is how to recruit, retain, and motivate such elite talent from the labor pool.  
For the non-DB losers, IAOs are a godsend critical to their emergency and law 
enforcement organizations. IAOs command a high salary, and offering whatever the market 
demands represents a value proposition for non-DB jurisdictions.545 Line employees in 
these organizations can clearly see an IAO’s impact; good IAOs coordinate their efforts 
and apply their thin numbers in such a way that diminishes ops tempo and improves their 
work lives. As a result, despite the IAOs’ elite status and salaries, the rank and file come 
to support quality IAOs as football players might rally around the star quarterback of a 
potent offense.546  
For the winners of the 2030s that still offer employees DB pensions, finding ways 
to attract and retain IAOs has proven more complicated, and different jurisdictions choose 
varied approaches in 2045. Some offer IAOs lavish salaries, which in some cases, exceed 
that of their most senior leaders.547 Others get away from lavish salaries by attempting to 
develop their IAOs organically. That is, they invest in the education of high-potential 
employees along the way, expecting those employees to grow into effective IAOs. Each of 
these approaches, however, has unintended and perplexing consequences.  
                                                 
545 The factors are wage-based competition and political finance of wage rivalry. 
546 The factor is intraorganizational pay structure effects. From the discussion of procedural justice in 
Chapter V, Section B, Subsection 1, recall that inequitable pay structures do not lead to problems if the 
pay-rate differences are perceived as legitimate.  
547 The factors are wage-based competition and political finance of wage rivalry. 
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The first approach—offering lavish salaries—works to recruit established IAOs. 
Yet, because these “winning” organizations do not face the same thin staffing as the losers, 
IAOs do not provide the same value to the organization. The rank and file in these 
organizations perceive this, and accordingly, line employees and even some leaders resent 
the wage disparity between themselves and the IAOs.548 Given the central, high-profile 
role IAOs have come to play, this has particularly deleterious effects. By 2045, many of 
the subject organizations have seen a general loss of employee loyalty and trust in 
supervision.549 Higher turnover rates have resulted, but problems in these organizations 
are not limited to manpower deficiencies; decreased collaboration and sharing of 
information have resulted as well.550 In extreme cases, organizations are seeing IAOs 
being sabotaged by young ascendant employees who see them as rivals.551  
The second approach of growing IAOs organically from within is achieving mixed 
results. Having established histories and relationships in their parent organizations, the 
IAOs that emerged were trusted by line employees and enhanced the social capital in their 
parent organizations.552 This social capital enables these IAOs to succeed where others 
struggle, and the organizations in which they work benefit as a result. Unfortunately, by 
2045, these benefits are proving short-lived because these IAOs are turning over at high 
rates after just a few years in their new roles. The reason for this is that, ironically, the pay-
out formulas and vesting provisions of their traditional pension plans provide a perverse 
incentive, which entices IAOs to move on. This perverse incentive may not seem readily 
apparent, so consider the following:  
From their prior service, these IAOs were already vested in their DB 
pensions, and after three to five years earning a higher IAO salary rate, they 
establish a higher terminal earnings basis. Thus, working as an IAO 
                                                 
548 The factor is intraorganizational pay structure effects.  
549 The factor is intraorganizational pay structure effects.  
550 The factor is intraorganizational pay structure effects. 
551 The factor is intraorganizational pay structure effects. 
552 See Chapter IV, Section A, Subsection 2.  
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effectively spikes their pension.553 At that point, the marginal return of 
staying with their original employer for an additional year—an extra 2–3 
percent added to their pension annuity—gets overwhelmed by the value of 
leaving. After all, by leaving, they can collect their pension annuity while 
simultaneously earning a full competitive salary working as an IAO for 
another jurisdiction.554  
In effect, rather than creating golden handcuffs for these organically grown IAOs, their DB 
pensions have created a golden repellent.  
Faced with losing the very IAOs they had nurtured, some employers double down 
and throw bonuses at their IAOs to retain them in house. Such measures are successful, but 
oddly, the productivity, attitudes, and on-the-job motivation of these bonus recipients tend 
to falter.555 By 2045, the organizations that attempted to grow their own IAOs find 
themselves in the same boat as everyone else trying to hire IAOs laterally in the open 
market.556 Adding insult to injury, the quick exits and pension spiking of their organically 
grown IAOs are starting to have a negative material effect on their pension fund finances.  
As noted at the outset, pension reform under the conditions of this scenario creates 
winners and losers in the early 2030s. By 2045, though, with the creation of IAOs and the 
deterministic role they play in organizational effectiveness, it is not abundantly clear who 
the winners and losers are. Organizations that preserved their DB pension structures—the 
winners—rightly want the capabilities IAOs provide, but their circumstances and pension 
structure leave them in a quandary over just how to pay these people. The losers, having 
left their DB pension constructs behind, do not face this quandary. Further, for these non-
DB jurisdictions, employing elite IAOs has such import that many will do whatever it takes 
                                                 
553 See Chapter III, Section A, Subsection 1. From Chapter III, recall that the terminal earnings used 
in most SLG pension formulas are based on the highest three years of income.  
554 In some public-sector settings, pension-vested employees face similar choices in that they can 
retire and arrange to return immediately to the same job as a contract employee. It is difficult to see, 
though, how such an arrangement would work legally for sworn officers in the homeland security domain.  
555 The factor is motivation crowding. 
556 The factor is wage-based competition. 
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to outbid all competitors when necessary.557 All in all, the HSE’s pension structure in 2045 
is making things in this world downright weird for employers.  
B. EPILOGUE 
Technological advancements may be the watershed in this scenario, but the 
complications associated with compensating highly differentiated, inimitable workers are 
what drive the HSE to a weird place. Arguably, organizations involved in homeland 
security today rely on collaborative cultures, teamwork, and no single employee or subset 
of “stars” to determine organizational outcomes.558 This notion is turned on its head in the 
third scenario; IAOs have the ability in this future world to make or break the 
organization’s effectiveness. Through the lens of pension reform and compensation, what 
makes this eventuality perplexing is the question of how employers are supposed to 
compete for and pay such stars.559 The scenario juxtaposes employers with and without 
DB pension arrangements approaching this question. As pension reform unfolds in this 
future world, employers who seemingly “won” by keeping their DB pension structures face 
some convoluted incentives in their efforts to hire and retain these rare workers.  
In terms of HSE mission effectiveness, the keys to the outcome here lie in the 
morale and collaboration-related maladies associated with dispersed pay structures and 
employee perceptions about pay-related fairness. The crowding out of intrinsic motivation 
and PSM by extrinsic rewards also influences the scenario’s end state. Labeled 
“intraorganizational pay structure effects” and “motivation crowding” in this thesis, these 
two factors represent third-order effects of pension reform. From its emphasis on these 
particular factors, this scenario highlights how pension reform can yield unintended and 
usually negative consequences.  
                                                 
557 The factor is political finance of wage rivalry. 
558 See Chapter V, Section B, Subsection 2. 
559 Baron and Kreps, Strategic Human Resources, 26–29. As mentioned in Chapter V, Section B, 
Subsection 2, Baron and Kreps explore what constitutes appropriate pay distributions for different types of 
jobs: “stars” versus “guardians” versus “foot-soldiers.”  
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How might a jurisdiction prevent or mitigate such consequences? There is a 
straightforward way to negate intraorganizational pay structure effects: keep the salaries 
paid to employees a secret. Pay secrecy makes sense because, with salaries hidden from 
view, the social comparisons and distributive or procedural justice questions from 
employees simply do not exist.560 At least, that is how it should work in theory. In practice, 
things are not so simple. As Pfeffer and, separately, Barron and Kreps observe, an 
employer’s transparency or secrecy about pay communicates company values to 
employees and signals the degree of trust employers have in their workers.561 If the 
employer is secretive, it can negatively impact employee attitudes and morale as well as 
encourage dysfunctional gossip about pay.562 Thus, there are competing arguments for pay 
secrecy versus transparency.  
Pay secrecy can also mitigate the negative effects of motivation crowding. As 
Nicola Bellé explains, prosaically motivated public employees may dodge altruistic actions 
if such actions have a self-serving aspect.563 This is because people who are genuinely 
altruistic may also be concerned about appearing to be altruistic to others. In Bellé’s words,  
Financial rewards for activities with a prosocial impact are likely to elicit 
two opposing effects on public employees’ extrinsic motivation: individuals 
are incentivized to work harder to obtain the monetary reward (price effect), 
but they may refrain from doing so because they are concerned about being 
considered greedy, which would spoil their social image (crowding-out 
effect related to external image).564 
                                                 
560 See Chapter V, Section B, Subsections 1–2. 
561 Pfeffer, “Six Dangerous Myths about Pay,” 118; Baron and Kreps, Strategic Human Resources, 
294–296. 
562 Pfeffer, “Six Dangerous Myths about Pay,” 294–296. 
563 Bellé, “Performance-Related Pay and the Crowding Out of Motivation in the Public Sector,” 232. 
564 Bellé, 232. 
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In a field experiment, Bellé tested the relative crowding effects when monetary rewards 
were hidden versus publicly known, and her findings verified that crowding effects 
diminished when rewards were secret.565  
While the relative merits of pay secrecy are fascinating, there seems little point in 
offering pay secrecy as a remedy for some of the challenges that arise in this scenario.566 
After all, while public records laws vary by state, the salaries paid to government 
employees are available to the public throughout most of the nation, and it is hard to 
imagine a set of circumstances under which the public would tolerate secrecy in this 
area.567  
  
                                                 
565 Bellé, 237–238. 
566 For a detailed exploration of the costs and benefits of pay secrecy, see Adrienne Colella et al., 
“Exposing Pay Secrecy,” Academy of Management Review 32, no. 1 (January 2007): 55–71, https://doi. 
org/10.5465/amr.2007.23463701. 
567 Kelly Hinchcliffe, “Why Employment Contracts Are So Much Fun for a Public Records Geek,” 
Poynter Institute, July 9, 2015, https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2015/why-employment-
contracts-are-so-much-fun-for-a-public-records-geek/. 
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X. CONCLUSION: A PATH TO STRATEGIC CONVERSATIONS  
This research effort set out to explore the impact pension reform may have on 
public-sector organizations with homeland security missions. Emerging from the research 
is a clear recognition that pension reform can trigger fundamental changes in employee 
behavior, organizational culture, and the market for human capital. What is not so clear is 
exactly how such changes are going to play out within the homeland security domain. This 
thesis turned to scenario-planning techniques to synthesize the research and provide 
plausible answers to the question of what pension reform’s impact will be.  
A. SCENARIO ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 
The scenario analysis in Chapters VII, VIII, and IX depicted three plausible futures, 
and the epilogues for each highlighted key findings and scenario-specific remedies. Table 
7 summarizes the weighting of different factors in the three scenarios presented.  
Table 7. Comparative Table of Scenario Drivers 
Factors Scenario 1  Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Projecting Pension Reform’s Impact 












Has to Hire a 
Rock Star 
Predetermined Elements Salience 
Turnover Effects Significant Significant Significant 
Human Capital Effects Significant Negligible Significant 
Wage-Based Competition Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Motivation Crowding Moderate Significant Significant 
Intraorganizational Pay Structure 
Effects 
Moderate Moderate Significant 
Corruption Deterrence Effects Moderate Low Low 
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Factors Scenario 1  Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Projecting Pension Reform’s Impact 












Has to Hire a 
Rock Star 
Critical Uncertainties Salience 




Pension Politics Moderate Significant Moderate 
Political Finance of Wage Rivalry Moderate Moderate Significant 
Sociological Influences Low Significant Low 
Technological Evolution Not Applicable Not Applicable Significant 
 
The three scenarios presented project the end-state effectiveness of the homeland 
security enterprise at the state and local level. From these projections, the scenarios answer 
the research question of this thesis at a macro level—that is, whether things get better, 
worse, or weird hinges on assessing the HSE in aggregate.568 Undoubtedly, at the micro 
level, atypical organizations or groups of organizations fare differently—better, worse, or 
weirdly—within each scenario. It bears mention that the outcomes at issue here have to do 
with the effectiveness of the enterprise, not necessarily the wellbeing of homeland security 
workers; in each of the scenarios presented, employees and annuitants experience 
significant financial setbacks through the loss of promised pension benefits. 
Notwithstanding the atypical cases or financially wounded workers, it is this overall 
effectiveness of the HSE that shapes homeland security conditions for the nation. Thus, 
aggregate outcomes are what matter.  
  
                                                 
568 The formal research question is as follows: What impact will pension reform have on public-sector 
organizations with homeland security missions? 
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The outcomes for each of the three scenarios presented may be summarized as 
follows:  
(1) Scenario 1 depicted a plausible future where all the factors play out in a 
banal, almost expected manner. As a result, the HSE trifurcates into first-, 
second-, and third-tier employers with a commensurate pecking order in 
terms of mission effectiveness. Things get worse under this scenario 
because a high proportion of the HSE suffers a loss of effectiveness ex post 
to pension reform.  
(2) Scenario 2 depicts a plausible future where developments in the capital 
market initiate a wholesale abandonment of the public sector’s DB pension 
regime. Things get better under this scenario because the benefits of labor 
mobility throughout the HSE are realized, and non-economic leveling 
effects prevent the kind of stark HSE divisions found in the first scenario.  
(3) Scenario 3: “When Your Jurisdiction has to Hire a Rock Star” depicts a 
plausible future where technological developments create a new class of 
worker, and the persistence of DB pension compensation in some quarters 
complicates the pursuit of human capital for employers. Things get weird 
in this scenario because DB pensions introduce perverse incentives for 
employees, and factors related to organizational behavior provide 
comparative advantages to employers with insolvent pension funds.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
If there is a central message that emerges from this thesis, it is that the current 
pension regime is financially unsustainable for many SLG jurisdictions, and there are perils 
related to homeland security for the nation whether these jurisdictions engage in effective 
pension reform or ride current practices to insolvency. The inescapable nature of these 
perils places a burden on future homeland security leaders to adapt. A central intent of 
scenario planning is to assist in the adaptive ability of key stakeholders. Scenarios can 
enable leaders to plan for undesirable outcomes and empower them to leverage desired 
effects. Thus, while the analysis presented does not provide a definitive or most-likely set 
of predictions, it does provide a useful perspective on what factors are relevant and where 
pension reform may drive the homeland security enterprise. At least it provides one man’s 
perspective, which has been informed largely by existing academic research. This begs the 
question, though, as to whether one man’s perspective is enough to make a difference?  
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In his book, The Art of the Long View, Peter Schwartz concludes that “scenario 
making is intensely participatory, or it fails.”569 Schwartz’s point lies in the notion that to 
have real value, scenarios must engage groups of people who are in a position to form a 
strategy, and the composition of the group must ensure that the scenario process integrates 
input from disparate perspectives. This does not bode well for the value of the scenarios 
presented because a thesis is an individual effort. However, if this thesis is taken as a 
launching point for a more collaborative effort by influential stakeholders, then it will have 
achieved a larger, provocative purpose.  
The ultimate recommendation here is for additional research into how different 
compensation schemes that may emerge ex post to pension reform impact organizational 
behavior and effectiveness. This recommendation parallels the sentiments of Westerman 
and Sundali and of Gupta and Shaw.570 Accordingly, further doctoral-level academic 
research from the disciplines of organizational behavior and public administration 
addressing the concerns raised in these pages would be beneficial. Given the vital need to 
succeed in the realm of homeland security, however, current and ascending homeland 
security leaders—the intended audience for this thesis—should not wait for the academic 
community to produce. This author urges leaders concerned about homeland security to 
assemble scenario-planning teams to engage on the subject of pension reform’s impact on 
the homeland security enterprise. This thesis could have notable value in support of such 
an effort from its exploration of existing academic research and synthesis of factors that 
will drive future outcomes.  
This recommendation raises the question of what may be the best or most 
appropriate forum for such a scenario-planning effort. The host entity could be an academic 
institution or think tank, or it could lie at any level of government. Indeed, any forum that 
could assemble a credible, diverse group of homeland security practitioners and subject-
matter experts could develop meaningful scenarios. One organization that could prove 
                                                 
569 Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, 234.  
570 Westerman and Sundali, “The Transformation of Employee Pensions in the United States,” 99–
103; Gupta and Shaw, “Employee Compensation: The Neglected Area of HRM Research,” 1–4.  
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particularly influential at the state level is the National Governors Association (NGA). As 
the “bipartisan organization of the nation’s governors [committed to] speak[ing] with a 
collective voice on national policy and develop[ing] innovative solutions that improve state 
government,” the NGA seems uniquely positioned to help the HSE adapt to the challenges 
of pension reform.571 The author urges the NGA, through its Homeland Security and 
Public Safety Committee, to impanel credible practitioners and experts and charge them 
with the task of replicating the scenario-planning exercise presented in this thesis. The 
resulting strategic conversations could bring about innovative policy initiatives that 
balance financial realities with homeland security imperatives. 
  
                                                 
571 “Mission Statement,” National Governors Association, Mission Statement, accessed October 15, 
2018, https://www.nga.org/cms/about. 
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APPENDIX. CASH BALANCE PLANS 
Cash balance plans represent a public-pension innovation that does not feature 
prominently in the literature on public pensions. They could be considered somewhat of a 
platypus because, though referred to as a type of DB plan, their structure imbues them with 
characteristics more akin to a DC plan. Elliott and Moore explain their features as follows: 
A cash balance plan, a type of defined benefit pension plan, promises an 
employee an employer contribution equal to a percent of each year’s 
earnings and a rate of return on that contribution. The benefit is always 
expressed as a total account balance. This is in contrast to a traditional 
defined benefit plan, which typically promises an employee a flat dollar 
amount based on years of service or an annuity. . . . Cash balance plans build 
value steadily and often at the same pace for all employees—whether 
they’ve worked for the employer for 1 or 30 years. The focus of these plans 
is on wealth building and “portability.”572 
Given this structure, cash balance plans do not have the backloading of benefits common 
in DB plans.573 This lack of backloading along with the portability that cash balance plans 
give employees means that they do not provide the kinds of retention incentives embedded 
in traditional DB plans.  
Other key differences between cash balance and traditional DB arrangements 
include payout options for employees and associated funding incentives for employers. 
Many cash balance plans give the employee the choice of drawing their pension as a single 
payment (lump sum) upon their retirement.574 For the employer, this provision alleviates 
the longevity risk they face under the traditional DB construct. More significantly, the lump 
sum provision motivates employers to manage funding levels conservatively. After all, 
workers electing to take the lump sum place an immediate cash burden on the payer even 
though the long-term valuation may be less. As Munnell, Aubry, and Cafarelli explain, 
                                                 
572 Kenneth R. Elliott and James H. Moore Jr., “Cash Balance Pension Plans: The New Wave,” 
Compensation and Working Conditions 5, no. 2 (summer 2000): 3–4, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/ 
cwc/cash-balance-pension-plans-the-new-wave.pdf.  
573 Munnell, Aubry, and Cafarelli, Defined Contribution Plans in the Public Sector, 3. 
574 Munnell, Aubry, and Cafarelli, 3. 
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cash balance plans “enhance the likelihood of [employers] making required contributions, 
thereby preventing the future buildup of large unfunded liabilities.”575 Such funding 
incentives could serve the long-term interest of the pension system’s financial health. 
Despite (or perhaps because of) these funding incentives, cash balance plans have not been 
widely adopted. Only 2 percent of SLG pension plan participants were covered under cash 
balance arrangements as of 2012, according to Munnell Aubry, and Cafarelli.576 
Overall, the incentives for employers and employees embedded in cash balance 
plans very little from DC retirement instruments. Therefore, they are considered equivalent 
to DC instruments and, thus, excluded from a more detailed discussion in this thesis.  
  
                                                 
575 Munnell, Aubry, and Cafarelli, 3. 
576 Munnell, Aubry, and Cafarelli, 6. 
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